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INTRODUCTION  
 
 7 
 
The span of time extending from the beginning of the twentieth century to 
the beginning of the twenty-first has seen the emergence and growth of 
genetics as a science. From the wish to select healthy populations, through 
the horror of the holocaust, onto the birth of molecular genetics and 
advances in medical technology, we now are at the development stage, the 
milestone, where genetics is again subtly being, or potentially being, used 
to select population health. Whilst in the beginning the idea was to 
improve a particular race, the hallmark today is to select and discard 
serious or non serious genetic and congenital disorders through counseling 
of couples heterozygous for particular diseases to actual selective discard 
of affected embryos, thereby eliminating or decreasing the incidence of 
particular genes from a population. The condoning by the World Health 
Organization of methods used in Cyprus, which is referred to throughout 
this thesis, has instigated a considerable amount of thought, especially 
with regard to whether this form of genetic testing of particular individuals 
and/or screening of populations, is or should be in effect a goal of 
medicine. Have we gone back to race hygiene? Are we discriminating 
against those less fortunate? Are we heading again towards a more subtle 
form of holocaust? It can be argued that selective discard of genetically 
unwanted embryos is worse than abortion. For besides the weight of 
killing an embryo there is the added weight of killing it for what it is; a 
 8 
statement against those genetically inferior. Even people who may be in 
favour of abortion under normal circumstances may find selective discard 
more weighty on another moral level. 
 
What therefore do we understand by Eugenics? Does selective discard 
make a statement against disabled people? And have we thought about 
where we are heading or are we simply taking the course of where the 
scientific-discovery winds lead; sailing an uncharted sea; launching a 
discovery of the unknown? The aim of this dissertation is to pose these 
and similar questions and to analyze some of the philosophical tools being 
used or which potentially can be used to determine genetic outcomes in 
practice. What map are we using to determine where we want to go? Is 
there indeed an ethical framework that guides us better than another? And 
do we have a right to decide where we are heading; to inquire whether our 
actions today will affect future generations favorably or adversely and be 
responsible (or accused of paternalism) to do something about it? 
 
Objective of the thesis 
The objective of the thesis is to analyze the ethics of genetic testing and 
screening, focusing particularly on the various moral approaches to the 
new genetic knowledge and technology. Normative issues have been 
discussed at length in the literature but so far no analysis has been carried 
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out which focuses on the main moral approaches and whether they indeed 
help us resolve ethical issues.  
 
If it can be stated that there is indeed an importance to this kind of testing 
as opposed to other tests, then we need to see whether socially constructed 
theories are more appropriate than the realm of the doctor -patient 
relationship, in deciding how the public should be approached with respect 
to genetics, especially in view of the strong market forces which drive 
research and offering of tests nowadays. 
 
This objective can be divided in three main aims: 
 
The problem of genetics 
First, two current areas of debate are analyzed in the first two chapters: 
eugenics and our responsibilities, if any, to future generations. These 
provide a broad perspective of concerns for the ethical implications of 
genetic testing and screening. Why is it of any moral significance that we 
screen for genetic disorders? This leads us directly to the question of 
genetic essentialism, dealt with in chapter 3: is there anything special 
about a genetic test as opposed to any other medical test, such as a blood 
glucose or cholesterol? Both kinds of test are saying something about the 
person, and both can have social and economic implications, such as for 
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insurance. But what, if anything, makes us be more concerned about a 
genetic screening test such as the BRCA mutation test? 
 
The moral methods 
Next, four moral approaches are analyzed. These are not put in that order 
deliberately; but the order should not be seen as one of escalating 
importance, for all approaches have their value. Rather the shift is from 
the liberal to the more deontological. Bioethics is not only philosophy. It 
brings together various fields, from medicine, through philosophy and 
even theology. The last chapter of this section in matter of fact describes a 
recent theological advance and its proposals as applied to the field of 
bioethics, with of course a special reference to genetic testing and 
screening. Again the choice is not deliberate. The pragmatic is the more 
liberal approach finding considerable comfort in American philosophy. 
Principlism, or the four -principles approach is second to none in 
popularity. Principlism has given a sound basis for discussion in bioethics. 
But is it specific enough in the particular area of genetics, or are further 
principles, beyond the four -principles, needed to specify further, and can 
these further principles be agreed upon generically in a secular society? 
The phenomenological approach is then presented as the more ‘European’ 
approach, being reflective of Continental philosophy. This focuses on the 
phenomenology and teleology of the medical encounter to analyze genetic 
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testing. Finally what has theology to say about genetics and bioethical 
debate? Can recent reflection, especially on Trinitarian theology, help us 
reach consensus in a pluralistic society? Religion is a force which cannot 
be ignored and which is represented heavily in bioethical literature, at least 
as a background of many scholars. 
 
The location of testing 
The final section is then more practical but very pertinent to our main aim. 
Who is strategically placed to do genetic counseling, given the importance, 
the quantity of tests, and the quality of counseling required? Should 
genetic counselors be counseling the general population, moving away 
from their traditional role of counseling those with genetic traits and/or 
disorders? Should all women requesting information of Breast Cancer 
(BRCA) genes go to specialized genetic counselors, are the latter in large 
enough quantities to be able to handle the demand in an appropriate way?  
 
The various chapters are thus linked together in an important way. First, 
we must establish whether there is indeed a problem and then must ask if 
all the ado about genetic testing is justified. Is genetic essentialism real or 
should doctors treat genetic tests as they treat any other test? Is there a 
difference between testing for BRCA and testing for blood glucose or 
cholesterol? If there is reason to consider genetic tests important, we must 
 12 
then have a moral tool to work with. What are the philosophical tools 
available and how do they help us in genetic testing and screening 
particularly? A moral framework, for example principlism, may indeed be 
sufficient to speak on bioethical issues in general or to teach/discuss 
bioethical dilemmas. But can such framework actually resolve our issues 
in a specific field like genetics? Finally, having been satisfied with one or 
two approaches, who is in actual fact to do the counseling? The thesis then 
hopes to sail through the definition of some pertinent problems, the tools 
we have to resolve them and who actually is to do the work in practice. 
 
One may indeed ask whether the final question, whether family doctors 
are strategically placed to impart genetic counseling, is pertinent to the 
main aim defined. Since it is useless speaking about a tool without 
defining who indeed is to use that tool, this section is considered 
important. We often speak too much in an abstract way on moral 
dilemmas omitting to consider who in fact is to deliver the actions. Often 
bioethical debate has trusted itself into the hospital or clinical situation. Is 
the situation of genetic testing one of primary or secondary care? There is 
a difference between the primary care physician and the specialized 
generalist or genetic counselor. The philosophy of their approach is 
different and their goals are different. Who imparts the genetic counseling 
for what test and which condition thus defines the outcome of genetic 
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practice in general? It would thus be a futile exercise and the work of the 
dissertation would have indeed a weakness if one were not to analyze the 
phenomenological situation in which genetic tests are ordered and 
counseling imparted. 
 
Outline of thesis 
Chapter 1 sets the scene for the thesis. It discusses Eugenics and the New 
Genetics. Many scholars, in particular historians of genetics and eugenics 
movements show concern for the current resurgence and indeed 
exponential rise of genetic technology, the ‘new genetics’. Although 
clearly the intentions of many is the curing of genetic disorders there are 
concerns of abuses. This chapter attempts to look into the history of 
eugenics and its founders, in reply to an attempt to attribute ‘good 
intentions’ to the movement. It looks closely at several countries and how 
the logic of eugenics led to its own demise. And finally, an appraisal is 
done of current fears of this new genetics and whether it can possibly lead 
to a new eugenics. 
 
Chapter 2 then analyses potential problems with genetic screening and 
testing. How will these affect future generations? Against what should we 
protect future generation: from germ-line therapy, as is often feared, or 
from genetic screening? Indeed should  we have any obligations to future 
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generations? Future generations have been discussed at length among 
scholars. The concept of ‘Guardian for future Generations’ is tackled and 
its main critics discussed. Whilst germ-line cures, it is argued, can only 
affect family trees, genetic screening and testing can have wider 
implications. If asking how this may affect future generations is a 
legitimate question and since we indeed make retrospective moral 
judgements, it would be wise to consider that future generations will make 
the same retrospective judgements on us. Moreover, such technologies 
affect present embryos to which we indeed can be considered to have an 
obligation. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with genetic essentialism and information. Is there 
anything special about genetic tests? In the ethics literature disagreement 
exists on whether genetic essentialism is true and whether this directly 
implies that there is anything special about genetic tests. Whilst genetic 
essentialism is defended because the range of possible phenotypes is 
ultimately related to one’s genetic makeup, this does not necessarily imply 
that there is anything special about genetic tests.  What makes genetic tests 
special is the strong moral questions they raise from other areas of 
bioethics, such as the status of the embryo and future generations, due to 
their predictive nature and the broad power they will give people, as 
opposed to the limited use of tests we have today, in selecting offspring. It 
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is therefore the moral dimension that makes genetic tests special and not 
genetic essentialism as such.  
 
The next four chapters scrutinize four moral approaches to ethics in 
genetic testing and screening: the Four-Principles approach, Pragmatic 
approaches, a Phenomenological approach and finally new deliberations in 
Christian Trinitarian thought, hence a Theological approach.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the moral approach of ‘principlism’. Can principles 
help in genetic screening decision-making? Although principles, as a 
framework to resolving moral dilemmas are still debated and seem to be in 
a philosophical quagmire, there are strong arguments that by specification 
one can resolve case-specific dilemmas in certain areas of bioethics. When 
it comes to genetic screening and testing however, the problem at the base 
is a moral disagreement to specific areas common to all cases – such as, 
again, the status of the embryo and parental issues. No amount of 
specification can resolve these issues without a dose of relativism. We 
explore a possibility of agreement on debatable areas specifically in regard 
to genetics – such as conferring status to the embryo solely for purposes of 
preventing genetic selection; but it is difficult to see how this can be 
incorporated into law without extrapolation to other areas. Albeit valuable 
for expounding opposing views and discussing issues, principles cannot 
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either alone or by specification, help resolve issues of genetic screening 
and testing. 
 
Chapter 5 then looks at a more pragmatic approach to genetics. There are 
various schools of pragmatism, but the Deweyan approach apparently is 
the most popular in the field of bioethics as it allows a historical approach 
indebted to Hegel. This in turn allows the pragmatist to specify and 
balance principles in various contexts. There are problems with where to 
draw a line between what is referred to here as the micro- and macro-level 
of doing bioethics, unless one is simply to be classified as a principlist. 
While most discussions on genetics occur at a macro level, most 
specifying must be done also at a micro level – the clinical encounter. 
Whilst pragmatism encourages us to understand better social and scientific 
factors and puts into perspective statements like ‘playing God’, doubts are 
raised about the ‘consensus’ process and how one can put aside 
fundamental values such as the moral status of the embryo on which there 
is general disagreement. If those doing pragmatism do not endorse these 
values, there seems to be little ground for process and compromise with 
those who do. One therefore asks whether pragmatism can ignore even 
those values that are not endorsed by everyone. 
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Chapter 6 shifts to teleology. Genetic screening and testing is reappraised 
through the phenomenology of the physician-patient relationship. It is 
widely held that there is a need for a philosophy of medicine. What 
scholars disagree on is what kind of philosophy this should follow. The 
Social Construct Theory is here contrasted with the teleological approach, 
arguing that history of medicine shows that a teleological approach may 
be more prudent in protecting patient interests. The issue of genetic testing 
advertising is discussed against a teleological background constructed 
through Heidegger’s phenomenology of being. The authentic relationship 
between a doctor and a patient and hence between medicine and society 
should protect the public against an economic telos which may differ from 
the inherent goals of medicine. 
 
Chapter 7 finally applies theological developments to the issue of genetic 
screening and testing. Catholic movements within the center of Roman 
Catholic doctrine recently have discussed Trinitarian theology as applied 
to sciences, arts, economics, health and other social areas. The possibilities 
that Trinitarian theology offers to bioethical debate, concentrating 
particularly on genetic screening and testing, are explored. It is important 
to analyze the philosophical implications of this approach in regard to the 
bioethical world, where much disagreement occurs on fundamental issues. 
It is Catholic basic teaching to recognize and see God’s hand in plurality, 
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not merely as a cliché and then doing what we were doing before. To 
recognize how to live in a pluralistic world is this century’s challenge to 
the Christian world. We recognize, in agreement with these theologians, 
that in order for a Trinitarian mode of understanding to be used by those 
doing bioethical debate, there is a need to depart from fundamentalism. 
Whilst this does not necessarily translate into a change in our 
understanding of the status of the embryo, it does lead to the arena of more 
openness and mutual understanding. 
 
Chapter 8 then assesses the arena where our understanding and 
deliberation of approaches to genetic testing and screening actually take, 
or should take, place. Family doctors are in an ideal situation to advise 
patients on most medical technologies and new developments. In this 
sense they are in the best position to guide and counsel patients on genetic 
testing and screening. Indeed most often it is the patient who seeks 
counsel from the family doctor (general practitioner). The special nature 
of genetic tests and the potential to exploit people’s money into futile 
testing puts the doctor in a special situation. While it is argued that the 
family doctor maintains a strategic position to impart information to the 
patient, it is also argued that due to the new nature of genetic tests and the 
way the family may be affected, including the multitude of ethical 
dilemmas these tests may pose, the position that should be favored is  that 
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they should be the health professionals to impart generic genetic 
counseling. Specialized genetic counselors may then continue to dedicate 
their time to special cases. Tests should not be made available over-the-
counter. It is the onus of the family doctor to refer patients for further 
counseling should this be necessary. Colleges and Academies of Family 
Physicians are in the ideal place to outpace industry especially in second 
and third world countries. Genetic counselors maintain their role as 
specialist counselors.  
 
Chapter 9 summarizes and discusses the important findings and 
conclusions of the previous chapters. It highlights the problems and issues 
that necessitate further ethical research and argues that a comprehensive 
analysis will be required. The area that creates most concern is that of 
genetic screening and testing. These technologies challenge moral 
concerns such as status of the embryo. At the same time it is difficult to 
see various philosophical frameworks solve these concerns. A teleology of 
medicine on the other hand promises a better understanding of the 
relationship between advances of bio -molecular sciences and medicine. 
The resolution of basic moral questions needs more understanding and 
dialogue that embrace a respect for pluralism and a departure from 
fundamentalism. Recent studies in Trinitarian theology hold promise for 
such a basis. 
 20 
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EUGENICS AND THE NEW GENETICS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P. Mallia and H. ten Have: Eugenics and the New Genetics, International 
Journal of Bioethics, in press (2003)  
 22 
Current Resurgence and Concerns on Eugenics  
With the hopes and promise of genetic cures have come fears and 
anxieties of genetic abuse. Daniel Kevles in his history of eugenics says 
that “The specter of Eugenics hovers over virtually all contemporary 
developments in human genetics, perhaps even more now than when this 
book was first published a decade ago” (Kevles, 1997, p. vii). Whilst 
powerful technologies already permit the selection of healthy embryos in 
vitro for implantation in women whose offspring are at risk for various 
genetic diseases and whilst new techniques have enabled the insertion of 
healthy genes into sperm that might otherwise be genetically impaired, 
there is no promise for the long run. 
 
Harper and Clarke devote a whole section of their book Genetics, Society, 
and Clinical Practice to the ‘Abuse of Genetics, Past, Present and Future’. 
They are concerned not only with the naming of genetic syndromes being 
linked to people involved in unethical activities but also with issues such 
as the genetic testing of children, ‘over -the-counter’ genetic testing, 
insurance, population and newborn screening and genetics in public health 
(Harper and Clarke, 1987, p. 221). The abuse of genetics vis -à-vis diseases 
such as Huntington’s disease and China’s genetics law, which carries 
considerable eugenic weight, are also featured prominently (Ibid., p. 237). 
Harper points out that the background of eugenics extended well before 
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the Nazi period and of how people like Davenport and other eugenicists 
were directly involved with and supportive of developments in Germany 
(Ibid., p. 227) whilst not pointing to any guilt to individuals. It does reflect 
however that abuse of science to cater for class differences can indeed 
escalate to a level of Nazi practices and that it is society and the preceding 
eugenic movements which were partly responsible.  
 
Galton’s formation of a movement came at a time in England where it is 
doubtful that there were any good intentions for mankind in general (o.c., 
p. 4). Rather it was motivated by wanting to better the social middle class, 
and from the very beginning attributed all forms of crime and pauperism 
to the lower poor classes. If one puts into doubt the ‘good intentions’ of 
eugenics as a movement, then can one quell fears of the New Genetics 
which is not preceded by any sort of institution or movement? It is argued 
that public scrutiny may not be enough as it may not be representative of 
populations or moral beliefs, as happened for eugenics movements. 
 
Was there an inherent evil in eugenics? 
Maybe Daniel Wikler, who laments Eugenics on being a movement with 
good intentions which went wrong, makes the best defense of Eugenics. 
He defends five wrongs usually attributed to eugenics (Wikler, 1999, p. 1-
16). Firstly Replacement which is the fact that eugenics seeks to replace a 
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group of people with another group considered better. Selection is what 
eugenics is all about. Wikler argues that selection is not necessarily wrong 
and that there are other forces in our society which also replace people and 
which we consider benevolent (Ibid., p. 7).  Secondly Value Pluralism: 
Wikler concedes that the ideal chosen by eugenicists was similar to 
themselves; they failed to realize that theirs is but one of a multiplicity of 
such vision (o.c., p. 8). The complaint is therefore right about the mainline 
eugenicists who made no secret about their wish to curb a certain sector of 
the population. If we were to accept a theoretical eugenics, “(v)alue 
pluralism could  become an issue in eugenics, even if it is not inherent in 
the core idea. Deaf parents who wish to abort fetuses which do not test 
positive for inherited deafness, and dwarf parents who want only a child 
with the gene for achondroplasia, hold unconventional values, and their 
freedom to act on them is at issue in the ethics of clinical genetics” (Ibid., 
p. 9). He concludes that we could limit ourselves to human characteristics 
on whose desirability there is widespread agreement.  
 
Regarding Statism (the intervention by the state), Wikler quotes James 
Watson who said that the greatest enemy to eugenics is state control. 
Wikler argues that lack of state intervention may, on the contrary, hasten 
the evils of eugenics (Ibid., p. 10). ‘Homemade’ eugenics by selective 
abortion already take place. Amniocenthesis directed at Down’s syndrome 
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in the UK is a clear example. Indeed the state is necessary if we are to 
prevent eugenics. Conversely, the state can be used, as in Cyprus, to direct 
eugenics programmes against a particular disorder, in this case 
thalassaemia (Hoedemakers and ten Have, 1998, p. 274-278).  
 
The fourth inherent wrong is Collectivism. Wikler analysis the argument 
that it is wrong for individuals to make sacrifices for the collective benefit 
(Wikler, 1999, p. 10). He identifies an ‘original sin’ in eugenics as 
calculating genetic improvement not in terms of the well-being of the 
individual, but for the effect which the existence of that individual might 
have on the well-being of others. This calls for the fifth and final wrong: 
Fairness. If there is a wrong in Galtonian eugenics, it is because it moves 
from the traditional seeking of the benefit for the individual to the cost this 
may have on society (Ibid., p. 12). The patient recedes from the 
foreground and a moral judgement is made on the basis of a calculation 
that takes into account the claims of many. In other words, there are some 
conditions that we may choose not to cure because they would impede the 
benefits of others. And if we follow this reasoning there would be no 
limits to what this burden on society would be. Thus progress in genetics 
must pay attention to these questions of distributive justice (Ibid., p. 13).  
Addressing the historical arguments implies that these five ‘wrongs’ may 
be however too simplistic a view to state that it was a movement having 
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good intentions. Eugenics arose from middle class prejudices against 
lower classes and/or race. The implications of this for today would be 
whether we have prejudice against those of us who breed genetic traits 
considered burdensome or against disabled reaching reproductive age in 
general. 
 
The rise of eugenics 
Kevles analyses the historical contexts of the movement and its founders. 
Francis Galton [1822 - 1911], the founder of the eugenics movement, 
proceeded from the idea that reputation indicated ability and that this does 
not depend on the social class one is born in. Galton did not accept that 
without social disadvantage professional men of moderate ability might 
not have got as far as they did, or that without social hindrance those of 
high ability might have traveled a good deal farther (Idem). Had he been 
more acute about the cultural incentives of behavior, he might have 
recognized that in America untold talent had been drawn away from 
“literature, philosophy, or art” into the forming of a nation and the 
conquest of a continent. And had he been more self-aware he might have 
understood that his proto-eugenic pronouncements “celebrated the social 
milieu – and met the psychic needs – of Francis Galton” (Ibid., p. 5). 
Kevles gives a detailed account of Galton’s upbringing and family and of 
his environment and concedes that why Galton turned to eugenic analysis 
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is not clear. He analysis several approaches, namely that Galton wanted to 
assert himself, against his self-lingering doubt, by “discovering the origins 
of success in lines of descent”; and owing to the probable infertility of his 
marriage (Ibid., p. 9). He was thus obsessed not really with a general 
improvement of the human race but with the propagation of his kind. Why 
should the characteristics he chose be any better than the rest? To answer 
this question is to answer the whole eugenics paradigm. That Galton’s 
ideas may have appealed to others simply reinforces the fact that there was 
a great division of class in their days.  Besides social prejudices and 
personal obsessions, it was the case, to Galton’s mind, that the scientific 
doctrine of evolution destroyed the religious doctrine of the fall from 
grace. He appropriated Darwin to argue that man, instead of falling from a 
high estate, was ‘rapidly rising from a low one’ (Ibid., p. 12). Eugenics 
would accelerate that process, would breed out the vestigial barbarism of 
the human race and manipulative evolution to bring the biological reality 
of man into consonance with his advanced moral ideals. Even in his day 
Galton found opposition. Critics warned that his eugenics would put 
restraints on the freedom and sanct ity of marriage. Moreover Galton 
reduced moral capacity to biology and his anticlericalism implied that 
mental capacity “was not implanted by God in every newborn 
individual”(Ibid., p. 20).  
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Karl Pearson (1857 – 1936) also came from a middle class family. His 
ideals were however of socialism and he was attracted to the German 
school of idealism (Idem). As Galton was getting older he needed a 
successor. He chose Pearson, although he did not like the sexual 
radicalism and socialism of Pearson’s circle; but the fact was that eugenic 
enthusiasm was highest amongst the social radicals. Unlike Galton, 
Pearson had no need to fantasize about the eugenic breeding of Pearson-
like progeny for he had three children. His eugenic ideas were thus 
charged less with psychosexual energy than with his commitment to social 
imperialism – the ideological system where his eugenic convictions had 
originated. Pearson also looked upon the middle class as the ideal (Ibid., p. 
22). He blamed capitalism for the reproduction of the socia lly unfit, 
which, with its demand for cheap labour, encouraged the immigration of 
workers below a desirable standard. He privately had asserted to Galton 
that charities for the children of the ‘incapables’ were ‘a national curse and 
not a blessing’. In his opinion, such measures as the minimum wage, the 
eight-hour day, free medical advise, and reduction in infant mortality 
encouraged an increase in unemployables, degenerates, and physical and 
mental weaklings. Natural selection, he believed, had been suspended, and 
replaced by ‘reproductive selection’, which gave the battle ‘to the most 
fertile, not the most fit’ (Ibid., p. 40).  
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Conversely, Charles B. Davenport (1866 – 1944) was a biologist who had 
carried out Mendelian inheritance studies in eye colour, hair and skin 
colour. He became America’s leading eugenicist Ibid., p. 41-56). He 
conceded that human heredity was complicated and included 
environmental factors. Kevles notes his racial attitudes and his 
identification with middle class. Heredity determined the characteristics 
both of Negroes – Davenport’s views on black Americans conformed for 
the most part to the standard racism of the day – and of the immigrants 
then flooding into the United States. He held that the Poles, the Irish, the 
Italians and the Hebrews were biologically different. Davenport also 
identified good human stock with the middle class – especially 
‘intellectuals’, artists and musicians, and scientists. In his American 
context, he also gave high marks to the native white Protestant majority.  
 
Within the eugenics movement therefore we can safely say that there 
never was a serious effort to discuss publicly what the ideal human sort 
would be and the bias was always in favour of the environment from 
which the individual protagonist came. In each country national 
background and historical context determined the eugenicists’ ideal type. 
Pauline Mazumdar, for example, concentrates on the British historical 
contexts and reconstructs the inner life of societies (Mazumdar, 1998). 
The British movements spoke on behalf of the middle class. Eighty 
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percent of their memberships were eminent people. But it would be well to 
look outside the United Kingdom and the USA to understand more fully 
how eugenics actually had taken root elsewhere. 
 
Eugenics in other countries 
In France eugenics was a reaction to the perception that society was in a 
state of decline and degeneration. Schneider quotes the translator of 
Darwin’s Origin of Species Clemence Royer, who in her preface to the 
1862 translation called for the elimination of “the weak, the infirm, the 
incurable, the wicked themselves and all the disgraces of nature…which 
they perpetuate and multiply indefinitely”(Scneider, 1990, p. 69-109). To 
be sure the French Eugenics Society emphasized more positive eugenics 
of marriage selections than negative eugenics. The church did not 
condemn in principle all eugenic practices but found objection to 
sterilization and held reservations of legally prohibiting marriages which 
did not pass a state eugenic test. However, at a congress of the Association 
of Christian Marriage the archbishop’s closing remarks were in favour of 
eugenics because God did not wish man to multiply poorly. However 
measures such as birth control were still condemned and the call was on 
the responsib ilities involved in procreation (Ibid., p. 80). Schneider 
concludes that France deserves its reputation as “the home of a neo-
Lamarckian eugenics whose main emphasis was on positive eugenics” 
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(Ibid., p. 103). Of prominent importance in this position was the decline of 
the population. The fear of depopulation worked against any form of 
negative eugenics such as sterilization. Therefore most eugenicists offered 
an emphasis on positive eugenics which increased the quality of all 
offspring. Opposition to eugenics came mostly form the Church in the 
thirties, and one sees therefore that were it not for the influence of natalists 
and the church to emphasis a more positive eugenics, negative eugenics 
could also have taken a strong hold in France. This is compounded by the 
fact that the seeds of eugenics here also lie in the prejudice of one class 
against another. 
 
In Brazil the state of affairs is quite different. Although Brazil imported 
the neo-Lamarckian positive eugenics of France, this country held less 
class prejudice and there was in fact a search for the identity of what the 
‘Brazilian’ person is. Eugenics was more oriented towards this 
nationalistic feeling of creating the pure Brazilian (Stepan, 1990, p. 110-
152). Structurally and socially, however, the origins of the eugenics 
movement related less to European than Brazilian developments. Of these, 
four were of special importance. Stepan (Ibid., 111-115) explains these as 
first the wish for the Brazilians to identify with the more civilized and 
advanced Europeans as contrasting with Brazilian ‘barbarism’ and 
‘backwardness’. Secondly there was the national pressing issue of the 
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misery and ill health of the working population. This population was 
largely black and mulatto as Brazil had been one of the last countries in 
that part of the world to eliminate slavery. The educated viewed the blacks 
and mulattos “as lazy, sickly, drunk, and in a constant state of 
vagabondage” (Ibid., p. 113). The third factor was that Brazil was largely 
a consumer of science not having university departments that could put up. 
It thus appealed, as elsewhere, to the medical community who were eager 
to promote their role as experts into shaping social life. Finally Brazil was 
a racially mixed nation produced out of a fusion of Indian, African, and 
European peoples. Although influenced by European racial ideas, 
Brazilian eugenics had to put up with its European counterparts 
considering Brazil the prime example of the ‘degeneration’ that occurred 
in a racially mixed country. The Brazilian elite shared this view, and racial 
improvement was of obvious appeal to this group. Eugenics was thus 
treated as a new science capable of bringing about social order(Ibid., p. 
114). 
 
In Brazil therefore the eugenics question was about ‘race’ and not about 
‘class’. The ideology was also neo-Lamarckian. It focused on diseases that 
were seen predominant among the poor. On the other hand it was not 
Nazi-style race hygiene: even some of the members of the elite were 
uncertain of their own ‘purity of blood’? (Ibid., p. 126) It centered as well 
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around middle class groups however who hoped to reform politics and 
launch Brazil as a world power. They were concerned later with 
‘whitening’ the race and hence white immigration was welcomed (Ibid., p. 
128-129).  
 
Only recently historians have started to treat German Eugenics  in its own 
right and not merely as a prelude to the Holocaust (Weiss, 1990, p. 8-68). 
Insofar as many authors neglect to do this, they obscured its context, logic, 
and history. Race Hygiene in Germany was far more heterogeneous in its 
politics and ideology than is generally assumed. Although its advocates 
were overwhelmingly recruited from the ranks of the Bildungsburgertum 
(educated middle classes), they embraced no single political outlook. By 
today’s standards many German eugenicists would be considered racist as 
they naturally accepted the racial and cultural superiority of Caucasians. 
However by the standards of those times these were the thoughts of many 
eugenicists across the world. Although there were a few of them who 
advocated Aryan and Nordic eugenics, many leading eugenicists did not 
conform to these lines of thought. Weiss stresses not to equate these pro-
Aryan sentiments made by a handful with the aims of the movement as a 
whole in Germany. Many of Germany’s leading eugenicists, such as 
Schallmayer, Muckermann, Ostermann, and Grotjahn criticized Aryan 
ideologies and rejected the idea of a “Nordic race hygiene” (Ibid., p. 10).  
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In Germany, the middle class were also weary of the seemingly hostile, 
uncontrollable, and ever -increasing industrial proletariat who caused a lot 
of labour unrest. In addition there were the increase of other social 
problems like prostitution, criminal activity, alcoholism and insane and 
feebleminded individuals. The lat ter group were ‘singled out’ by medical 
and lay observers as an especially grave social and financial liability for 
the new Reich. These problems were hotly debated and the German 
eugenicists were highly aware of this debate. That the race hygienists 
would endorse the biomedical solution for their social and political 
problems can be attributed to the high regard with which physicians and 
German medicine were held, who promoted themselves as custodians of 
the national health. All the movement’s important leaders were physicians. 
The intent was that of eugenicists in other countries. It was the Nazi 
movement that used race hygiene to their ends in the holocaust. The  
writings of eugenicists did not emphasize anti-Semitism. None were 
involved in any piece of anti-Semitic legislation. They had little real 
influence over any piece of Nazi legislation, and the Nuremberg Laws 
forbidding marriages or extramarital relations between Jews and Aryans 
were composed without the aid of a single ‘Professional race hygienist’. 
Finally, the eugenicists did not take part in the infamous Wannsee 
Conference of 1942, where plans for the ‘final solution to the Jewish 
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question’ were confirmed (Ibid., p. 48). Whilst not absolving the 
eugenicists completely Weiss concludes however that when all is said and 
done, it is the logic of eugenics far more than its racism that proved to be 
the most unfortunate legacy of the German race hygiene movement for the 
Third Reich (Ibid., p. 49). 
 
The post war era – the New Eugenics 
Although the post-war period was marked by a shying away from 
eugenics by the same people who had supported it during the pre-World 
War II period, another surge in eugenics thought came in the sixties. This 
new eugenics arrived with a ‘sea-change’ in the Anglo -American 
environment. A revival was being made of the thought that sociopathology 
was genetic rather environmental (Kevles, 1997, p. 269). Arthur Jensen, a 
professor of education and psychology at the University of California at 
Berkeley insisted that IQ was genetic and could not be boosted, and that 
too much zeal for environmentalism led to his argument being widely 
ignored. He affirmed that races differed physiologically, anatomically, and 
biochemically, and declared it was reasonable to hypothesize that genetic 
factors may play a part in racial differences in IQ-test performance and 
that in the future unemployment may be found to run in the genes of 
families “as certainly as bad teeth do now” (Ibid., p. 269-270). William 
Shockley had been arguing for several years that the failure to explore the 
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subject of race and intelligence was keeping society ignorant of the 
knowledge to combat such trends. He thought that blacks were genetically 
pre-determined by a form of ‘genetic enslavement’ and were destined to 
be a lower ranking breed similar to the ones described in Brave New 
World (Ibid., p. 271). Edward O. Wilson, a professor of Zoology at 
Harvard went far beyond this and gave theories in his sociobiology about 
traits in man’s genes of territoriality, male dominance over women, 
polygamy and even homosexuality, arguing about the latter that it was an 
inbred trait in certain males to allow the propagation of the genes of other 
males in the community benefiting their survival and thus increasing the 
genes these individuals shared with their homosexual counterparts (Ibid., 
p. 272-275). In 1971, Shockley had proposed sterilization as a means of 
decreasing the number of people with low intelligence. He proposed a 
financial incentive: the lower a person scored on an IQ test, the greater 
would be the financial incentive for sterilization – which he proposed on a 
voluntary basis. Voluntary sterilization had continued in the United States 
but was frequently abusive.  
 
In the post Vietnam period, we see a rise of concern with regards to these 
authoritative views coming mostly from minority groups, pressure groups 
and the political left. Catholics especially led a crusade against abuses; in 
particular they led the pro-life group which led a battle against abortion. 
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Interestingly Kevles also identifies the new group of professional ethicists , 
There was tumult against persons like Jensen and Wilson.  
 
Fearing the New Genetics 
Medical genetics is defined by the British Medical Association as an 
integrated service, comprising clinical genetics and laboratory genetics, 
the aim being “to help families at genetic disadvantage to live and 
reproduce as normally as possible. The primary purpose of genetic 
technology is to respond to medical ‘need’ and alleviate suffering rather 
than to enhance the range of normal variation” (BMA, 1998, p. 2). Adams 
reminds us that eugenics was “often intertwined with the development of 
genetics – in courses, textbooks, institutional names, monographs, and the 
concerns of investigators” (Adama, 1990, p. 219). It is not unreasonable to 
extrapolate from eugenic history that the new genetics cannot lead to a 
new eugenics. This is compounded by the fact that the UNESCO 
declaration on the human genome omits any reference to eugenics 
(UNESCO, 1996). In a commentary to this Lenoir, former Chair of the 
International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO, says that the declaration 
is an effort to unite countries and that eugenics is still a controversial 
notion with “little consensus on its precise definition” (Lenoir, 1997, p. 
31-42). 
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Cyprus is a case in point where the direction is clearly to discourage 
couples found to be heterozygous for thalassaemia. Prenatal screening 
with the intent on selective abortion is also promoted. This was all 
condoned by the World Health Organization (WHO). Hoedemaekers and 
ten Have (Hoedemakers and ten Have, 1998,p. 274-278) have shown 
concern for the WHO memorandum which states that, “It is only in the 
field of preventive medicine that a moderate investment can produce such 
rapid and wide-ranging benefits … It is not only high-incidence 
communities that should seriously consider such a programme” (WHO, 
1983, p. 63-69). The memorandum also notes: “… the cost of running a 
prevention programme for thalassaemias are trivial compared with the 
financial and social implications of a high incidence of the disease” (Ibid., 
p. 78-79). 
 
Chorionic villus sampling and amniocentesis have become commonplace, 
especially in the UK, to provide screening programmes to detect fetal 
abnormalities with the purpose of offering abortion to parents whose fetus 
tests positive for conditions such as Down’s syndrome and other genetic 
handicaps. Such tests are spoken openly not only in medical texts but also 
in lay books offered to pregnant women1. 
                                                               
1 To mention but a few: 
Lissauer T., Clayden G., Illustrated Textbook of Paediatrics, Mosby 1999, p 64 
Hull D., Johnston D., Esential Paediatrics,  Churchill Livingston, 1999, p. 26 
Symonds E., Essential Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Churchill Livingston, 1987, p. 64, 85 
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‘Multiplex genetic testing’ has come to mean testing for a number of 
genetic disorders in a ‘package’ offered to the client. The American 
Medical Association has cautioned the use of such tests with wisdom and 
warned that physicians must be able to explain the implications of these 
tests to the clients they are being offered. Moreover it states that ‘before 
such tests reach health care providers, clinics, and drugstores, the ethical 
and social implication of these tests must be understood, and careful 
restrictions and regulations must be established’ (AMA, 1998, p. 15-21). 
The Iceland Parliament has in the meantime already approved the 
exclusive right to incorporate genetic information of the entire population 
into a database (Annas, 1998, p. 1830-1833). It is clear that the full ethical 
implications have not yet been approved and the New England Journal of 
Medicine raises questions on the ‘Lessons from Iceland’ (Gulcher and 
Stefannson, 1998, p. 1827-1830).  
 
These examples show that the relation between the new genetics and 
eugenics is different as in the past. The idea that we can develop “… a 
human genetics that would create no victims. That seemed to be true only 
so long as the attempts to map the human chromosome were safely 
confined to the abstract, mathematical and generally unsuccessful. With 
                                                                                                                                                            
Kitzinger S, Pregnancy Day-by-Day, Dorling Kindersley, 1998, p. 35 
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more powerful methods, more concrete results began to come, and they no 
longer appeared to be as harmless as before” (Mazumdar, 1998, p. 267-
268). 
 
Therefore on the one hand one may quell fears that the new genetics is 
advocating a new form of eugenics, as there are no ideological movements 
preceding the research other than science and technology. On the other 
hand people may still search for a genetic superiority in their offspring, if 
not through enhancement, through the elimination of genetic disorders and 
in choosing the ‘perfect baby’. This would imply that those with genetic 
diseases are seen not as full persons in their own right, but with part of 
their constitution – their genetic condition – replacing the whole (Parens 
and Asch, 1998, p. S3). It is clear we are on the verge of a new era, if 
eugenics came at the times of social class segregation, the new genetics 
comes at a time of body-worship; a time in which having is more in vogue 
than being. This aura makes it difficult for us to accept that those with 
disabilities have the same being as those of perfect bodily physique and 
health. We are in danger of falling into the trap of seeing money spent on 
conditions as thalassaemia being a burden on the economy whilst 
conversely procedures like plastic surgery and cosmetic abortion find 
themselves on national health schemes. Whilst priority may be given to 
genetic enhancements like tall stature and the genetic control of obesity, 
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the WHO as we have seen condones selective abortion and compulsory 
screening for a condition which is not the fault of the individual.  
 
Is the New Genetics a new eugenics? 
 
Clearly there are differences between the old eugenics and the new 
genetics. Whilst the latter originated from middle class individuals who 
were upset at how their society was becoming overwhelmed with certain 
sectors of the population they considered inferior, the new genetics is 
directed against disease or at least sectors of the population carrying traits 
for disease. There clearly can be no fears today that Nazi-style attacks are 
made on individuals carrying a trait or homozygous form of genetic 
disease; but there is an on-going inherent attack on embryos and fertilized 
ova to select the less disabled. This has led to concerns of discrimination 
from disabled groups but even within these groups there are individuals 
who would support abortion, concerning themselves more with 
discrimination than with eliminating potential newborns. The argument 
has shifted towards the question of who a person is and towards identity as 
human beings. Clearly the advances of science from assisted procreation 
to stem cell research enhances our quest to quench our thirst for better 
cures and longevity.  
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Whilst therefore the old eugenics was more based on ideals of race, class 
and political society, the new eugenics arises from the population with a 
quest for a better future for themselves as parents and their future 
offspring. People are tempted to considering the new genetics 
pragmatically and to believing that selecting the perfect baby is nothing 
more than selecting the best for our children. Therefore whilst the former 
was top-down, coming from political levels down onto populations, the 
latter is bottom-up, where politicians have to cater for the wishes of 
populations and scientists. Witness the recent problems of President 
George W. Bush with stem cell research. Notwithstanding pre-election 
promises of not endorsing any form of abortion, the decision was not 
straightforward. Finally research is to be allowed on existing stem cells 
but not endorsing the creation of new ones. Yet what will go on privately 
or in countries which do not have the necessary legal structures seems to 
be beyond the politicians’ control. What is also significant is that the 
media bring to peoples living rooms at the peak time of the day the 
potential of these experiments without of course concentrating on the 
moral, legal and social consequences. This is partly due also to the 
sensational news such advances invariably create, but also because they 
may be intent on promoting business. It cannot be excluded that large 
corporations will be behind what to lay out to the public. It is the public 
then that will put pressure on the necessary areas voting for politicians 
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who will induce the changes they seek. Is there anything wrong in this? 
Only the fact that it does not take into consideration the moral dimensions.  
 
How do Wikler’s five inherent wrongs stand when confronted by the 
contemporary outlook? Wikler brings forth a number of ‘benevolent social 
programs ’ which are intent on replacing people rather than helping them 
(Wikler, 1999, p. 7). Macroeconomic interventions may inevitably effect 
the circumstances of human reproduction for example. But benevolent 
programs may not necessarily be morally right in themselves. Although 
capitalism appeals to many western countries because it allows free 
economic markets, it is not in any way proved to be the best system. The 
Catholic church has often pronounced itself on such matters, stating that 
capitalism may exploit the worker (John Paul II, 1981). In any case, the 
very fact that macroeconomic situations may have an effect on human 
reproduction may indeed be indicative of an inherent wrong with that 
force and in time produce enough support to change large-scale effect. 
Medicine is full of instances however in which we cure maladies in people 
who then live up to reproductive age, thus not eliminating these ‘bad’ 
genes and indeed working against natural selection. To say therefore that 
selection is good is tantamount to concluding that a lot of medicine is 
indeed bad. Put differently, if we make it our goal to improve the genome 
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of the human race, then what we do in some instances of medicine, 
whereby genes that would otherwise perish are now surviving, is wrong.  
 
Regarding value pluralism, it is precisely areas in which there is 
widespread agreement that may find minority groups being affected 
wrongly. One has to point out that the converse of the deaf selecting their 
kind is also true and that there may be a considerable larger number of 
people eliminating embryos who test positive for deafness. Watson’s 
quote that the State may be the greatest enemy to eugenics may indeed be 
strongly on point. It is states on the other hand who are enhancing eugenic 
practices. Statism on the other hand is not a solution unless it is based on 
moral imperatives rather than political agendas, something quite difficult 
to achieve. Although we cannot expect an individual to be sacrificed for 
the collective benefit, we can definitely promote collective education of 
moral stances in new genetic technology, hence promoting collective 
sacrifices for the collective benefit of all through genetic practices. On 
fairness and distributive justice, cannot we say that this is the concern 
with all of medicine? Does not the cure of everything put a burden by 
eliminating ‘survival of the fittest’? For Wikler the genetic well being of 
‘the group’ is a proper object of concern if done justly which seems for 
him the question of moral importance and not whether this constitutes 
eugenics. Defining the genetic well-being of the group is however what 
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the whole genetics debate is all about when taken holistically with its 
moral dimensions. To ‘replace’ people is obviously prima facie wrong. 
The very word represents eliminating or choosing one over another. This 
is what is done in embryo or fertilized cell selection. Clearly this 
constitutes a moral problem for many. If on the other hand the 
replacement comes over time because through germ cell intervention 
genetically diseased free individuals are born instead of the genetically 
diseased, then we can view this form of ‘replacement’ as positive. 
 
Conclusion 
We may still be far from correcting congenital disorders with genetic 
engineering, but the completion of the human genome project definitely 
marks a start to a new era in genetic studies. Are economic forces the 
petrol of the day? Will the rare disorder benefit as much as the disorder 
which generates more money, or will this be subject to a different 
engineering, that of selective screening and progressive elimination from 
the gene pool? Clearly the demons of the past have not yet been exorcised. 
With genetics on an exponential increase a new look at bioethics 
infrastructures and legislation is of paramount importance, especially in 
developing countries where companies may seek legislation free 
environments to promote their ends. In an era where a symbiotic relation 
exists between market forces and medicine, it is clearly not the case to 
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attribute ‘good intentions’ to research before these are publicly 
scrutinized. Felice’s proposal for a peer-reviewed system (Felice, 1998, p. 
117-129) or Agius’ proposal for a ‘Guardian’ (Agius, 1998, p. 67-83) may 
be possible solutions, although proposals are criticized and could be 
perfected2. 
 
Conversely whilst racism and group concern did not qualify as good 
intentions in the past but passed public scrutiny because of popularity, the 
same can happen today with appeals for ‘better babies’ and genetic 
‘cures’. The good intentions may be there, but this time the power motive 
may be industry, which may not discriminate fairly. The real danger is 
who is to carry out the scrutiny – as we are left with similar bodies that 
allowed eugenics to take hold. Clearly we should move beyond 
governments to, for instance, the United Nations and the European Union. 
It is hoped that these bodies do not shy away as with the UNESCO report 
and legislate conservatively until positive results we are all comfortable 
with are seen. Clearly no body would like to deprive the genetically ill of 
any cures; but a concern with our genetic future and with present threats of 
discrimination and confidentiality is in all respects legitimate. If however 
                                                               
2 see WILDES K., “Redisigning the Human Genome: Are There Constraints from 
Nature?” p. 35-49; ENGELHARDT H.T., “Human Nature Genetically Re-Engineered: 
Moral Responsibilities to Future Generations, p. 51-63; JUENGST E.T., “Should We 
Treat the Human Germ-line as a Global Human Resourse?”, p 85-102; in Germ-Line 
Intervention And Our Responsibilities to Future Generations, Ed. Agius E., Busuttil S., 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998 
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we are to face a ‘bottom-up’ situation in which the forces come inherently 
from people up to the politicians, then it is on the bottom we should 
concentrate, educating people of the moral dimensions of these new 
technologies. This education need be factual and honest, not fear-inducing. 
It would be justifiable however to educate the public on the general terms 
used. Stem-cell research may sound captivating; the more realistic embryo  
research brings people more to their senses of what actually is going on. 
‘Assisted procreation’ for a perfect baby may sound appealing; the 
selective elimination of your other potential children may not.  
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Introduction 
The question whether we have responsibilities towards future generations 
has recently emerged on the agenda of philosophy and ethics (McMahan, 
1995). Questions of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ addressed in the 
United Nations General Assembly, such as the statement to reform the 
traditional regulation of the Law of the Sea which is affected by modern 
technologies, are clearly addressed towards what future generations will 
inherit from the present (Pardo, 1975). Moral theories have however had 
notorious problems in providing a solid basis for the foundations of these 
obligations. We cannot take for granted that the problems we envisage 
today will be the same as those perceived by future generations. 
Conversely the question of whether we have a right to speak on behalf of 
future generations always imposes its toll. Any legislation or social order 
will have widespread effects on the details of people’s lives (Parfit, 1982, 
1984). This in turn means that legislation will determine who will be born, 
and that therefore the latter will not have existed were it not for these 
changes. Any theory about future generations therefore must be 
impersonal rather than applied to individuals (Parfit, 1984). However 
traditional theories were impersonal and these had led to impossible 
implications when applied to questions concerning future generations. 
Hence ‘questions on our obligations to future generations has resulted in a 
profound challenge to moral theory itself’ (McMahan, 1995, p. 302).  
 
 50 
However, these questions have become more urgent in relation to the 
genome that our future generations will inherit. Clearly prima facie we 
have a duty not to disturb the genome through germ-line intervention. Any 
damage that we do now will be transmitted to future generations who can 
hold us responsible. As an extension of the protection of the common 
heritage of mankind, Agius has proposed that this concept of ‘Guardian’ 
be extended to the genetic system (Agius, 1998). A conference held in 
Malta (1995) debated this proposal. In this contribution we will critically 
evaluate the arguments brought for and against such a proposal within the 
perspective of future generations arguments.  
 
The concept of a Guardian 
The idea of allowing future generations to participate in the 
‘administration of the human genetic heritage’ by the provision of a 
“Guardian” has been put forward to UNESCO (Agius, 1998, p. 75). Such 
a Guardian would not have legislative powers, nor powers to stop 
processes from happening but would serve as a voice before institutions 
and technological companies whose decision could affect the welfare of 
future generations. His role would not be to decide but to promote 
enlightened decisions, opposing attitudes which are inconsiderate towards 
future peoples.  
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The main idea behind the guardian hypothesis is that the current 
intellectual property system must be altered for the regulation of 
biotechnological interventions because of its potential threats to future 
generations of the industrialized countries and to present generations of 
developing countries. Genetic engineering today is inducing farmers to use 
only the most efficient plants or animals; by cross breeding lines with 
valuable characteristics and screening the progeny for desired traits, a 
reliance on particular lines is encouraged. This of course is dangerous 
because of unforeseen diseases and the possible loss of biological 
diversity. Moreover in nature a species is in itself a biological boundary. 
Genetic engineering by gene splicing gives us the power to cross-fertilize 
species threatening the species unity by an artificial form of interbreeding. 
The direct application of gene-splicing to cure human genetic disease is 
thus a concern of disrupting the human genome. Finally, it is argued that 
third world countries can be put at a disadvantage because of the firm 
control over these technologies by industrialized countries. Environmental 
destruction is aggravated through further erosion of genetic diversity, as 
local crops are replaced by genetically engineered crops and increased use 
of harmful agrochemical. By defining genes as a common heritage we can 
amend the current patent system which protects the right to private 
ownership of small segments of mankind’s genetic heritage which is far 
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away from the ethical ideals of the common heritage of mankind principle. 
In this essay we concentrate only on human genetics. 
 
Critics of the guardian proposal 
a). By whose authority? 
The proposal for a Guardian to take care for future generations has been 
criticized however for various reasons. Wildes (1998) argues that in a 
secular world there can be no appeal to a higher authority such as God, 
nature or reason. The only way to move forward in bio-ethics is by 
consent between moral strangers. If we cannot appeal to reason, nor to a 
powerful deity, nor to nature, we lack a common secular morality. In this 
absence our only alternative is allowing each other to do things – a 
principle of  permission. We can arrive at resolving controversies by 
agreement. Moral authority can thus be arrived at by collaboration 
between parties. In the same manner, Engelhardt (1998) argues that 
assuming a general responsibility towards a unique genetic inheritance, 
free from engineered alternations, is indefensible at least in general secular 
terms. Only three ‘content-less’ moral principles can guide us. The first 
would be to avoid malevolent acts against future generations, the second 
not to undertake changes to the human genome that one has good grounds 
for knowing the recipients would find unacceptable, and finally to act 
prudently so as not to cause more harm than benefit. He argues that history 
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provides ample grounds for concern; the establishment of a Guardian 
would be the secular equivalent of establishing a particular ‘religion’ and 
imposing it upon the entire world. Engelhardt asks in what sense would 
future generations have a right to be denied benefits as procured by 
enhancements. What obligations does one have to future generations not 
to make them better off in these respects? He argues that perhaps the 
purported right of future generations not to receive an altered genome is 
that they should be protected against harm, risks and dangers possibly 
associated with altering the genome. If such is the case one can at best 
argue not to alter the genome unless one has good grounds to believe that 
the benefits involved outweigh the risks. The obligation would thus be not 
to act imprudently. Moreover insofar as significant benefits can be 
achieved, then one is obliged to pursue the good and indeed, all else being 
equal, to develop human germ-line engineering and enhance human 
capacities through altering the genome. Like Wildes, he argues that any 
moral content must be agreed upon between parties. Any Guardian, if it is 
to have secular moral authority, will be obliged to act in a most general 
and content-less fashion that it would have to leave moral communities 
free to act peaceably on their own understanding of the good. Any attempt 
to impose a particular all-encompassing vision of obligations to future 
generations would, and should, be the object of contempt by secular 
environments.  
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Engelhardt’s and Wildes’ arguments have at heart the notion of dialogue 
between moral strangers. Unless they can show that they propose a form 
of arriving at common moral ground between moral strangers, which they 
do not, the principle of permission which is proposed is fraught with 
difficulties. James Lindemann Nelson for example notes that Engelhardt 
will not accept that acheiving coherence among principles together with 
our conceptions and morals of the world will be enough to warrant any 
judgements (Nelson, 1997). Nelson asks what reason is there for one to 
adhere to any agreement between moral strangers if it does not serve one’s 
interest. Even concern for peaceableness is not warranted as some people 
may opt for not wanting peace. Even if it is in my interests to act 
peaceably, this leaves me acting strategically and not morally. If one is 
adva ntaged in the relationship there is no reason why one should care 
about the other. It seems impossible therefore how permissions and 
agreements count as moral reasons for action. 
 
There is also an inherent reductio ad absurdum in a principle of permission 
between moral strangers for this presupposes that the two put aside their 
moral ideals in order to agree upon another moral stance between them. 
For example, two people may disagree upon abortion (else they would not 
be moral strangers in this regard) and agree to perform abortion within 
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their relationship, professional or otherwise. Now this would presuppose 
that at least one is compromising his or her moral ideal on abortion. In this 
respect the message he or she will be sending is that they cannot be trusted 
with their own moral ideals, and therefore how can they be trusted within 
this secular moral agreement? Indeed why at all should I want to agree 
with someone, unless for example, there is something in it for me?  
 
b). Protect the ‘present’ rather than the ‘future’. 
A second type of objection to the Guardian proposal states that our 
concern with future generations is out of focus (Juengst, 1998). We should 
direct protective efforts towards people with genetic differences and 
people with disabilities ins tead of focussing on genes we have inherited or 
will transmit. Juengst argues that the Common Heritage (CH) view is 
conceptually flawed and even socially dangerous. It distorts the accepted 
biological concepts and risks social abuses, thus enforcing an awkward 
and impractical right to inherit one’s share of a common heritage of 
mankind. The genetic engineer can go a long way by changing alleles at a 
natural locus, rather than deleting existing loci or adding new genes, 
towards therapeutic achievement and enhancement applications. It is the 
common gene-line, not the germ line that is at issue. The concept of the 
human genome does not really concern itself with all the substantive 
variations or different alleles that are possible at a given locus, any more 
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than the concept of the human skeleton must account for the minute 
variations observable between bones of different people (as for example 
used in forensic studies in identifying people). The human genome is thus 
an abstraction and not a concept comparable to the seabed. It is not a 
natural resource and thus does not constitute common heritage. What we 
should be concerned with therefore is the protection of disabled persons 
and people with genetic differences in the present. Juengst however omits 
to address legitimate concerns about what the future can hold for those 
generations. Will parents for example be forced not to withhold genetic 
‘cures’ (and in the process affecting their family germ-line) as occurs 
frequently today with certain surgical procedures especially when 
concerning malformed newborns? Moreover the concept of the human 
genome does indeed include a recognition of variation and that is precisely 
why it is an abstraction.  
 
c). Are future generations moral agents? 
The third type of objection denies that future generations can be moral 
patients (Heyd, 1998). For logical reasons possible people cannot be moral 
subjects or have moral rights. Thus one cannot argue against the creation 
of genetically modified creatures in their interests as otherwise they would 
not exist. However this argument is flawed in certain circumstances of 
genetics. Whilst it can be shown that social programs affect who meets 
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whom and thus who is actually born, it does not limit the birth of 
genetically modified individuals who would otherwise still have been 
born. Thus if one refers to a genetic programme, such as occurred in 
Cyprus, whereby the state tries to prevent the marriage of individuals with 
carrier traits for thalassaemia, then it can be supposed, and thus Heyd’s 
argument validated, that individuals who are homozygous for thalassaemia 
are prevented from being born. The same cannot hold for the modification 
of germ-lines. If I modify my germ line genes to make my offspring free 
from a genetic disorder which I may carry, or enhance them to make a 
particular trait (say more intelligent) possible, then I will be affecting 
offspring which may have been born otherwise had I not made the 
intervention. Clearly any side effect or genetic quirk transmitted to my 
offspring is my responsibility in some way, especially had I known in 
advance about the possible side effects. Heyd furthermore argues that 
future generations may hold different ideal standards than our own and 
that therefore the idea of a guardian or trustee cannot hold. However he 
concludes that we do hold responsibility in how we want our descendants 
to look like, but we cannot be their keepers.  
 
d). Present Guardians: Politicians and Peer Review. 
Spicker (1998) argues that geneticists should be held accountable to others 
as they conduct scientific research by adhering to the prevailing normative 
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standards of scientific inquiry. He argues that ‘protecting’ future 
generations is a logical worry. Although Spicker agrees with Parfit’s 
contention that future generations cannot coherently claim that their 
predecessors failed in their duty to protect them (because they would not 
have existed), he contends that future generations can claim that 
governments of previous generations acted irresponsibly in failing to 
regulate the actions of genetic engineers, whose research outcomes and 
discoveries concerning the human genome could be used either to the 
detriment or benefit of actual future individuals and generations. This is 
precisely because temporarily contiguous generations (the next generation 
or two) have to be necessarily affected before future ones can. Therefore 
geneticists are morally responsible not only for the known, but maybe 
more importantly, for the unknown effects towards future generations. 
 
Spicker’s contention can be supported by the following argument. 
Consider present day doctors prescribing antibiotics. It is a known fact that 
these powerful medicines are abused and given when they should not be. 
This has given rise to resistant microbes. If doctors do not act responsibly 
now, we know that future generations (at least the contiguous ‘in between’ 
generations) may benefit less from antibiotics than we do today because 
there will be a considerable amount of resistant strains around. So present 
doctors are clearly responsible for this ‘foreseeable’ disaster. Yet they 
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should be responsible even for the ‘unforeseeable’ – in this case the 
scenario may be that future generations may not be able or find 
considerable difficulty in generating new antibiotics to these resistant 
strains (as for example we are finding difficulty generating an antiviral for 
HIV simply because it is different than the usual virus we usually deal 
with). Therefore if future generations find themselves taken back to the 
nineteenth century when antibiotics were not available and people died 
from a simple infection, surely they can judge previous generations for 
acting irresponsibly when antibiotics were available. This puts a burden on 
present generations to act responsibly now. This responsibility is nothing 
but an effort to protect future (even contiguous) generations from an 
absence of treatment weapons. 
 
The legacy we may owe to future generations is therefore a demand on 
geneticists to act responsibly and remain careful in there work, to “… keep 
faith with the standards of science” (Spicker, 1998, p. 157). He contends 
that rather than electing a Guardian, one should urge our true guardians – 
the politicians – to work cooperatively through the democratic process and 
to mandate geneticists into educating those who work in the media of the 
long-term consequences and implications. However, it is difficult to agree 
that geneticists are responsible to educate those who work in the media. 
Indeed the media has often served to alarm people and to portend an 
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image of humanity against science. Rather the media has a responsibility 
itself to study and transmit the right messages. Responsible media bodies 
today have their own reporters qualified in science and scientific writing 
and therefore knowledgeable of portraying true images. It is the media 
which can act irresponsibly and allow unqualified investigative reporters 
to speak about subjects which they have not covered deeply enough.  
 
Spicker is right however in pointing out our true ‘Guardians’. But as 
politicians are representatives of the people, we all have a responsibility to 
contribute and point out dangers. In this respect, Felice’s suggestion of 
Guardianship by peer review is as important as allowing politicians to do 
all the work. Felice (1998) argues for widening the scope of existing peer 
review groups. He asks what mechanisms do we have to ensure good 
science and to see that human interests are protected. The element of time 
is essential is science to pass judgement on the value of research and 
technology; a review of past and present experiences provides guidelines 
in making projections for the future. In mainstream science, funding 
agencies ask for the views of expert ‘peer review groups’ to whom 
research proposals are referred for evaluation. These seek specific answers 
to quality of proposed research, the clarity of question asked and the 
relevance and significance of the work proposed. Moreover it is their 
competence to ask the appropriateness of the research methods and 
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competence of the researchers and to what extent this research advances 
the frontiers of knowledge. He argues that the collective wisdom of 
scientists along with educated lay persons in these peer review groups has 
assured and served well to direct resources into productive research while 
guaranteeing human assurance. However he argues that the wider scope 
for public participation in the peer review groups requires increased efforts 
to educate the publics concerned. 
 
 
Nevertheless, in keeping with the antibiotic analogy, it can be argue d that 
if we can make retrospective moral judgements on past experiences, we 
may infer that future generations will make retrospective moral 
judgements on what we do today. This in itself gives us the moral 
obligation to act morally towards future generations. In what follows this 
line of argumentation is taken up and it is shown that our true concerns 
should be towards genetic testing and screening, for it is the consequential 
acts upon these issues that can adversely affect future generations. 
 
Genetic testing and screening – the real threat 
There are two principal ways in which genetic screening and genetic 
testing for individuals can affect future generations. Individuals can screen 
for traits and conditions and selectively discard embryos that do not fit 
their criteria. Secondly it can be the state that imposes screening on 
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populations to try to modify their behavior. This would include gender 
selection which can be done with a simple genetic test at an early stage. 
An obvious example is the familial selection of boys in China due to the 
law allowing one child per couple in over-populated regions. This has 
invariably led to more boys than girls being ‘selected’ as many would 
prefer to have a boy to inherit their property and take care of them when 
old. Clearly the creation of the problem was not the government’s 
introduction of the law. The government probably thought that the sex 
ratio would remain the same. It was indeed a cultural side-effect of the 
population selecting more male babies than females which brought about 
the problem. Genetic testing will surely make this type of selection easier 
at an early stage of pregnancy. So, in what way can the state be held 
responsible for what happened to the present generations and what will 
continue to propagate to the future unless controlled. Obviously even if the 
government cannot be held responsible for what it did, the fact it is seeing 
the side effect now which is undesirable, calls for action to protect the 
situation from worsening. An impersonal responsibility to future 
generations is clearly there.  
 
But can one make a retrospective moral judgement on a government 
before the effects where known? Retrospective moral judgements have 
been made for example in the radiation experiments carried out by US 
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scientists on patients who were not informed of the possible harm caused 
by radiation when the same scientists knew this could have been a 
possibility3. Clearly a more evaluative process could have brought forward 
the notion of what the (Chinese) people would do. Even if not, a close 
look at what the people were actually doing could have enacted a change 
in the law before it had time to have its toll. Clearly the Chinese 
government put more weight on decreasing its population growth than on 
the problem of gender discrimination. If present generations can blame the 
past generations for faults they are suffering, clearly future generations 
can do the same towards the present. Does this blame not exempt one from 
taking a neutral stand towards future generations? Clearly if the problems 
can be perceived, one has a responsibility to prevent these foreseeable 
situations. 
 
Let us consider now the situation in Cyprus where widespread screening 
for carriers of thalasaemia takes place to genetically counsel couples who 
are both carriers. The whole programme is intended at decreasing the 
incidence of thalassaemia, and hence decreasing the number of births with 
this disorder. One may argue, as indeed disability rights groups do, that 
possible people are deprived of an existence. Selective abortion does not 
really discriminate against the disabled unless one wishes to argue that it is 
                                                               
3 See, for example, Buchanan, A. “The Controversy over Retrospective Moral 
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not in their interest to decrease the number of people with that disability. 
Thus deaf people may have an argument for discrimination because they 
do not want their numbers decreasing. But thalassaemic people do not 
because on the whole we want to cure people with thalassaemia. The only 
way one can argue for discrimination is by taking a pro-life stance, but this 
would defend all aborted fetuses and not only those with a genetic 
disorder. From a pro-choice point of view, since one does not defend any 
fetus, one can only argue against decreasing numbers (such as gender 
discrimination). But the argument for decreasing numbers does not hold 
with respect to conditions that we want to cure as this will bring about a 
decrease in numbers of affected people, if the cure is effective. 
 
From the foregoing it seems clear that one should be more concerned with 
the perils of genetic screening than with germ-line modification. This is a 
paradox indeed, as the former seems more innocent. Selection modifies 
our overall gene line more than any amount of genetic engineering to cure 
(or even enhance) could do. The gene line is affected because the pool, 
from which a choice of genetic shuffling occurs, will be changed. The 
‘Guardian’ proposal, conversely, admonishes we should beware of genetic 
engineering which modifies our germ-line (or gene-line as Juengst has put 
it). It is disconcerting however that most concerns focus only on gene-line 
                                                                                                                                                            
Judgement”, in Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1996: 245-250. 
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modification through genetic engineering. As a matter of fact we may owe 
it to the future generations of families who carry a defective gene in their 
genome to liberate them from the burden of this disease. Such would be 
the case for Huntington’s disease and which probably haunt the families 
whose trees carry these burdensome diseases. Even if genetic engineering 
were to bring about side-effects to these cures, these may be more than 
welcome when balanced against the horror of knowing you may develop 
dementia and chorea at the age of forty. Moreover these side effects will 
only continue to manifest themselves in these relevant family trees as the 
present disease does. It will hardly affect the rest of the world, as these 
diseases do not.  
 
Rather therefore than being concerned about gene -line for future 
generations through genetic engineering which will affect only specific 
family trees who would probably welcome such changes, one should be 
worried about the screening efforts undertaken against common disorders. 
The World Health Organization has condoned the Cyprus experience with 
thalassaemia to reduce the amount of homozygous individuals by a 
process of selective abortion, and mandatory genetic testing and 
counseling (approved also by the Orthodox Church) for couples (WHO, 
1983). However there does exist concern that we should solve our 
problems of allocation of scarce resources by such drastic measures as 
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abortion and mandatory invasion of people’s lives by genetic tests 
(Hoedemaekers and ten Have, 1998), even though in all fairness the lives 
of Cypriots with thalassaemia have been enhanced by the considerable 
reduction in the frequency of those born with the disease (Kitcher, 1996, 
p. 236).  
 
The film Gattaca4 portrays a realistic image of how selective discard of 
fertilized ova carrying genes for specific possibilities of diseases can lead 
to a society where people who are normal by today’s standards are 
discriminated against. We would select those people for specific jobs who 
have been genetically advantaged and thus pose less risk of manifesting 
disease. Which employer would not prefer workers who are less likely to 
pose insurance and sickness benefit problems? Which insurance would not 
like to insure those who are less likely to claim? Will a situation thus be 
passed on to future generations whereby mandatory genetic testing is 
necessary; albeit even pre-conceptually? This raises the concern for 
parental autonomy, especially in regard to selective non-treatment of 
malformed newborns. It is not infrequent that cases are cited where 
                                                               
4 The film portrays the story of two boys born to a couple, one by orthodox means and 
the other through a selective process of ‘best’ genetic make -up through a fertility clinic. 
The story relates the struggles of the former to compete in a world where all are 
genetically selected. He  uses urine, blood and hair samples of a ‘selected’ person who 
was crippled in an accident to get through a space programme course. His ‘selected’ 
brother, a detective, traces him down during an investigation in the academy. The film 
ends with the two challenging each other to a swim in troubled seas sending the message 
that determination is as good as being genetically selected. 
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parents found themselves in legal battles because the authorities went 
contrary to their views on refusing surgery5. Will genetic cures be imposed 
on children? It should be concerning for us to see how future generations 
will be affected by genetic screening. Will insurance and employers make 
genetic testing mandatory? Will couples be pressured to have genetic 
testing of their unborn and pressured into selective discard or abortion 
because of fear of poor prospects of their offspring or at least better 
chances if screening is done?  
 
Naturally one can argue that these future generations will probably be 
grateful towards us as otherwise they would not have existed (had they, 
that is, not replaced their ‘inferior’ siblings). But who will speak in favor 
of those potential genetically ‘inferior’ siblings now? Surely it has to be 
previous generations. Therefore even though those who may live may 
have a different opinion than we do now, it is we who have a 
responsibility to those who potentially can be saved from selective 
abortions and discards. This is in fact the paradoxical absurdity pointed 
out by Parfitt (1984) that any theory has to be impersonal. What can be 
more personal than not being allowed to live (for discard and abortion 
means taking away an existing life, and not a potential life as that of the 
                                                               
5 See for example case in which parents refused transplant to their child, Nicholson R.H., 
“In the Family’s Best Interest”, in Hastings Center Report , Vol. 27, No.1, 1997, p4, and 
also the recent case of the Maltese Conjoined Twins: London A.J., “The Maltese 
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genetically superior who would then not exist) in order to be replaced by 
the genetically superior sibling. Not searching for the better genetically 
endowed in a pool of fertilized ova would give all an equal chance of 
implantation. 
 
Developing an ethics with future generations in mind 
Simulating a future scenario, Walters and Palmer (1997) picture a 
situation in which the World Health Organization, following a definitive 
genetic cure for Cystic Fibrosis on both somatic and germ cells, call for all 
at-risk individuals to undergo genetic testing6. All those found to be 
affected or heterozygous will be made to accept treatment of both their 
reproductive and somatic cells. In this way WHO would estimate to 
eradicate the disease within 35 years. 
This hypothetical situation was extrapolated from past and present 
programs aimed at controlling infectious diseases (e.g. the world wide 
campaign to eliminate smallpox and mandatory immunization for measles 
and polio). The authors concede that there is a difference between disease 
transmitted genetically and infectious diseases transmitted by contact or 
other vectors. Also the hypothetical example does not state whether an 
initial voluntary program had been tried and failed. In fact, the authors say 
                                                                                                                                                            
Conjoined Twins, Two Views of their Separation”, in Hastings Center Report, Vol. 31, 
No. 1: 48-52. 
66 Walter, L., Gage Palmer, J., The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy, Oxford University 
Press, 1997, p. 87-88. 
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that as a matter of moral principle state intervention in reproductive 
decisions is virtually always wrong. They advocate a voluntary program of 
germ-line genetic intervention and are confident that people would 
participate. Conversely they counter most arguments against germ-line 
intervention. Although one risks irreversible mistakes, the benefits of cure 
should outweigh these risks. Also alternative strategies like selective 
abortion or selective discard are fraught with moral problems; germ-line 
therapy is more in line with respect for children and human life and 
moreover does not discriminate against people with disabilities. Although 
some use for enhancement may be morally justifiable this is an issue 
where policy makers must put their weight. Although those with power 
will have an advantage over those who cannot afford the treatment, public 
health concerns should balance this out. Moreover it is better that humans 
possess the technology for cure than not possess the ability at all. 
 
The moral soundness of any eugenics-like program or policy depends on 
the existence of an obligation to protect or improve the genetic 
composition of the human species and hence directly to protect or improve 
future generations (Neri, 1998). Rawls (1972) has made the classical 
formulation of this obligation saying the early generations owe future ones 
the descent of a healthy genetic endowment and hence should pursue 
reasonable policies towards this end. Thus over time populations are 
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expected to at least maintain the general level of natural abilities and to 
prevent diffusion of serious diseases. Rawls seems to be endorsing both a 
positive and a negative eugenics. However Agius (1990) and Serracino 
Inglott (1990) have criticized Rawls’ treatment of intergenerational ethics 
in that he always assumes that future generations will inherit more if every 
generation had to follow a ‘just saving principle’. This principle does not 
take into consideration the very high price that may be paid for growth in 
other areas of life.  
 
McGleenan (1998) says that legislative responses to gene therapy are 
unanimous in their adoption of a somatic cell vs. germ line dichotomy. 
Moreover many countries have adopted a two-tiered approach for ethical 
oversight, first at local research ethics committee level reviewing the 
proposed protocol and second at a more national level by a committee of 
experts. However, committees tend to emphasize scientific review rather 
than ethical review. Germ-line intervention is seen to pose too many risk 
and committees tend to be warmer to somatic cell therapy. However, 
McGleenan notes that this dichotomy may not be that sound and a 
prohibition on gene therapy will become more strenuous as safer therapy 
grows and public demand increases.  
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The main question therefore is what ethics should be kept in mind when 
considering future generations. The real ethical threats seem to be 
associated with genetic screening. Screening affects populations and who 
will or should live. It constitutes a threat to how we see illness. A country 
wishing to impose on its people a program where by selective discard or 
abortion or by the prevention of marriage, it will attempt to decrease a 
genetic condition, even if done on a voluntary bases will carry a heavy toll 
on those wishing to stay out of the program. Will people with the disease 
still be treated without judgement? Will insurance still insure those who 
have opted not to have genetic tests? Furthermore, genetic disease not 
being contagious and thus not an immediate threat to populations, cannot 
be given policies along lines of infectious diseases. With WHO’s 
condoning of selective abortion and discard to control thalassaemia and 
with UNESCO’s shying away from expressing its views on eugenics, we 
are still far away from an ethic towards future generations. Our legacy 
towards future generations is our responsibility to learn from past errors. 
We need to distinguish between eugenics and the curing of genetic 
conditions which the individual wants to be rid of. If our ethics is based on 
individual concerns rather than freeing countries from genetic conditions 
which are an economic burden, we are more safe than if programs 
intending to eradicate a genetic disease are imposed by world authorities.  
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Conclusion 
When one asks, “will there come a time when parents will not be able to 
refuse genetic tests or treatment of the children”, or, “will there come a 
time when insurance companies and employers impose genetic tests”, one 
is showing concern for future generations and those contiguous with us. 
The threat is however in the present and it is present legislation and 
protection that we should seek in order to safeguard future policies. 
Moreover it has been argued that genetic cures to somatic and germ cells 
cannot effect families other than those already carrying a disease. Since 
only family lines will be affected, there is hardly a threat to the human 
genome as a whole. Such ideas are based on misconceptions or 
misunderstandings of genetics in general. Of course if germ line 
modification had to become a luxury to enhance capabilities of offspring, 
then this may constitute a threat; but there are other more urgent threats 
brought about paradoxically simply by the seeming benign nature of 
genetic screening. This threatens the lives of existent embryos, plus poses 
threats to sections of the population based on their genetic makeup. This is 
eugenics at large. 
 
The threats to future generations can be summarized thus: 
1. Threat to family rights 
2. Threat by insurance, employers, marriage ‘counseling’ imposed by the 
state. 
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3. Selective threat to potential future generations through abortion or 
discard.  
 
Rather therefore than a threat to a common heritage which is the human 
genome, future generations face a threat of eugenics which comes not 
through some manipulative engineering of somatic or germ-line cells but 
through a selective process. There may be a place for a ‘guardian’ since it 
seems that WHO and UNESCO have not been sensitive to these issues. 
More than a supervisory role, this ‘guardian’ should help to implement 
legislation that protects future generations from the threat and abuse of 
genetic screening. There does not seem to be any concern for the gene-line 
that at this stage should take precedence over threats posed by screening. 
Whist therefore the concept of Guardian may need to be studied deeper, 
the real and present danger may be in genetic screening and testing. The 
present ‘guardian’, our politicians, in agreement with Spicker, are the 
people who should guard against this. 
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Introduction 
Is there anything special about genetic testing? Does genetic information 
carry more significance than any other medical test? And should we really 
be concerned with knowing people’s or the embryo’s genetic constitution 
than we are concerned to know the latter’s alpha feto-protein status and 
the former’s cholesterol? Innovation in medicine almost always creates 
feelings of moral unease. Evidence to this are technologies such as those 
of organ transplantation in the 1950s and assisted proc reation in the 1970s. 
Medical genetics and the sequencing of the human genome have created 
the concern that we may tamper with the very essence of life – our DNA. 
Whilst on the one hand medicine strives to cure genetic ailments such as 
Tay-Sachs disease, thalassaemia and Huntington’s disease, the projects of 
genetics go much further and search into the realm of enhancement and 
cloning. Even simply having genetic information at disposal can affect our 
very essence by allowing us to choose who will live or die and by possibly 
fostering new eugenic attitudes. Medicine, by its very nature, has always 
thwarted the natural order. By simply curing an asthmatic person, we will 
be favoring his survival among the more fit, thus going against natural 
selection. If however our concerns with genetic information are to be 
grounded solidly into engendering an attitude of awareness and if we are 
especially concerned about where this technology can actually take us, we 
must show that there is something essential about genetic information 
which other kind of medical information does not have.  
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This contribution explores arguments for and against genetic essentialism. 
It is shown that indeed there is something contingent and necessary about 
genetic information for human essence. This in itself should increase 
awareness of where we are heading. The power which genetic information 
gives can be overwhelming when compared to other medical information; 
whilst the consequences of medical information are to the individual or his 
or her close relatives, that of genetic information can have a consequence 
of entire populations or cohorts, changing something essential in human 
nature other than merely going against ‘survival of the fittest’.  
 
Genetic Essentialism 
Genetic essentialism is the idea that we are our genes; the nature, or 
essence, of the human being is in his or her genes (Cranor 1994).  Genetic 
essentialism is defined as “a scientific discourse…with the potential to 
establish social categories based on an essential truth about the body” 
(Franklin 1993: 34). In this discourse, the self is reduced to a molecular 
entity, equating human beings with their genes (Nelkin and Lindee 1995). 
Yet by changing our environment we constantly go against our essential 
nature. We take folic acid in order to decrease the chance of neural tube 
defects in babies; we treat all sorts of ailments, including genetic diseases. 
On a more social level we try to influence our environments by optimizing 
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our chances of survival in this world. We pay money to attend good 
schools. We go to extra classes to have a better chance at passing exams. 
We follow fashion to improve our appearance and hence our chances of 
attracting a partner. Parents do their best to have the “perfect baby” 
(McGee, 1997). They not only take the necessary medical precautions and 
advise but may follow tales of how one may influence the gender outcome 
during intercourse or by calculating the time around ovulation. Even 
contraception is a way of maximizing our efforts for those children born 
into the family. And whilst institutions such as the Catholic Church object 
to contraception, they understand the social pressures and advocate 
‘natural family planning’. All these efforts influence and change 
outcomes. When it comes to using genetic information to influence the 
‘outcome’ of our babies, some may feel this is a responsibility which 
parents have to carry. For example, McGee has argued that the 
attractiveness of genetic intervention is that it allows parents to participate 
scientifically and systematically in the construction of ‘the perfect baby’, 
which all wish to have (McGee 1997: 77-78) - a natural extension of 
parent’s efforts to participate in the molding of their offspring. He warns 
however of the special complexities of reproductive decis ions such as 
expecting too much from a child who was genetically ‘chosen’ to have a 
better brain for education or a better body for sport. Parents may put undue 
pressure on their offspring to satisfy their chosen genetic traits. Not getting 
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what we bargained for on our genetic menu may not only increase the 
scope of pressure on one’s children, it may also increase society’s scope of 
choice for education or sport. In turn the offspring may then choose their 
future partners according to what genetic constitut ion was chosen for 
them. Thus if I was chosen to be good at sport, I may not like what society 
has pressured me into, and in turn choose a wife with ‘intelligence’ genes. 
Therefore my offspring may have a better set of genetic possibilities, 
especially if I may make sure that I choose ‘intelligence’ as a factor and 
not ‘sport’, further decreasing the natural ‘autonomy’ (admittedly a poor 
choice of vocabulary for a natural process) which a baby may have a right 
to.  
 
Holm (1999) argues that genetic essentialism is false. For every allegedly 
special feature or special combination of features of genetic information it 
is possible to find non-genetic health related information which shares the 
same features. He argues that it is all medical information which should be 
protected, as is the case for the Danish law on health information. Holm 
discusses only the relevance of genetic information to employment, 
showing that there are other medical facts besides genetic, which may be 
used to discriminate against workers or the choice of employees. Yet for 
this question to be answered completely one must consider areas other 
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than employment, such as insurance and selective abortion or discard of 
fertilized ova, which have different implications.  
 
Holm believes that in each of these areas analogous arguments could be 
found. His premise is that if genetic essentialism is true, then there is a 
straightforward argument for the claim that genetic information is special, 
although the truth of this statement is not explored. In fact this statement 
need not be true for even though we may argue that we are our genes, it is 
not the fact of genetic information but the consequential acts with this 
information that may make it of special relevance. Indeed there may be 
other non-genetic tests that may give the same weight of a genetic test 
(such as alpha feto-protein). Does this prove the point that there can be 
non-genetic tests which have the same outcome? Obviously not, for with 
genetic tests the scope and width of possible tests increases so much that 
whereas the few tests we have today used antenatally, are aimed at not 
having a defective fetus, genetic tests, as shown above will increase the 
scope beyond this to actually selecting what characteristics we want in 
offspring by a procedure of eliminating the ones not chosen. There are no 
other tests that give us the power in having “the perfect baby”.  
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It is in the category of ‘predictive’ and ‘pre-symptomatic’ testing that most 
difficult issues arise when speaking of genetic tests (Harper 1997). By pre-
symptomatic testing one implies a certainty in a positive result; something 
which is not true for ‘predictive’ testing. In predictive testing the risk of 
the disorder occurring is not only reduced but lacks any degree of 
certainty. This is probably the case for the breast cancer genes BRCA1 
and BRCA2. Yet their lack of certainty has induced enough fear in many 
women to seek radical mastectomies. Harper says that it is controversial 
whether genetic testing is ‘medical’ at all. He is concerned that there is 
already a certain degree of ‘medicalization’ in such clients being referred 
to as ‘patients’ and in those testing positive called ‘affected’. This is true 
even for pre-symptomatic testing, though the disorder may be many years 
ahead or not occur at all (Huntington’s disease and breast cancer 
respectively). 
 
Are there new ethical dilemmas raised by genetic information? 
This question has been raised by the British Medical Association (1998). 
Many of the ethical dilemmas of genetics are the same as in other areas of 
medicine and concern confidentiality and acting in the patient’s best 
interests and to avoid harm. The BMA argues however that when applied 
to genetic technology, the usual imperative of maximizing benefit and 
decreasing harm may be seen from a different angle. Our increasing 
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understanding of how an individual’s genes can cause or predispose 
towards a disorder, widens the scope of decisions to try to bypass nature 
by terminating pregnancies or by preventive surgical removal of tissues. 
Moreover genetic choices are more likely to touch the lives of others. This 
is the main ethical concern where genetic technology differs from other 
areas of medicine. The individual’s priorities and autonomous choices 
may not be the sole determinant of performing tests. Certainly an 
awareness of the implications for other family members should be on the 
individual’s agenda towards a decision process. Although the family 
history has often been asked by insurance companies, the use of genetic 
tests takes this into a new field altogether. The information provided may 
be linked and other family members denied insurance, because a relative 
did a genetic test in the past (BMA 1998: 162).  
 
It is not clear cut however how genetic information is different from other 
information for insurance purposes. Certainly it would constitute a 
discrimination if not all people were asked to undergo genetic testing. 
Conversely, if all were asked to do so, increasing premiums to everyone 
may decrease the scope of insurance because people will either opt not to 
be insured or insurance opt not to insure them. Consequently, the pool of 
insured persons decreases, taking down with it the pool of money offered 
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to clients. The discrimination would be diminished and premiums would 
have to go down again.  
 
The problem with this is that people lose their right not to know about 
medical information. A person who has a brother with Huntington’s 
disease may not feel it in his interest to know his future. Certainly this 
information will put him in a different category of insurability, even were 
everyone to be tested. Thus the question of discrimination is not entirely 
disposed of. However a condition like Huntington’s disease is definitely a 
more serious case than, for example, a gene for ischaemic heart disease, 
because of the certainty it carries. 
 
The essence of the human genome 
To affirm that the essence of human beings is defined by genes, we need 
to ask ourselves what is truly the essence, the nature, of DNA other than 
its molecular structure. By exploring this question we may be in a better 
position to analyze whether genetic essentialism is a necessary or a 
contingent truth rather than excluding it as a falsity. The questions to ask 
therefore are: (a) What do we mean by the essence of genetic tests?, (b) Is 
genetic essentialism a contingent truth, a necessary truth or a falsity?, (c) 
Are genetic tests special?, (d) Does ‘c’ depend on ‘b’. 
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a). The Essence of Genetic Tests  
Clearly by ‘essence’ we do not simply mean that DNA is structurally 
made of nucleic acid molecules. It is the arrangement of these molecules 
into codons forming exons and introns which constitute the structural 
reality of DNA. But the essential reality we contend to be the information  
they carry. DNA is a molecule of low entropy, a non-chaotic arrangement 
of molecules, which carries information. This information is translated 
into proteins which in turn are transformed into anatomical detail, from 
genotype to phenotype. 
 
Yet there is a further truth in the essence of the genome, the fact that the 
double helix can split into two strands and combine with that of another 
individual in order to ‘shuffle’ genes. This creates a new molecule, which 
in the process can undergo different kinds of mutations to produce an 
individual complement of chromosomes in its own right. The essence of 
DNA is therefore its twofold function of mutations and transmitting 
information to form new DNA. 
 
b). The truth of Genetic Essentialism; the Environment 
The human individual is not only made by his or her genetic program. An 
infinite amount of environmental factors have a role in the ‘outcome’ of 
the individual. Even schizophrenia, a severe psychiatric disorder thought 
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to have a strong genetic predisposition is affected by the environment; 
indeed the condition may not manifest itself at all under the right 
circumstances (Storr, 1981).  Yet no matter how much we change the 
environment, we exist between a range of possibilities. Certain anatomical 
details do not change, such as short or tall stature, color of skin, and 
arguably even obesity (for given the same amount of food one may remain 
underweight whilst another still become overweight, medical conditions 
apart). Indeed studies on twins show how much environment can change 
characteristics, but one can probably always identify the characteristics 
which makes them twins. This is similar to having two identical cars, one 
given to a person who takes good care of it and the other given to someone 
who maltreats and batters it. The divergence after a few years would be 
obviois, but we could still make out the model. 
 
It is after the second process where we can interfere, (non-
environmentally, as it were) both in the correction of bad mutations and in 
the inclusion of genes (engineering) or, in the process of selecting which 
one of the many generated to choose. Now this choosing is indeed 
affecting the essential nature of DNA to combine randomly. Although it 
may be argued that people do not choose each other randomly, there is 
resistance in many societies to pre-arranged marriages as there is to incest. 
As seen from a scientific birds’-eye-view, people mix randomly and the 
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less inbreeding there is in populations the fitter the resultant population to 
survive. The reason for this is that the genome needs to shuffle randomly 
in order to cope with a changing environment. The chaotic nature of this 
process is as important to cope with a chaotic environment (May 1992). 
To take a simple example, it is argued that the gene for thalassaemia 
survived because those individuals carrying that gene were not affected by 
malaria. Extrapolating to a statistically improbable chance that all humans 
were to be affected by a condition ‘a’ for which there is no cure and for 
which only those with a genetic condition ‘b’ survive, which otherwise is 
considered a disease, then if the population had to eliminate that gene ‘b’ 
from its random pool, the entire population would be washed out7.  
 
Thus although the environment, both natural and that induced by humans, 
affects the possible ‘outcome’ of individuals, it is paradoxically wrong to 
consider the phenotype as environmentally induced. One may argue that 
there are characteristics over which the environment has considerable 
influence, say obesity. But in all probability, even if we invent an obesity 
rug, those who would have to take it would be those genetically 
predisposed to becoming more obese than others. For some life is a 
constant struggle with dieting; for others, no matter how much they eat 
they are always lean.  
                                                               
7 There is no allusion to population health being genetically determined here, but simply 
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Therefore the problem of essence lies where we want to put our definition: 
is essence the range of possibilities which the environment has on the 
phenotype, or simply the resultant possibility, that is one of several 
outcomes of phenotype. In other words if my phenotype has given me the 
genetic constitution of growing fat and I make a continuous effort to 
control my food intake, will my essence in this respect be that of a lean 
individual, or that of a lean individual who-will-get-fat-if-not-careful? It is 
quite obvious that the essence of the individual lies not only in what result 
the environment has had on him or her, but in all the range of possible 
results different environments could have. This potentiality-of-being, so to 
speak, is in effect the phenotype. It is this phenotype which lasts forever 
and which is a direct resultant of the genotype. It can only change if the 
genotype is affected a priori (on germ cells) or a posteriori (on somatic 
cells).  
 
It is important to note at this stage that all this does not imply a 
deterministic view. What is being alluded is that at the end of the day 
genes do indeed count. Environment plays a very important role in 
determining human outcomes, but within a range (albeit large and varies) 
and spectrum of possibilities beyond which genetic determinism plays a 
                                                                                                                                                            
that in the past populations were indeed subject to natural selection too. 
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more important role than one may wish to admit. After all, why should 
insurance companies or parents wishing to ‘select’ embryos bother if this 
were not so. One cannot dismiss the whole humanistic arena of thought 
and that factors like education and socioeconomic environment are 
secondary. They are indeed primary factors as well on individuality. 
 
When thought of in this way, the phenotype is thus essentially directly 
dependent on the genotype. If the essence of human nature and anatomy is 
dependent on this range of phenotypes which environment can affect, than 
the only way we can change this essence is by intervention on the 
genotype. It is only then that the said environment (probably Einstein had 
to be born when he was born to discover relativity) can be used to effect 
this possibility of being. The environment can only play a role within the 
range of possibilities dictated by the genome. One has to conclude that it is 
thus a natural truth that the genotype affects the phenotype; it is a 
contingent truth that the environment affects our essence. It can only do so 
at the whim, as it were, of the genotype. 
 
c). Therefore are Genetic tests special? 
We must now ask ourselves whether the fact that genetic essentialism is 
true makes genetic information special. In other words, is the predictive  
nature of genetic information of relevance to this genetic essentialism. It 
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does not follow that genetic essentialism gives a straightforward claim that 
genetic information is special. If at all we must show why. Let us consider 
two predictive tests, one from the genotype (BRCA) and blood 
cholesterol, a phenotype test. Clearly the distinction is that the latter is 
only a phenotype possibility. Cholesterol needs not be found in my blood 
unless I have the familial condition which makes it more possible. A 
healthy diet can bring cholesterol down and thus reduce my statistical 
chances (and risk factor) of a heart attack or stroke. Conversely the BRCA 
result is there to stay. Research may show that the ge netic removal of this 
gene may or may not have an outcome on phenotype – the appearance of 
the malignancy. Conversely a change in environment (mastectomy) will 
practically eliminate the risk of cancer. Both kinds of tests are affected by 
a possible solution, albeit one more radically than the other. But the 
BRCA tells me something of my essence. Although it does not tell me 
who I am (on its own), it tells me however that I have a definite statistical 
risk. Natural environment will not change this; only intervention would. 
Although the same can be said for high cholesterol in that only genetically 
predisposed individuals will develop, and albeit this is a specific test of 
one of a possible range of phenotype, it is nevertheless one possibility of 
the range and thus a direct result of the genotype. If there is a difference it 
is that one is an a priori condition of the phenotype, whilst the other is an a 
posteriori condition of the environment. Only the manifestation of breast 
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cancer would be an a posteriori condition of the environment in the case of 
breast cancer and not the BRCA gene.  
 
But can one say in this respect that there is anything special about the 
tests? Even for prenatal diagnosis there are non-genetic tests that may 
induce us to eliminate certain fetuses. Yet genetic tests provide a greater 
potential not only for eliminating affected fetuses, but for choosing a priori 
part of the essence (in so far as a characteristic/s can form part of the 
essence) of the individual on which a decision is made on whether to 
eliminate it or not. This is somewhat different than a posteriori killing 
affected fetuses. The genetic information thus gives us a potential of 
acting by choice, before the fertilized eggs develop into a possible of 
phenotype. This choice would not be available in regard to the phenotype, 
the developed embryo or adult, unless by killing. Although one may argue 
that both instances are killing, the danger with selection is that we may 
tend to put less weight on its moral consequence. This kind of  
geneticisation (a moral consequential act) makes genetic tests special (be 
it given that genetic essentialism is true).  
 
Is ‘c’ dependent on ‘b’: Geneticisation 
Is the moral consequence of selecting populations merely one of a 
divergence of opinion about whether killing or discarding fertilized eggs is 
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equivalent to killing an adult human, or is it one of consequence to 
affecting our genome? In this respect, is the major moral problem merely 
one of defining the categories of beings who may be discraded, or that of a 
responsibility to future generations? Geneticisation is the reduction of the 
differences between individuals to their DNA (Lippman 1992). It has been 
associated with medicalisation – the reduction of medical conditions to 
their genetic bases. It is argued that medical professionals (in Cyprus, for 
example) do not only consider the burden of a disease on the patient but 
the future burden of the treatment itself (Hoedemaekers and ten Have 
1998).  
The main problem with geneticisation need not be its reduction of 
medicine to genetic therapy (ten Have 2001). The concern is mostly with 
an attitude towards life in general and with choosing eugenically future 
populations. The percentage of the population in Cyprus being 
thalassaemic will be reduced. This was done either by social pressure on 
couples who are both carriers advising them of their potential chances of 
having homozygous offspring, and directly by selective abortion. 
Paternalism in these instances appears in different forms – strategies are 
used to convey the importance of preventive measures (in this case beta-
thalassaemia). This results in social pressure that limits free choice. 
Responsibility is put on couples and moreover on health professionals in 
directing their decisions. Quality of life arguments are used to justify 
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remedial actions, such as selective abortion which became part of general 
medical practice and acceptable for target groups. Although this seems 
inconsistent with the goals of medicine is had been condoned by the 
World Health Organization (WHO 1983). Thalassaemics became a burden 
on medical resources. Although active treatment programs were upheld for 
thalassaemia patients, it was at the same time giving society a message 
they should not have further children with the condition. The decrease in 
thalassaemia came about by selectively eliminating genetically ‘tainted’ 
individuals. Such a measure can only be acceptable to individuals who put 
no moral value on fetuses. A fetus is reduced to its genetic essence, rather 
than merely as a human being. Clearly for that section of the human 
population who uphold the status of the embryo, it is not only this 
geneticisation plays a crucial role. It can be argued therefore that in this 
respect genetic tests are indeed more special than other medical tests. One 
can conclude that the answer to question ‘c’ above is affirmative and that 
since genetic essentialism is contingently or naturally true, then genetic 
information is special. But even if one were not to confer any status to the 
embryo, the conclusion still holds insofar as the power it gives us to affect 
outcomes of future generations. 
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The ‘power’ factor 
But what about the claim that there are other tests which like genetic tests 
can be used towards the same end as genetic tests (which would imply 
there is nothing special about these tests as argued by Holm). This answer 
lies within the broadened scope of power we have over population cohort 
selection or elimination (as suggested above) in an area where there is 
moral disagreement – namely that of the status of the embryo. Clearly no 
one would eliminate me when I am an adult because of a genetic 
condition. But if my genetic status were known in my embryonic stage, 
then I would have been left to the whim of the moral values of others. In 
other words, what makes genetic tests special is also due to the fact that 
we disagree in other moral areas. If we were all to agree on upholding the 
status of the embryo, then the scope of whether genetic tests are special or 
not would only be in their potential to change the essence of the potential 
person – the genotype.  
 
Clearly however genetics may give us the power to cure genetic disease, 
rather than discard fetuses, by effecting a structural change to the gene. 
This will only result in genetic changes to the offspring of the family tree 
of that condition. Such families may welcome even a mild genetic side 
effect in exchange for the cure of a terrible disease like Huntington’s. 
Since these diseases do not affect in any other way the human genome 
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pool, the cures similarly will not affect future generations as they will be 
transmitted purely down these family lines.  
 
But the ‘power’ over our genome has also raised concerns of 
discrimination against the disabled (Parens and Adrienne 1999). It can be 
argued that this concern is unfounded and what is really at issue is again 
the status of the embryo. For if I am pro-choice, I am concerned with the 
elimination of a disorder or disability. Surely even the disabled would 
accept a cure of their condition (excluding from this argument groups who 
do not view their condition as a disability such as the Deaf). If one does 
not revere the status of the embryo, selectively aborting that embryo 
would not constitute a discriminatory act but simply an act against the 
disease like any other act to cure that disease. Conversely, if one is pro-
life, all abortions are wrong and not simply the ones against disabled. It is 
a contradiction in terms for one to be pro-choice and yet still consider 
selective abortion discriminatory – for that would mean one is against 
eliminating the disease. Only groups like the Deaf can take this stance 
whose reasoning should then be similar to the rest of the general 
population, that is, depending on their conception of the embryo. 
 
Therefore the special nature of genetic tests lies in their potential to give 
us the power to choose our offspring, to choose the perfect baby. 
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Moreover it extends our medical goals to use a form of genetic hygiene to 
clear our populations from genetic conditions – a power which comes at 
the expense of the fetus. Since other tests can only be done on adult 
humans and those done on the fetus are very limited (like alpha feto-
protein), this width of the new parameters of the new genetics increases 
the value of this genetic information. The problem at the root is our moral 
differences concerning such issues as the moral status of the embryo. Until 
these differences are resolved, genetic essentialism definitely can be said 
to give a special significance to genetic information.  
 
Conclusion 
It has been argued that genetic essentialism is a necessary truth. Tests 
done on the phenotype are contingent truths and that there is no doubt 
about the special significance of the genome. Yet this genetic essentialism 
cannot be a premise to conclude that genetic information is special as a 
direct result. There has to be something which makes genetic tests 
significantly different from other forms of tests. It has been argued that 
their significance lies in the power that genetic information gives us. This 
power results from the broad amount of information we can have to 
engender offspring in a way we like. This power can be invoked by or 
conferred upon governments to rid countries of traits that are a burden to 
health care resources. That the WHO has already condoned such activities 
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stresses the importance we must give the argument of the special nature of 
genetic information. 
 
There is no way of telling where the use of genetic information for 
selective screening of fertilized ova or fetuses will end. The panacea will 
invariably involve future generations who were ‘made’ through such 
selective processes to in turn select different traits in their offspring from 
those traits which may have rendered their lives a misery of pressure to 
live up to what was expected of them. A significant problem at the root of 
all this is our understanding of the status of the embryo, until issues like 
cloning and genetic therapies become a practical reality. A further moral 
issue however which is of equally significant concern, is the pressure  
which society (or family) can put on these selected people and the pressure 
which these in turn would induce in their offspring. Life would have 
turned from merely trying to provide your children with a better future 
into choosing, or protecting from, genetic traits of your choice. If giving 
our children a brighter future means adding to the existent pressure of 
family size another one of selecting genes to become a better ballerina 
than her mother, we would be deleting considerably the liberty our 
children have to explore their own potentialities. If it can be argued that 
this does not make genetic information anymore special than other tests 
then it could be argued that there is nothing special about genetic 
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information. But to honestly argue that selecting a child’s genetic make-up 
through information and elimination of other potential children of yours is 
equivalent to trying to give your child a better education by selecting a 
better school is being over-enthusiastic and ambitious to say the least. One 
can only conclude that without being deterministic in outlook, in today’s 
cultural/scientific ambience there is indeed something special about 
genetic information. After all it is from genetic tests that one embryo can 
be chosen over another; and this due to a determining factor which will 
form part of the being of the embryo. 
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Can the four middle-level principles (respect for autonomy, beneficence, 
nonmaleficence and Justice) after specification resolve moral issues in 
genetics, in particular genetic screening and testing? More specifically, 
can policy makers, as has been the case in Cyprus, use principles and 
invoke justice to demand genetic testing, and do such demands justify 
selective abortions and screening? Can the wish to have a perfect baby by 
eliminating genetically affected embryos be justified (or questioned) by 
specifying mid-level principles? In this article we will argue that although 
mid-level principles are useful in pursuing discussions about genetic 
screening and testing, specification and balancing is not enough to arrive 
at the hard-core questions of whether a life is worth sacrificing. This can 
only be done on moral grounds or higher-order principles such as respect 
for life, which seem rather difficult in the present bioethics scenario. 
 
This article is broadly divided into a metaethical analysis of where 
principlism has arrived at today, and then to substantiate what principlism 
stands for today into the realm of genetic screening and testing.  
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Metaethical issues. 
The recent writings of bioethical scholars at the turn of the century have 
shown that principlism8 as a philosophical theory (or method) is in a 
philosophical quagmire. Principlism was one of the first contemporary 
attempts to ground bioethics in a theory (Smith Iltis, 2000). In fact 
Beauchamp and Childress would not have it called a theory at all and refer 
to it as a method to tackle decision-making in bioethics (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 1979). Their idea is that despite our differences we could all 
agree on certain basic principles; the rest being to identify a common 
morality. In the fourth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics  
(Beauchamp and Childress, 1994) they realized something extra was 
needed to help resolve moral issues. They thus introduced what 
Richardson (1990) had called ‘specifism’ - after a process of specifying 
one’s way the moral solution should be obvious.  
 
Richardson laments that Beauchamp and Childress still rely much on 
balancing principles rather than specification (Richardson, 2000). His 
primary purpose is not to develop another theory but to show where 
                                                               
 
8 A company recently set up in Malta has sent adverts to the health professions promoting 
the tests it carries out. The Family doctor, who in this country is not required by law to 
undergo specific training in genetic counseling before referring patients, may be unaware 
of the ethical implications of such tests unless the local authorities sit down and formulate 
guidelines, may invariably send patients for testing even without proper informed 
consent. 
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principles can be made useful (Ibid., p. 287) arguing that balancing is a 
metaphor to be relegated in favour of specifying principles.  
 
Casuists posit their method as an alternative to specified principlism and 
other approaches to bioethical decision-making (Smith Iltis, 2000, p.279). 
Strong (2000) defends a form of casuistry that recognizes the importance 
of ethical principles where casuistry and principlism can be compatible. 
But casuistry is more practical than specified principlism, which lacks a 
method for reasoning to resolve conflicting principles (Ibid., p. 330). 
Casuistry is not a theory but a method using ethical values to arrive to 
moral conclusions. In this respect Strong claims it is superior to specified 
principlism and that the claim by Richardson that specified principlism 
provides the most promising method for resolving cases is unfounded 
(Ibid., p. 339). 
 
Beauchamp (2000) points out that specified principlism and casuistry have 
a lot in common both being case-based approach methods (Ibid., 344). He 
argues that any principlist will know that the more difficult or specific the 
case, the more one needs to specify to particular situations. This however 
brings to light the main problem with principlist and other theories: They 
are directed at resolving or discussing case -specific moral issues, leaving 
broader issues like abortion, assisted suicide, and genetic screening and 
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testing without moral resolution. If we are to have a principle-based 
approach to understanding the ethics of genetic screening and testing we 
must at least be able to specify our way further than the four principles.  
 
The importance of principles 
Nevertheless Evans (2000) shows that the use of principles has societal 
value both in policy and legal language. In this sense they may be 
considered sociologically important. Legislators have to use terms that are 
understandable by the public and words like ‘beneficence’, ‘justice’ and 
‘autonomy’ resound well. It is this usefulness that explains the rise and 
success of principles (Ibid., p. 34). If citizens cannot trust their 
government officials to exercise their discretion over where, for example, 
to build a dam, they certainly cannot trust their government concerning 
bioethical issues. Thus the institutional review board (IRB), which 
represents indirectly the government, must not only be satisfied that the 
researchers are confident that their work is ethical, they must also be able 
to show the public and “better yet, ‘prove’ with objective, transparent 
methods, that the research is ethical” (Ibid. p. 35). Evans also shows how 
the President’s Commission on human genetic engineering, Splicing Life 
(see p. 33, f/n 11) tackled the issue of ‘Playing God’ (which was raised by 
three theologians who had written to President Carter in 1980) using a 
risk-benefit analysis. “Principlism had created a language that could be 
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used to discard enough information to bring order to this difficult 
problem” (Ibid., p. 34). 
 
Eric Cassell (2000) also describes how the principles formulated in the 
Belmont Report changed the face of medicine. Medicine has moved from 
a physician-centered to a patient-centered approach. Today patients may 
believe that it is not the doctor, but science and technology that diagnose, 
treat and cure disease (Ibid., p. 15). The blossoming of individualism has 
put greater weight on respect for autonomy. Patients are given reports and 
their conditions discussed openly. Cassell seems to lament the old days 
when a more humane approach was the norm. We no longer understand 
the principles of the Belmont report as when they were formulated. The 
meaning of benevolence has shifted from acting for the good of the sick 
person to acting for the good of the body part. 
 
O’Neill (2001) tries to show how principles identify requirements we must 
live up to; although they do not actually tell us what to do, we must 
honour general commitments. Those who dismiss principles as 
impractical, she argues, have misunderstood how principles work (Ibid., p 
15). Although she admits that practical principles alone are insufficient for 
guidance, they are not pointless as their opponents would have them (Ibid., 
p 18). Ethical principles are not algorithmic; they may constrain but do not 
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regiment action. What is right for one person may not be the same for 
another. Although we hold the principle that people should eat the right 
amount of food, this ‘right amount’ is different from an office clerk to a 
builder. But the principle holds. She argues therefore that for practical 
judgement it is impossible to dispense with principles unless one can 
establish a radical form of particularism, something, she argues, which is 
of the greatest epistemological difficulty (Ibid., p. 20). Benjamin 
conversely shows that practical ethics has taken a broadly pragmatic 
approach. Judgements about particular cases change with changing values 
and principles and with changing background beliefs and theories 
(Benjamin, 2001: 25). New knowledge, as is genetic knowledge, brings 
about new possibilities that create or aggravate as many conflicts as they 
eliminate or reduce (Ibid., p. 27).  In today’s modern and pluralistic world 
we will have good and important principles that will be inherently 
incompatible and one cannot assume therefore that ethical theory must be 
singular and comprehensive. 
 
The use of higher-order principles in genetic screening and testing 
Nevertheless it is in this context that decisions on genetic testing and 
screening are taking place. Today a person can walk into a clinic and ask 
for specific genetic tests to be done. Genetic tests are publicized 
(Chandros Hull and Prasad, 2001) so as to make the public aware that they 
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too are at risk; portraying that knowledge of the genetic status will give 
them a cure. Chandros Hull and Prasad lament the untruth of such adverts. 
Companies can start operating in countries where legislation is poor and 
where they can perform genetic tests for locals and foreigners9. This is 
especially relevant where patients can go to private practitioners who may 
wish not to refuse what seem to be autonomous requests by people.  
 
Whilst O’Neill’s argument seems sound therefore, the question remains 
whether we can resolve moral dilemmas in genetics using the four 
principles alone. That principles for genetic screening and testing are 
needed can be argued from diverse circumstances. For primary care 
physicians to do screening and counseling, having had proper training 
(BMA, 1998; Harper and Clarke, 1997:192; Christie and Hoffmaster, 
1986, p.176), guidelines and specific principles are necessary to deal 
effectively with surrounding issues. One needs a principle for example of 
whether or not genetic information should be revealed to insurance 
companies. The British Medical Association, albeit aware of the sensitive 
nature of genetic tests (BMA, 1998, p.235) recommends that doctors 
reveal results if they were known at the time of applying for insurance. 
However genetic tests cannot be requested by insurers (Ibid). Yet it can be 
argued that it is not fair for individua ls to disclose their genetic 
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constitution to insurers both on account that it can be misinterpreted and a 
heterozygous (and hence benign) condition penalized (Capron, 1990) and 
also because if insurance is to be fair it must give a fair analysis to all. 
Hence premium goes up with age; existing conditions are not insured or 
carry increased premiums, and specific tests are requested of all people 
applying for insurance. If genetic tests are to be requested by insurance 
companies they must be requested of all people if they are to have a fair 
assessment. Genetic tests tell us nothing of existing conditions, they 
simply have a predictive and presymptomatic nature. If one is to assess the 
risk of breast cancer by BRCA testing therefore, one has to carry out this 
test in all women. It is unfair to penalize only those who have been 
courageous enough to actually do the test. Risks are risks, whether we 
know about them or not. On the other hand, if we were to request genetic 
tests of everybody, we would jeopardize the right not to know. For 
example a young man who has Huntington’s disease in his family may not 
feel it in his interest to know if he will develop the disease later on in life. 
We need a higher order principle protecting genetic knowledge from 
insurance companies except in specific agreed upon conditions. 
 
Richardson recognizes this imperative of needing additional principles in 
order to specify the general principles. He uses the case of the Belmont 
Report which brought out the first three of the four principles (Beauchamp 
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and Childress had split the principle of beneficence in beneficence and 
non-maleficence) when applied to children (Richardson, 2000). In order 
for example to do research on human subjects, one must make sure that 
the principles of beneficence, autonomy and justice are adequately 
satisfied. This is not the case for children who cannot be considered fully 
autonomous to impart an informed consent. Thus we also start out with a 
principle that unites them and specifies how they are brought to bear on 
the research context. He uses this argument in order to show the difference 
between balancing principles and specifying principles, and arguing in the 
process that one can only really specify (Ibid, p.303). Yet in the process he 
shows that one must rely on a higher order moral principle. In this case it 
is the principle that we cannot conduct research on children because the 
four principles alone are simply not satisfied. Luckily we agree on this 
principle to protect children. 
 
Indeed other authors ha ve advocated the need for other moral factors in 
the decision making process. Sellers (1994) argues that in the context of 
whether to eliminate a fetus which tests positive in a genetic test, the 
principles of autonomy, non-maleficence and beneficence contribute 
significantly to the decision-making process, "…but the fact that there is a 
decision to be made, that abortion is allowed for cases of genetic disease, 
is dependent on something else and that is the moral status of the fetus” 
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(Sellers 1994, p. 968). There is no way of balancing between beneficence 
and justice to the fetus, beneficence and justice to the mother and 
beneficence to the family which she must look after. Sellers also argues 
that experience has shown that genetic counselors refer patients to 
gynaecologists for prenatal diagnosis for sex–related disorders solely on 
parental whim and if the parents feel that sex selection is warranted for 
their wellbeing, even if not on medical grounds, then autonomy should 
prevail (Ibid. p.969) – again a disturbing result of the failure to balance 
between principles by specification without having higher order 
principles. 
 
 
Beauchamp and Childress themselves find it difficult to resolve issues of 
genetic testing and screening by specification (Beauchamp and Childress, 
1994, p. 405). Whilst they make a sound analysis of whether workers who 
are genetically predisposed to develop diseases at the place of work can or 
cannot be made not to work in the company if they are a risk to others 
(Ibid., p.316-317), they make a less convincing argument when it comes to 
disclosure of information between couples (Ibid., p. 405). They cite an 
example of a woman, presenting with her spouse, seeking tests for 
infertility. She is found to have XY chromosomes. The question is 
whether to give the results only to her or whether to tell them both 
together. Does marriage confer a duty on us towards both spouses, 
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overriding individual autonomy, especially if they came together? Does 
not the husband have a right to know about his wife’s condition - that she 
is only phenotypically female, will never be able to bear children, and that 
she will require an operation to remove the undescended testes because of 
the risk of malignant transformation? Clearly in order to specify, we need 
a higher order moral principle on marriage privileges. 
 
Is there a case for specific higher-order principles in genetics 
only? 
The value of principles in guiding moral judgement cannot be 
underestimated, even if they do not help us in determining a moral course 
of action. However, the non-specificity of principles is not helpful in 
determining outcome without specification of a higher set of principles 
than the ‘four mid-level principles’ in order to guide action? A possible 
scenario could be to find solace in agreeing upon specific principles within 
the context of genetics only; without, that is, imposing this ‘selective 
agreement’ on other controversial areas. We have already seen some 
examples. Another could include a principle safeguarding the human 
genome for future and present generations hence guiding genetic curing 
and enhancement technologies especially on germ cells. The status of the 
embryo could be defined for genetic purposes only. Concern exists to 
protect fetuses from selective abortion. On the other hand selective 
abortion in order to select traits may be seen as a moral imperative and 
 109 
responsibility of parents (McGee, 1997), raising concern for disabled 
fetuses and those that do not carry the trait that their parents would select.  
 
Yet another princip le could respect parental rights. We know that parental 
rights are not absolute but we also feel the need to give parents some 
control over tests being carried out on their children (Pelias and 
Markward, 2001; Mallia, 2002) . This is the reason why parents sign 
consent forms and why the process of informed consent must go through 
them. Although it has been argued that young people can make decisions 
on their own vis-à-vis genetic testing (Dickenson, 1999), parents may have 
a right to refuse testing on their children. In an unclear future where 
genetic traits may be important in job selection, and in which genetic cures 
are possible, parents may wish to refuse tests until their children are 
mature enough to understand them. On the other hand, supposing a cure is 
possible for a genetic disorder which requires the result of a genetic test, 
would parents still have a right to refuse such testing considering the 
implications? Such could be the possible scenario for Huntington’s disease 
or for breast cancer. Parents are naturally protective of their children from 
both possible future disadvantages and uncertain cures. A principle of 
parental autonomy would help in developing clearer guidelines to parental 
consent without making such a principle absolute (insofar as denying 
treatment in certain circumstances may be considered a harm).  
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The drawbacks to such a scenario of selective agreement are implicit and 
immediately, almost embarrassingly, evident. Can one define the status of 
the embryo, for example, in one respect when dealing with genetics, and 
leave it unresolved when dealing in other areas? It may be to hard for the 
secular world to consider the status of the embryo as a human being. To 
accept such a proposal would mean opposing abortion which Pro-choice 
people will not favor. But if it can be argued that such a principle is used 
only in the case of genetic testing and screening so as to prevent abortion 
being used liberally for the purpose of selecting traits, then there may be 
an argument for preventing the slippery slope of abortion in all 
circumstances. Pro-choice individuals have argued, for example, that 
selective abortion discriminates against disabled (Parens and Asch, 
1999:S2-S3). Conversely such a principle would protect the disabled from 
being prevented a life because of their genetic constitution. It also prevents 
potential people being selected or discarded because of their genetic traits. 
This would have to be considered also in the light that such selective 
procedures would probably be available only to economically advanced 
societies. This would give them an overall genetic advantage over other 
countries.  
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Can one agree, on the other hand, to allow selective abortion for purposes 
of scarce resources, after specifying that in this circumstance justice 
overrides beneficence and autonomy? The Cyprus paradigm has illustrated 
this point. Medical professionals (in Cyprus) do not only consider the 
burden of a disease on the patient but the future burden of the treatment 
itself. Paternalism appears in different forms – strategies are used to 
convey the importance of preventive measures (in this case beta-
thalassaemia). This results in social pressure that limits freedom choice. 
Responsibility is put on couples and moreover on health professionals in 
directing their decisions. Quality of life arguments are used to justify 
remedial actions, such as selective abortion, which became part of general 
medical practice and acceptable for target groups (Hoedemakers and ten 
Have, 1998)  . Yet this had also been condoned by the World Health 
Organization (1983) which argued that it is a paradigm case of how 
countries should solve their genetic health issues. Now it is understood 
that countries, which face a financial burden because of a particular 
genetic disorder, may feel duty bound to do something about it. And 
admittedly the lives of Cypriots with thalassaemia have been enhanced by 
the considerable reduction in the frequency of those born with the disease 
(Kitcher, 1996). But can one allow selective abortion for the resolution of 
scarce resources and the elimination of a genetic condition which is a 
burden and then not allow for selective abortion to select genetically 
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preferred traits or eliminate others by parents? How can one resolve this 
by specification if not at the whim of the specifee?  
 
Conclusion 
Whilst in certain circumstances therefore it would seem that specification 
leads us to reasonable resolution of dilemmas or problems, in others it just 
leaves us in areas of unresolved moral issues. Thus Richardson’s example 
of specification in the case for children who cannot be considered fully 
autonomous works because we already have a stance on the moral status 
of children. Similarly Beauchamp and Childress’ arguments on whether 
employees who are genetically susceptible to harm in certain work 
environments can easily be resolved by specification and balancing 
because we already know the answers once the issues are spread clear. If 
workers, when exposed to a certain milieu will be at risk of harm to self or 
others, then it is reasonable to prohibit them from working or to make 
them take responsibility in some way. 
 
But when it comes to issues of selective abortion or discard, parental 
autonomy and rights of future generations the issues cannot be resolved by 
simple specification (and/or balancing) of mid-level principles as these hit 
on moral ground on which there is profound disagreement. Even if we do 
agree-to-agree on, say, the status of the embryo, or parental rights, only for 
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deliberations in genetics, it is difficult to see how in the long run these are 
not extrapolated into other areas by slippery slope. Thus if we say the 
embryo has legal status for purposes of preventing genetic selection, by 
the same reasoning, when using principles in other areas of bioethics, we 
may agree not to confer a legal status to the embryo. This confusion in 
legislation makes selective agreement rather difficult if not impossible. 
Moreover if we had to give parents the right to refuse genetic tests, would 
not the same rights allow the use of genetic tests to select the ‘perfect 
baby’ by genetic elimination?  
 
One can only conclude that the use of principles by specification, with or 
without balancing, can only be used where the specified areas have clear 
moral guidance. The area of gene tic screening and testing is too fraught 
with moral ground on which there is profound disagreement. One cannot 
specify when one is faced with a choice between whether to define an 
embryo as a human being protected by rights or as simply a potential 
human to which no rights can be attributed. It would seem therefore that in 
genetics beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice alone cannot 
be specified any further unless principles of higher (moral) order were 
resolved. This does not seem to be the case for the near future and other 
than expounding opposing views or merely for deliberation of issues, the 
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four mid-level principles cannot be used, in our opinion, to resolve 
questions of moral significance in genetic screening. 
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This article considers the implications of pragmatic approaches to 
genetics, in particular genetic screening, in the light of  advances in genetic 
knowledge which have created more possibilities in prevention of 
disabilities through a selective process. 
 
McGee (1997) suggests replacing determinist, reductionist thinking with a 
pragmatic recognition of the interaction and cultural matrices in 
approaching genetics. Only in this way, he asserts, can we begin to 
develop coherent accounts of organic function which both “acknowledge 
the power of genetic structures and do not obscure their reciprocal, 
temporal relationships with the environment” (ibid., p.78). He defends a 
‘commonsense reproduction’ in which the search of a perfect baby can be 
extended by genetic choices. That parents may force a genetically 
predetermined child to excel in sport is something that to a certain extent 
is already found in our society today. The athlete will induce his child into 
more training and exercise than the average parent; the scholar will create 
a better study environment for his children. McGee says that little 
attention is paid to this parenthood dimension. The ‘Perfect Baby’ is an 
icon of hope; but more than hope, responsible parenthood involves 
choices; “choosing to make a baby involves a commitment to work to 
make a better life for that baby”(Ibid., p. 78). We need to undress the 
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myths around ‘playing God’ arguments and recognise we do so already in 
many ways. 
 
It is unclear whether the word ‘make’ incorporates merely the conjugal act 
of attempting to have a baby, or whether it involves the Gattacian10 
process of screening genes of potential embryos and selecting the best 
characteristics deemed so by the parents.  
 
Is it therefore the inevitable path that to raise children would imply 
selecting genetically the potential children you have to offer? Would this 
pragmatic approach to genetics lead us into questionable moral grounds, in 
which case should one strive to understand these grounds? Ideally for 
example moralists have tried to persuade genetic counselors to be 
nondirective in their approach with patients or clients - an approach which 
poses considerable questions in itself (Clarke, 1998: 401). How can one 
remain indifferent to a couple who is selecting to have a girl over a boy 
simply because they already have another girl? Gender selection has not 
only been criticized, it is illegal by many conve ntions11. Yet a pragmatic 
                                                               
 
Notes: 
 
10 After the film “Gattaca”, which portrayed a society that chose its babies through a 
process of in-vitro fertilization and selection of the best embryos. 
11 As an example see Council of Europe Convention for Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Biomedicine: 
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approach may not question the morality of this choice, although in theory 
it may agree on biological grounds so as not to create an imbalance 
between males and females. With this approach, a pragmatist may opt for 
allowing gender selection if there already exists an imbalance between the 
sexes in order to try to achieve equality. Like the principlist, the 
pragmatist will specify and balance situations, but in the process trying to 
debunk biological myths. 
 
In order to evaluate such thinking and to see in what circumstances it can 
and cannot make sense and in order to see whether it is even technically 
feasible to put all form of reductionism and moral thinking aside, we need 
first to go to the core of pragmatism itself. 
 
Pragmatism: relativism or conversation? 
Rorty (1998) admits that “pragmatism” is a “vague, ambiguous, and 
overworked word”. He characterizes pragmatism on various levels, 
asserting that it is simple anti-essentialism opposed to notions like ‘truth’, 
‘language’ and ‘morality’. The pragmatist tells us that it is the morality of 
practice, rather than theory, of action rather than contemplation, in which 
one can say something useful about ‘truth’.  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) , Chapter IV, Article 14 (Non-
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Secondly, Rorty characterizes pragmatism as not seeing an 
epistemological difference between truth about what ought to be and truth 
about what is, nor any metaphysical difference between facts and values or 
methodological difference between morality and science. He argues that 
even nonpragmatists think Plato was wrong to think of morality as 
discovering the essence of goodness or Mill and Kant in reducing morality 
to rules and duties. When the pragmatist thus attacks the notion of truth as 
accuracy of representation he is thus attacking “the traditional distinctions 
between reason and desire, reason and appetite and reason and 
will”(Rorty, 1998: 164). Rorty laments that conformity to the social norms 
is not good enough for the Platonist, who wants to further constrain 
himself by Kantian strategies of finding principles which are definatory of 
the essence of knowledge, morality and rationality:  “It is the urge to 
answer questions like ‘Why believe what I take to be true?’ ‘Why do what 
I take to be right?’ by appealing to something more than the ordinary, 
retail, detailed, concrete reasons which have brought one to one’s present 
view” (Ibid. p.164). This urge is common to nineteenth century idealists 
and contemporary realists from Russell to Husserl and Heidegger who ask 
us to abandon that tradition. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
selection of sex). 
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Finally, Rorty equates pragmatism with conversation. Philosophy brings 
self-knowledge by letting us read our own picture and not by 
programming us into believing certain pictures. He prefers this third 
characterization because it focuses on the fundamental choice of the 
human mind to converse with our fellow human beings as our only source 
of guidance. Thus what Christians have sought to find in the conformity 
with the voice of God, and Kantians in a priori principles, the pragmatist 
seeks to be liberated from and finds his Nietzschean ‘metaphysical 
comfort’ in a renewed sense of community. “Our identifiation with our 
community – our society, our political tradition, our intellectual heritage – 
is heightened when we see this community as ours rather than nature’s , 
shaped rather than found, one among many which men have made” 
(Idem.). In the end what matters is one’s loyalty to fellow human beings 
clinging together against the dark, and not the hope of getting it right. 
 
Pragmatism is not relativism. For Rorty pragmatists are relativists only 
with respect to philosophical theories and not real theories. Thus Rorty 
explains how the attempt of philosophers to ground the elements of 
philosophical practice into something external to these practices, a theory, 
is futile and therefore whatever theory one uses is immaterial. But the 
pragmatist is all out in favor of conversation with political and social 
theories of change and practice. ‘Relativism’ is thus the view that every 
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belief in a certain topic is just as good as any other belief. No one really 
holds this view and philosophers who are called relativists are usually 
those who see little difference between the grounds for choosing such 
opinions. Kantian or Platonic theories are just attempts to ground our 
beliefs into a neat coherence. “Pragmatists think that any such 
philosophical grounding is, apart from elegance of execution, pretty much 
as good or as bad as the practice it purports to ground” (Ibid., p.167). 
Rorty laments that those who call pragmatists relativist make the mistake 
of thinking that once you hold a relative position on the philosophical 
theories (attempts at grounding) lead themselves to being relativistic about 
the first -level theories themselves. Nobody cares about incompatible 
alternative formulations of a categorical imperative but the pragmatist 
cares about political change and engages in debate not in terms of 
categories or principles but in terms of various concrete advantages and 
disadvantages. Thus the pragmatist will use principles only as hypothetical 
guidelines, which can be abandoned in favour of a general consensus. 
 
However, to classify all pragmatists as Rortyan would be to misconstrue 
the whole idea of pragmatism. Indeed many modern pragmatists like 
McGee would classify themselves as Deweyan. Dewey and Rorty speak of 
different kinds of instrumentalism. Dewey dealt not just with individual 
attempts to find truth through practical experience but emphasized the 
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biological and psychological aspects of thinking (Popkin, 1999, p.600). 
Thinking is a biological phenomenon that involves a biological entity 
interacting with its environment. This entity in the human form cannot be 
separated on an intellectual level which does not take into account the 
situations which people deal with in the real world. This is very much like 
the phenomenologist’s being-in-the -world criterion. Dewey was 
influenced by Hegel. Nevertheless he tried to show that a liberal society 
need not presuppose, as Hegel claimed, abstract principles or a standpoint 
outside history, as its basis for moral inquiry. Although individuals are 
indeed shaped by their community, they can, through rational inquiry 
devise new solutions to social problems, working consciously together to 
reform their community and their own moral outlooks (Schneewind, 2001, 
p. 154). Like Peirce and James, Dewey rejects the ‘quest for certainty’, 
and is suspicious of philosophical dualisms from Plato through to 
Descartes. Unlike Peirce and James, however, he suggests a psychological 
basis for this desire for certainty. It arose from the sharp dichotomy 
between theory and practice and the distaste for the uncertain, change, and 
for what is practical found in Greek culture (Haack, 2001, p. 354). Rorty is 
thus more poignant and is the more radical of pragmatists, contrating 
pragmatism to ‘realism’ (Ibid., p. 355).  
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Pragmatists neither put all morals aside nor think reductionistically as 
biologists. Instead they view moral principles as hypotheticals that need to 
be validated in the particularities of the context. Indeed this brings them 
close to principlists, for not only do they not operate in a place devoid of 
principles but indeed will balance and specify them. The scientific 
methods thus needs to be applied to normative issues. Deweyan 
pragmatism is deeply indebted to Hegel in its historicism. There are 
historical precedents and norms and notions of good and bad. The point is 
that they are not fixed or absolute and evolve over time. That does not 
mean that they do not inform conduct or behaviour in a particular context. 
There are also some fixed notions in pragmatism in fact (a regard for 
deliberative democracy and consensus, for example), that helps ensure that 
these norms do not deviate into mere contextualism. Pragmatism therefore 
cannot be equated with situationalism or relativism. 
 
McGee (1997, p. 50) for example laments at how those in American 
academia have largely distanced themselves from immersion in the field 
of public discussion. Philosophical scholarship “tends to settle for truths 
that work within what John Dewey called ‘hermetically sealed systems’ of 
philosophical thinking. Our systems calim to be grounded in religion or 
‘pure reason’ , and we too often fail to descend from our lofty and elegant 
ideals into the mundane world of everyday experiences, where we live and 
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make all of our important choices”.  McGee argues that the idea of 
‘playing God’ is misconstrued as we play God everyday in medical 
practice.  
 
Some problems with pragmatism as applied to bio-ethics 
Fins, Bacchetta, and Miller (1997) suggest a method known as ‘clinica l 
pragmatism’ to be used by clinicians at the bedside. Although the clinical 
situation is more specific than general issues in bio-ethics, it is 
nevertheless the basis where much bio-ethical decision-making on issues 
such as physician assisted suicide, the dying patient, and genetic 
counseling has to take place. One therefore already must distinguish a 
pragmatism which occurs on this micro level of bio-ethics and a 
pragmatism which occurs on the macro level of discussing the ethical 
implications of, say, genetic screening, in general. This immediately poses 
a problem for if we discuss and reach consensus on a macro level, then we 
are in effect creating guidelines and hence principles upon which we 
would recommend people to move in the (micro) clinical situation. Thus if 
we arrive at the pragmatic consensus that we should not have selective 
abortion, then we are in effect going to base this on either a principle or a 
law. If it is to be based on a law it must have a grounding principle. In any 
case a rule is being created. If at a clinical level you have an expert 
pragmatist, who can be either the patient or the doctor, he or she will 
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expect to deal pragmatically with the situation at hand without having to 
accept what has (albeit pragmatically) been agreed to beforehand. It is 
unclear therefore at what level pragmatists talk unless they are to be 
construed as merely principlists, balancing and specifying each context. 
 
Nevertheless it is just as well to expound upon the suggestions of Fins et 
al. (1997). Jansen (1998) argues that whilst it is a virtue of clinical 
pragmatism that it recommends a careful analysis of the clinical situation 
(and one may extrapolate this argument to the macro level), before 
offering moral judgements about what ought to be done, the consensus 
reached by no means is a mark of success in moral problem solving. Any 
case, in effect, could come out differently depending on how skilled the 
participants are at making their points and convincing the other side. 
Moreover, Jansen laments that the case12 selected by Fins et al. does not 
                                                               
12 Readers interested in the full details of the case should consult the paper in which it 
appears (Fins, Bacchetta, and Miller, 1997). It concerns a 91 year old gentleman with 
severe dementia and parkinson’s disease. He has just come out of intensive care for 
treatment of aspiration pneumonia. He is totally dependent and incapable of caring for 
himself. The prognosis is very poor and returning him to intensive care would be futile. 
The team wish to issue a DNR order but the gentleman’s wife (age 87) refuses 
completely, wishing them to use all possible means to keep him alive. The team 
subsequently dialogue with the lady. It was evident that she understood little about 
Parkinson’s and its prognosis. Therefore sensitive interaction and explaining helped her 
to understand and accept their position.  
 
Jansen thus laments the adequacy of such a case as a demonstration of pragmatism as it 
does not involve moral principles as hypothetical guidelines and would have explected 
the authors to produce a case in which use of principles as only hypothetical guidelines 
are demonstrated. Moreover she argues that in order to assess outcomes one must use 
some form of principles as guidelines. In this case, a different outcome, such as the 
woman being more articulate and able to persuade the medics, would have brought on the 
opposite effect – which Jansen considers is not  a mark of success of consensus. 
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show at all how principles are treated as hypothetical guides. In most 
discussions in fact they will be left out of the picture if we are simply 
limiting ourselves to assessing consequences. The possibility, thus, of a 
different consensus is not a mark of success. The success of a case is 
measured because we believe , for example, that a DNR order should have 
been given. Clinicians should thus have the knowledge of how to handle a 
situation before they are faced with one; such a priori knowledge is 
essential for good moral outcomes. One can grant that pragmatism may 
give valuable insights into how to engage in the moral debate, but, Jansen 
argues, to say that principles should be tested for outcomes pragmatically 
and that we should test them by experience is a false contrast: “On this 
view, we discover better moral principles not through pragmatic 
experimental testing, but through more careful and more subtle a priori 
reflection” (Ibid., p.34). 
  
This is in matter of fact where pragmatism is confusing. For authors have 
failed to distinguish between the earlier reference to micro and macro 
situations. Jansen asserts that we can arrive to moral principles through a 
priori reflection. The Belmont report was in fact built, it is attested, by 
reflecting on the clinical situation (Jonsen, 1994: xv). But in fact, the 
reflection had to take place on experience. Even though one can generalize 
outside specific clinical situations, one must continuously reflect and 
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contrast with the clinical setting in order to establish principles. Whether 
this is a casuist approach or in fact a pragmatic approach is irrelevant. One 
cannot establish principles without the experience of being in the world. 
But then we are left with a dilemma for the pragmatist. For if we have 
arrived at some form of principles by consensus, it would not be a 
pragmatist approach any longer had I to invoke these principles in other 
contexts and situations. Once one is using principles as hypothetical 
guides, one is in effect guiding one’s moral choices along pre-established 
principles.  
 
Pragmatism attempts to deal at both levels. Fins and Bacchetta describe a 
case history occurring at micro- level, yet in their rebuttal to Jansen, they 
work on the macro level. In fact “Pragmatists understand moral 
considerations, including rules and principles, as tools suited to do moral 
work in facing problematic situations. As circumstances of social 
existence change, some of these tools may need to be modified, 
reconstructed, or possibly scrapped, depending on their ‘functional fitness’ 
in the process of moral problem solving” (Fins, Miller and Bacchetta, 
1998, p. 40). The Principle of double effect and the distinction between 
ordinary and extraordinary medical treatment are rightfully quoted. 
However double effect was introduced in order to avoid abuse of causing a 
harm where a good is not proportionate to that harm. We may now be 
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understanding that in certain circumstances the intention is still not to 
cause harm, although the bad effect comes about as a direct rather than 
foreseen act. This is the case for killing a fetus by removing a cancerous 
uterus or an ectopic pregnancy, as opposed to killing a fetus that is caught 
in the birth canal by performing a craniotomy (Childress and Beauchamp, 
1994, p. 207) . But the spirit of double effect, even if it is changed will 
remain the same. There are fundamental beliefs underneath which cannot 
be abandoned. Conversely Fins, Miller and Bacchetta argue that clinical 
pragmatism is not situationa lism. In jumping from the clinical case they 
describe to more general (macro-) situations like double effect and 
ordinary vs extraordinary treatment, they give us little hope of understand 
the difference. This is unfortunate as used within  a moral framework, such 
as Catholicism, being pragmatic on a macro scale may provide some hope 
for arranging rule if it is too rigid.  
 
Pragmatism also encourages reaching a consensus. Ruth Bailey (1996) 
assesses the dangers of arriving pragmatically by consensus. Being a 
disabled person herself, she discusses prenatal testing and shows how 
irrelevant matters can be put on the bargaining table, especially at a 
political level, when trying to reach consensus. The policy structure 
governing prenatal diagnosis in the United Kingdom had originally been 
split between health policy, and legislation regulating abortion. In neither 
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was the use of prenatal diagnosis a substantive issue. These two strands 
were brought together in the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act. Ostensibly, Bailey asserts, this was a matter of parliamentary 
convenience rather than principle. The 1967 Abortion act did not specify 
time limits but rather made the provision that one cannot procure an 
abortion if the child was capable of being born alive, in accordance with 
the 1929 Infant Life Preservation Act. This allowed abortions only on 
severely disabled fetuses which would not have been capable, therefore, of 
living at the time of the abortion. However with advances in neonatal 
medicine, babies could be born and kept alive at 24 weeks; but if the limit 
was lowered to 24 weeks, there would have been insufficient time to abort 
fetuses based on prenatal testing – results of which are not ready before 22 
or 23 weeks. This necessitated a pragmatic approach to accommodate the 
circumstance. In effect pro-life and pro-choice parliamentarians negotiated 
a consensus. Section 4 of the 1967 Act paid little attention to which 
impairments, if any prohibited a ‘meaningful life’. In return for 
introducing the 28-week upper limit, pro-lifers negotiated that a 24 weeks 
limit was given on other sections pertaining to the mother’s life or health 
risks. However they did not realize that the provision of the Infant Life 
Preservation Act (the being capable of being born alive test) would no 
longer apply. An attempt to reintroduce the time limit failed but it was 
realized that the main problem was what constituted a ‘serious handicap’. 
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It was agreed to require medical practitioners to state the nature of the 
handicap that the fetus was at risk from on the official abortion certificate. 
Impairment had become a reason for affording a fetus less value and 
protection before the law.  
 
Bailey therefore concludes that accepting the clause permitting abortion to 
term on grounds of serious handicap was due to a mixture of political 
expediency and the persuasiveness of prevention of impairment (Ibid. 
p.159). Morgan and Lee (1989) point out that the UK now has a more 
eugenic abortion policy than before 1990 not simply because abortion can 
be carried out after 28 weeks, but because it was apparent that the most 
clearly favored ground for abortion was the genetic handicap ground. 
Clearly pragmatic discussion and consensus on such issues cannot evade 
political questions and the satisfaction of previous laws (Op. Cit., p. 159). 
Omitting the overall picture of principles (in this case that impairment 
cannot be a reason for affording a fetus less protection) can result in 
genetic laws which not only amount to eugenic policies but which can 
have implications to groups such as the disabled in this case. It should be 
feasible for policy makers to consider that the harm of terminating a 
pregnancy because the foetus is disabled can be outweighed by the idea of 
trying to ensure that children who are born with specific disabilities have 
the best possible lives they can. 
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Bailey goes on to point out recent shifts in policy which imply that 
screening for Down’s syndrome has become a matter of public health 
concern. The Report on Medical Research and Health of the Advisory 
Council on Science and Technology (1993) recommends a Central 
Screening Office to provide better coordination and implementation of all 
genetic screening programs and prenatal diagnosis. One cannot but 
reiterate at this stage the pragmatic approach by Cyprus to eliminate the 
amount of homozygous thalassaemia patients by conducting a screening 
process of all couples before they get married and enforcing counseling on 
those who both test positive. If one finds such approaches unobjectionable, 
then one must condone eugenic efforts by China (Harper, 1997).  
 
One must hail efforts of pragmatists to discuss the issue in their full social 
and biological implications. Thus an outright ban on genetic testing and an 
international law of protecting the human genome must not be based 
merely on principle and emotion. One has to discuss in depth the 
biological consequences without crying wolf before one actually sees an 
area of trouble. Concern therefore that we may damage our genome and to 
try to protect the  genome as a human heritage may in effect be 
compromising a cure to a genetic disease. Although such ideals may be 
based on bona-fide principles, one must be careful not to allow one’s 
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ignorance in a field to outbalance any hope for the ill. A family carrying a 
gene for Huntington’s disease may welcome a genetic side -effect so long 
as they are liberated from this terrible disease. And since Huntington’s 
runs down in family trees, and only there, we may expect that this side-
effect will run down only in the same families of those treated and thus 
hardly affect the overall human genome ‘heritage’. Ideas to resist 
biological advances in genetics must, it can be argued, be balanced out by 
a more pragmatic approach than merely hanging on to principles. They 
must be carried out in the light of educating those concerned about the true 
scientific facts and the real, as opposed to the imagined, threats.  
 
Approaching genetics pragmatically 
Hedgecoe (1998) relates two distinct types of problems surrounding 
genetic technology and these are the usual ones that surround most new 
medical technology: the practical difficulties and the categorical 
objections. The former are often presented as scientific truths with which 
to refute such technologies, such as the realization that following cloning, 
the DNA continues to carry the age of the donor, thus giving the clone a 
biological age which amounts to its natural age plus the age of the DNA. 
Such however are in reality pragmatic concerns that surround any new 
technology. There seems in fact to be a lack of clarification of the use of 
the term ‘pragmatism’ when applied to medical technologies, genetics in 
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particular. It would seem that consensus and dialogue are much easier on 
this level of ‘pragmatic difficulties’, which in effec t move a lot of the 
political debate, then to answer questions about ‘playing God’, doing 
eugenics, and concern for future generations in changing the human 
genome. Leon Kass and Paul Ramsey are both vocal opponents of what 
they call ‘playing God’ (Tollefsen, 2000). Conversely McGee (1999) and 
Saatkamp (1999)  write of parents’ obligation and responsibility to use 
genetic technology; they do not pose the question of whether parents 
should engage in the genetic engineering of their children. Saatkamp 
writes that the new human genetics provides practical and specific 
guidelines for parents and societies that wish to choose characteristics and 
behavioral patterns for future generations (Ibid, 1999: 56), whilst McGee 
holds eugenics and public education as attempts to make people more 
intelligent and less aggressive (Op. Cit., 1999: 56). 
 
McGee as we have seen rebuts arguments against playing God by the 
concept that we already play God because parents make decisions about 
their children all the time. Any form of surgery and medicine is in fact a 
strive to allow the weak to survive and with regards to the rearing of 
children, we strive already to give them much advantages. By selecting a 
school for our children we are already affecting the future and by simply 
aborting a fetus we are changing the future of that possible person (Ibid, 
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p.56). But comparing affecting future generations by simply the choice of 
schools for one’s children to selectively aborting a fetus with certain 
characteristics may not be a fair comparison. Indeed both have an effect 
on the future; but then even if I sneeze I may bump into the next car and 
effect the future of the panel beater who waited eagerly for work to come 
in. There is a whole spectrum of events in life which change the future 
from sneezing through choice of education and work to matter-of-factly 
choosing genetic characteristics. Surely one cannot put all these in the 
same basket. A person can be arrested for theft; another for murder. The 
fact that both are arrested does not make the crimes equivalent. Selective 
abortion or discard can hardly be equated on the same level as choice of 
schools. 
 
Secondly, McGee may be going down the slippery slope by speaking 
about abortion in a matter-of-fact, already accepted way – something 
which it is not. In fact most of the objections to genetic screening are 
about selective abortion and selective discard of potential fetuses for 
implantation. If one is a staunch pro-choicer attributing no moral value to 
the embryo, then one’s position is understandable, but not commendable 
by all. Many still believe that abortion not only is playing God in itself by 
deciding who will live and who will not, but is, religious feelings apart, a 
crime in itself. To take the step into pragmatic genetics whilst assuming 
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such issues have been cleared out by the world in general and more 
specifically by the world of bio-ethics is ambitious to say the least. 
According to Tollefsen (2000: 94), McGee simply does not accept the 
distinction between genetically engineering one’s children and planning 
out their future. He asserts that in this ‘Rortyan pragmatism’, the good is 
merely either the useful or the valued and that in the setting of these values 
and ends by the will, agents implicitly view themselves as ultimately 
sovereign over such ends and values. Although McGee would probably 
accept to being called Rortyan it is in this definition of values that most 
find concern with pragmatic approaches to bio-ethics. 
 
The issue of Playing God 
Ruth Chadwick (1998) suggests that when people make use of the 
statement ‘playing God’, they are in effect saying two things. The first is a 
warning to decision-makers that they are not infallible and are not divine 
or omniscient. The second is a warning of unease and disquiet about a 
particular course of action being taken. Human beings may be going too 
far and risk unforeseen consequences in doing so. She asserts that it is 
more of a counsel against a particular form of action than an argument 
against it. It is “more than mere rhetoric” (Hedgecoe, 1998: 388). 
Bioethicists nevertheless, particularly those from analytic philosophy, find 
such terms as vague and lacking clarity. Yet such vagueness and lack of 
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clarity may simply be other ways of saying that the phrase contains far too 
much information (Evans, 2000: 33). John Evans refers to the United 
States President’s Commission (1983) report on human genetic 
engineering, Splicing Life in its treatment of the statement ‘playing 
God’(Op. Cit., p.33). The analysis begins by stating that “though it does 
not have a specific religious meaning, the objection to scientists ‘playing 
God’… appears to the Commission to convey several rather different 
ideas, some describing the power of gene splicing itself and some relating 
merely to its consequences”. After refuting deontological claims the report 
concluded that the only serious objections one could have to such 
technologies is in their risks and benefits analysis. One cannot simply 
know all the consequences of one’s action to present and future 
generations by gene splicing. One ‘playing God’ objection was that 
humans lack the God-like wisdom to exercise these powers. In reflecting 
on this statement the Commission simply reduced it to its potential 
consequences and not that genetic splicing is wrong as such. It thus 
concludes that we must have more scientific data before giving the go-
ahead on such technologies but that there is nothing to stop further 
research on such technologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 137 
Re-evaluating background beliefs and theories 
Practical ethics does therefore take a broadly pragmatic approach to moral 
reasoning. In this approach practice is at least as important as theory. 
Martin Benjamin (2001: 31) explains how a simplified diagram of a 
person’s moral outlook is composed of three main elements. In no 
particular order they are: (a) judgements about particular cases, (b) values 
and principles, and (c) background beliefs and theories. These interact 
with one another. 
       
 
Values and principles, in the light of experience, sometimes have to be 
modified. Benjamin quite rightly quotes the story of evaluating the death 
of a person. Before advanced medical technologies, death was considered 
an event when the person stopped breathing and his or her heart stopped 
beating. Advances in medical technologies however led to people being 
able to be kept alive almost indefinitely. The basic principle and value of 
the conservation of life at all costs now seemed to be quite unethical 
indeed and also a source of waste of resources. Why keep a person alive 
indefinitely? Clearly a re-evaluation of the background beliefs of 
prolonging life at all costs was necessary. This took place when new 
criteria for identifying respirator -dependent unconscious patients whose 
brain function has been totally and irreversibly lost, were proposed (Ibid., 
p.26).  What was changed was not the moral principles but our 
understanding of the world. Moral pluralism holds that a number of good 
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and important ethical principles are inherently incompatible. Advances in 
knowledge are unlikely to help us resolve moral issues; conversely new 
knowledge brings new possibilities which in turn “create or aggravate as 
many conflicts as they eliminate or reduce” (Ibid., p.27). Such has been 
the case with advances in genetic technology. The discovery of how to 
trace conditions to particular genes, combined with assisted procreation 
technology has created the problem of selecting babies to our choice, or 
babies which can compete in a competitive world. Countries can eliminate 
genetic disorders taxing their economy as was the case for Cyprus 
(Hoedemaekers and ten Have: 1998). This conflicts with selectively 
aborting other fetuses or the discarding of fertilized ova and/or thequestion 
of saying something about disabled. The question which the pragmatist 
approach would pose is, in this context therefore, not a complete putting 
aside of our values and principles, but whether this new technology should 
make us think differently towards our concept of reproductive technology 
and the status of the embryo. Just as the prolonging of life with artificial 
means led us to consider that there is a stage where we should terminate 
life – a life whose death depended on a completely new conception of 
defining death; similarly we may be compelled to rethink our conception 
of life vis -à-vis fertilized ova or selectively aborting disabled fetuses. 
Until someone comes out with a formula, analogous to the brain-death 
criteria for the life-support problem, it is difficult to see people holding 
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values and principles on life change them even if they can sympathize 
with parents wanting to eliminate the possibility of having a child with a 
genetic condition they carry in their family. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The President’s Commission report on gene splicing in fact cuts straight 
into the heart of the problem with medical technologies and pragmatic 
approaches to genetics stating that most genetic technologies are not 
wrong in themselves and only the weak hearted may refute scientists the 
right to continue research in unknown areas.. Yet the ‘playing God’ issue 
has in fact more weight than attributed to by the report. The report itself 
found that the heart of the playing God argument lies in lack of human 
knowledge and wisdom to assess the consequences. It is here where 
pragmatic approaches to genetics can help; in its striving to discuss and 
assess consequences. Whilst a ban on research would be wrong, the 
application of such research cannot but await detailed analysis of 
outcomes. Where such outcomes remain speculative and unknown, their 
application will always be controversial.  
 
The pragmatist however may put himself above values, which for many 
are issues at the heart of the debate, to arrive at consequential analysis. 
Thus such issues as selective abortion are really about the status of the 
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embryo and eugenics. About the latter he or she may be willing to assess 
outcomes pragmatically; about the former there is no debate. With this 
state of affairs, those who accept abortion as a daily part of life can 
embark the train and go ahead with such technologies, leaving those with 
‘values’ behind trying to debate why it is wrong. Approaching specific 
issues pragmatically may be a good way of debating genetic technologies; 
discussing values is not. The pragmatist may have nothing to say about 
fundamental values. Where t he pragmatist goes wrong is that in his efforts 
to tell us to live-in-the-world, he does not acknowledge that it is indeed by 
living in this world that we have such values. Whether they came a priori 
or a posteriori is really irrelevant. Until such time as he continues to ignore 
cries against abortion and other ends and values he is not recognizing part 
of the world we live in. Until such time, pragmatism can help us in the 
practical difficulties, but not in resolving categorical objections and it 
remains an enemy to those who uphold values over themselves. The 
pragmatist need ask whether selective discard and abortion are simply 
value-laden issues that should not form part of the picture. Until we can 
convince ourselves that we need to change our basic beliefs, then it is only 
a practical broad pragmatic bio-ethics which can come to our help; a 
pragmatics which accepts that there are basic values and beliefs which 
however may be open for deliberation. We can then walk with James D. 
Wallace and say that morality is a collection of disparate items of practical 
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knowledge that have their origin in the learned activities that are the 
substance of our lives. And moreover that “In a changing world no body 
of practical knowledge can be said to be complete, nor can it be known to 
be adequate as it stands for any test it may have to face in the future” 
(Wallace: 1996). 
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Scholars largely agree that there is a need today for a comprehensive 
philosophy of medicine (Pellegr ino, 2001; Wildes 2001). It is with such a 
foundation that we analyze moral dilemmas generated by medical 
technology, such as genetic technologies and the uses (and misuses) of 
genetic testing and screening. In this respect however there is profound 
disagreement on what a philosophy of medicine should look like. The 
socially constructed philosophy as proposed by various authors including 
Kevin Wildes and Robert Veatch is here contrasted with the teleological 
approach as proposed by Edmund Pellegrino. It is argued that if medicine 
and medical technology are to have morally accepted goals, one must bow 
towards a teleological approach. This argumentation is based on 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. By applying this philosophy, 
based on the relationship between the doctor and the patient, or between 
the medical community and society, we can have a teleological foundation 
for doing genetic testing and screening. With this foundation the patient 
can be protected from postmodern consumerism and over-the-counter 
genetics, which can result not only in a danger to himself and the 
community, but is based on a goal to make money, using the ‘goals’ of 
medicine to its advantage. 
 144 
 
Post-modernism and medicine 
Michael Bury (1998) distinguished between postmodernism and 
postmodernity. ‘Postmodernism’ as a term points to the way events and 
products vie with each other in the cultural sphere: they can hardly be 
separated. We thus watch the ‘news’ of what is happening in Afghanistan 
whilst we wait to see if our lottery ticket has come up; technologies of 
news and lottery play hitting our minds with equal force. ‘Postmodernity’, 
on the other hand, is the foundation of this postmodernism. It is the social 
and technological processes that underlie and interact with postmodern 
cultures. Globalization, the endless expansion of modern capitalist 
economic forms, seems unstoppable with European countries debating 
whether they should form a union or not to survive. Idealistically it may 
seem sound to remain independent; realistically it may not make economic 
sense to survive. With such unification, come also laws and bylaws, as is 
the European Convention for Bioethics. Capitalist commodities are now 
found in every part of the globe, and it is this infrastructure which forms 
the basis for genetic technologies. 
 
Direct-to-consumer advertising of genetic testing, for example, is a 
profound result of a post-modernist culture, whose aims are capitalistic 
economy rather than a teleology of a medical community striving to seek a 
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cure for a genetic disease. Chandros Hull and Prassad (2001) object to the 
use of advertising to promote a genetic test for a breast cancer gene 
(BRCA). They encounter the advert whilst leaving a performance of a play 
which involves a tale of an oncology ward. The play is an adjunct, a 
warmer, towards an advertisement which, they say, misguides women by 
suggesting they contact the company directly about its BRCA1/2 genetic 
test rather than talk to their health care providers about genetic testing, 
their personal risk of breast cancer, and the potential usefulness of the test. 
 
We are entering an era in which ever more genetic tests will be integrated 
into clinical practice and a direct-to-consumer increase in advertising is 
expected. Adverts misguide and give broad truths. Whilst it is a small 
cohort of women who should be interested in doing the BRCA1/2 genetic 
tests, the adverts Chandros Hull and Prasad refer to is broad and directed 
to all women. It reads: “If you could discover your risk for a second breast 
cancer or for ovarian cancer, would you? Chances are, you would…Such 
is the promise of (this test). It reads your genetic code to determine 
whether you possess the altered…genes that dramatically increase your 
risk of breast and ovarian cancer. Knowing your family history is neither 
enough, nor is it always accurate” (Ibid., p.34). Whilst uncertainties 
surround this genetic test, the advertisement claims to ‘dispel fears’. 
Conversely the test can hardly ‘provide hope’ when in fact the follow-up 
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for a positive result is really uncertain, other than having a radical 
mastectomy (Idem). One needs to question therefore whether socially 
constructed theories, that is, those theories which allow the goal of 
medicine to be defined by forces within the public sphere, are justified. It 
is undisputed that large corporations can have a big say in policy and they 
may influence the philosophy and ethics of advertising to ascertain the 
telos of medicine to fit into their own economic telos. One need therefore 
consider these socially constructed theories. 
 
Socially constructed theories 
Social construct theories, as put forward by Wildes (2001) propound a 
philosophy of medicine whose ontology is constructed by social phenoma 
rather than by what is solely deemed as the traditional teleology based on 
fundamental ontology of medical practice. It may be disconcerting, 
however, to evaluate what socially constructed theories really imply. 
Tristram Engelhardt for example is a proponent for a principle of 
‘permission’. In a world where we cannot find a secular moral foundation, 
he argues that disagreeing moral agents may come together and agree 
upon a course of action which is acceptable to both (Engelhardt, 1994). 
Yet who are the moral agents involved when it comes to offering genetic 
testing to the public or when decisions on population genetic screening 
with directive counseling is advocated as has been the case for Cyprus 
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(Hoedemakers and ten Have, 1998)? Is it perhaps the industry reaching a 
moral concensus with the medical profession? And at wha t stage does the 
consumer, in this case the patient, come in? Since advertising is directed 
towards the potential patient, it would seem that the only motivational 
effort to involve the consumer in this moral debate is by ‘educating’ him 
through the means of adverts, which may be as misleading as they are 
intent on promoting profits. In this case, who is the voice for the 
consumer? One may also ask, whose side does the medical profession take 
when coming into symbiotic relationships with market forces? For in order 
to serve its goals, medicine has had a long standing relationship with 
industry, accepting this ‘evil’ in order to benefit from a new drug or cure. 
Even if medicine and industry make bad bed partners therefore (albeit 
theoretically), they have sle pt rather comfortably together to the extent 
that industry seems to be able to ‘count on’ the medical field in promoting 
its aims. With the advent of a new cure the different goals of technology 
companies (monetary) and the medical field (attending to the sick) has 
changed their potential mutual parasitism into a symbiotic role. The evils 
of capitalism are accepted for the promise of newer cures. In the process 
even the medical people may have a financial incentive, but this is a ‘good 
external’ (MacIntyre, 1984) rather than an inherent goal of medicine.  
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Yet the very viability of genetic tests requires a great number to be done in 
order for their production to be economically viable to a company. So the 
medical profession, albeit given some form of incentive, can be called 
upon to ‘test’ greater numbers of people, the motive becoming profit 
margins rather than offering hope. Subtle coercion, as the above -
mentioned advert telling consumers to go directly to the company instead 
of the health care professional to get proper advise, acting on induced 
fears, will draw larger numbers to do the test than is actually necessary. A 
test for this could be to ask how many people do such companies in fact 
advise that the test is not for them? 
 
Kevin Wildes, arguing against Pellegrino’s and Thomasma’s (1993) 
teleological approach, calls for a socially constructed approach to 
bioethical issues (Wildes, 2001). He says that Pellegrino’s basis of the 
philosophy of medicine on the doctor-patient relationship is too narrow in 
addressing the crises of contemporary medicine to have to do with these 
fundamental questions on the nature of medicine and its goals (Ibid., 
p.74). He accuses Pellegrino of assuming what he wants to prove – that 
there is a nature of medicine and from this to construct a philosophy of 
medicine. What Wildes seems to be doing however is to equate ‘nature of’ 
with ‘philosophy of’. Thus in speaking of a philosophy of medicine, 
Wildes uses the term ‘nature of medicine’ (Ibid., p. 78). This project rests 
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on crucial and controversial assumptions about philosophy and our 
abilities to know the world. He argues that medicine is practiced in a 
social context and that the ‘art’ of medicine is to capture this social 
context as a social philosophy and social science. 
 
Wildes’ evaluation of facts however fails to show why the social construct 
theory is better than a teleological approach in the formulation of a 
philosophy of medicine. Perhaps Pellegrino’s remarkable rebuttal of 
Wildes argumentation is in showing how social construction allows for no 
permanent theory of medicine and therefore no stable ethics of the 
profession. In an elegant manner, Pellegrino argues that, “these 
(professional ethics) can become victim of a socially aberrant society as 
was the case under German national Socialism, Maoist China, Stalinist 
Russia or Imperial Japan. In each case, medicine was redefined as an 
instrument of social and political purpose, and the physician was made a 
social functionary. Medical ethics itself became the ethic of social 
purpose” (Pellegrino, 2001: 177). It is very difficult to play down such a 
strong statement, by its very factual and historical nature an unconcealed 
truth. Whilst Wildes thinks that the moral boundaries beyond medicine 
would act as deterrents to these kinds of situations from happening again, 
he does not realize, as Pellegrino indeed points out that these same moral 
boundaries would be socially constructed and thus subject to the same 
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pathologies that distorted medicine and its ethics in the first place. What if, 
as pointed out above, medical ethics comes to be directed more by 
economic canons than by the needs of the patient? If policy makers as 
happened in China and Cyprus, relieve doctors of their primacy towards 
the sick person in favour of a higher ‘social goal’, then a social 
constructed philosophy of medicine would be entirely “extrinsic to the 
ends of medicine” (Pellegrino, 2001, p. 178). 
 
A philosophy based on the phenomenology of the relationship 
Just as the function of a healthy body depends on the sound functioning of 
each and every individual cell, the functioning of medicine depends in its 
entirety on the individual relationships between doctors and their patients. 
If this relationship fails to work on a global level, then the whole of 
medicine fails. Medicine has been described as an ‘art’. This art is 
constructed at levels of people, rather than in making policy. The word 
‘ethics’ by its very nature implies a correct way of doing things, it implies 
an act. It is thus based on people, and not simply rules. Virtue has been 
advocated as essential to medicine (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993), and 
rebutted as secondary (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994) in arriving to 
sound moral conclusions. Yet it is always the virtuous application of rules 
which make those actions and rules morally valid. Consider the invocation 
of the principle of double effect. This has been invoked by the 1985 
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Belgian Episcopal Conference to revoke the necessity of allowing the 
mother to die in order to save the infant when the pregnancy is a danger to 
the mother’s life, for example. It is the recognition of the value of the 
mother’s life which satisfied the act of saving her life whilst bringing 
about the unintended death of the fetus as a benefit which is 
commensurate with the harm being brought about. Conversely the 
application of the abortion law in the United Kingdom shows how 
principles and rules can be applied to cover one’s action and yet inherently 
still be immoral because the judgement used in applying them was without 
virtue (Bailey, 1996). Hence a woman can have an abortion today by 
having two doctors sign that the fetus is detrimental to her mental well 
being. Even if the mental well being is a ‘good’ big enough to necessitate 
the unintended death of the fetus, today mothers are offered abortion, 
within the framework of the same law, following amniocenthesis. The aim 
here is entirely to kill the fetus; the excuse is the detriment of the woman’s 
mental health – an unvirtuous application of a law. 
 
Any socially constructed me dicine will still have to rely therefore on the 
virtues of physicians practicing that medicine. Some however would have 
it otherwise. Robert Veatch has pioneered such an approach. In one of his 
latest contributions (2000) he persists in attacking the Hippocratic oath 
and the American Medical Association’s (1903) position that a physician 
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should be mindful of his or her mission and of the responsibilities they 
must incur in the discharge of their duties, especially where it comes to 
social pressures. Veatch argues that physicians cannot know the patient’s 
best interests and cannot be expected to know what is medically 
beneficial. The participation of the patient means that the patient knows 
better and that the physician is in no position to be mindful of requests 
(Ibid., pp. 705-707). Whilst Veatch’s upholding of patient rights is to be 
commendable, he unfortunately persists in equating these rights against 
what the physician considers patient benefit. But with this reasoning, a 
physician will not have the possibility to refuse, or at least persuade 
against, a genetic test to a patient who is impressed by advertising thinking 
she actually needs the test. Not all women need to do the BRCA1/2 test, 
yet advertising induces them to believe so. Is it not the onus of  the 
physician to explain this to the patient? In situations where physicians are 
gatekeepers of funds, or even in situations where they act solely on 
principle, has not a physician a right not to participate in this patient’s 
faulty perception of things, especially if the latter, out of fear or ignorance, 
persists stubbornly in requesting such a test? 
 
The answer to these quagmires can indeed be found, in our opinion, in the 
phenomenology of the relationship between a physician and her patient. 
Zaner has spoken extensively about the phenomenological approach and 
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that resolving dilemmas need be preceded by the doctor putting himself in 
the ‘lived experience’ of the patient (Zaner, 1994, p. 219). Toombs 
conversely speaks of the frustration involved in the doctor’s 
objectification of the patient’s body into a ‘medical body’ and how this 
objectification is disturbing to the patient and conversely how the latter is 
not satisfied with ‘scientific’ explanations of illness (Toombs, 1992a). 
Toombs et al (1995) also argue that a disease which cannot be cured 
demands attention to the person. These two phenomenologists and others 
like Leder have all contemplated general theories of health (Leder, 1995). 
Leder (1990, pp. 83-84), Rawlinson (1982, p. 75) and Toombs (1992b, p. 
136 ff) have made use of Heidegger’s borken tool example as a promising 
way to a phenomenology of illness. More recently younger authors have 
examined phenomenological theory. Bullington (1999) has examined 
phenomenological theory in psychosomatic illne s focussing especially on 
the work of Merleau-Ponty. A more in-depth attempt by Svenaeus (1999) 
is directed at using phenomenology as a basis for a philosophy of medical 
practice. Svenaeus considers illness as ‘unhomelike’ experience. Inspired 
by Heidegger and Gadamer he describes the doctor-patient relationship as 
a way to ‘attune’ back to the homelikeness of the healthy individual. 
Dekkers (1999) laments that Svenaeus does not treat ‘suffering’ 
adequately; indeed how can we use ‘homelike-being-in-the -world’ for the 
terminally ill. In all fairness Svenaeus admits that he has only wanted to 
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open the road to a more profound study of phenomenological basis of 
health (1999, p. 287). 
 
Our approach conversely departs from Pellegrino’s suggestion (1994, p. 
362) to link the four principles of bioethics to a phenomenology of the 
doctor-patient relationship. Heidegger’s phenomenology can be used in 
fact to explain biomedical principles from the phenomenology of the 
doctor-patient relationship (Mallia, 1998). This position is only 
summarized here, focussing on the phenomenon of the relationship and 
then how this can be applied to the situation at hand of genetic testing and 
screening. Heidegger, in his existential philosophy (Heidegger. trans 
1962), never intended to discuss ethics, let alone the goals of medicine. 
Yet as applied philosophy, his basic notions can be applied to everyday 
relationships, as it is a discursive ontology of man’s existence. That 
existence is found in every encounter with other beings, one of which is 
indeed the encounter between a patient and a doctor, each having an 
ontology in their own right. Conversely, there are ample sources today 
which attest to an inherent ethics in Heidegger’s philosophy. Frederick 
Olafson (1998) notes that although Heidegger never dealt with questions 
of normative ethics, there was, in Being and Time , a very harsh critique of 
the whole question of ‘values’ as objective criteria for the guidance of our 
lives. These were declared to belong to an anonymous public mode of 
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selfhood, what Heidegger referred to as ‘Das Man’ (Olafson,1998, p.3). 
Joanna Hodge (1995) confesses to read Heidegger as revealing the process 
of the questions of metaphysics and ethics in their simultaneous search of 
‘what it is to be human’. Heidegger, she says, works in the restricted 
conception of ethics as concerned only with the relationship of human 
being to being human. Heidegger reveals the universalization of ethics in 
the globalization of technology but does not endeavor to move from the 
question of ‘what it is to be human’ to negotiating what it means for 
humans to be together (Hodge, 1995, p. 27). Hodge argues there is an 
urgent need for a retrieval of the notion of ethics from a metaphysical 
fixity, and that the elements of this are to be found in Heidegger’s work 
(Ibid., p 15). If we stop solely at the question of ‘what it is to be human’, 
we risk limiting ourselves in these metaphysical ‘fixities’ and, in the name 
of ethical differences, “people are massacred, distinct groups subjected to 
genocide. Ethics ceases to be a set of questions about what it takes for 
human beings to flourish…Ethics becomes a set of issues for which there 
is offered a global, indeed a final, solution in all its horror” (Ibid., p.27). 
Such was the case for the Nazi death camps. Moreover, “the actualizing of 
metaphysics in technology reduces the question of ethics to a question 
about the nature of human beings in terms of usefulness and 
productiveness” (Ibid., p. 27).  
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If we cannot hope for a comprehensive ethics of humans from Heidegger’s 
work, we can hope for a return to an authentic description of the ontology 
of the doctor-patient relationship. Through this ontological foundation we 
can find a means of preventing medical technology, and genetic 
technology specifically, from overwhelming human nature and finding 
usefulness in the nature of medicine, rather than in post-modern drives and 
economic canons.  
 
The ontology of the patient, the doctor and the relationship 
Heidegger spoke of the coming together of beings, of authentic 
relationships and modes of being-with and of leveling down of 
relationships. Of course he spoke of these in a general and primordial 
sense, but nevertheless in such a manner as to allow one to extrapolate and 
take these into particular relationships. “Knowing oneself is grounded in 
Being-with, which understands primordially. It operates in accordance 
with the kind of Being which is closest to us – Being-in-the-world; and it 
does so by an acquaintance with that which Dasein, along with the Others, 
comes across in its environmental circumspection and concerns itself with 
– an acquaintance in which Dasein understands” (Heidegger, 1962, p 161). 
Thus because of the existential nature, and not because of any knowledge 
that comes from the other, one being knows the other. The entity which is 
the other has the same kind of being as (Dasein) (Ibid., p. 162). Through 
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this one can come to understand the ‘psychical life of other’: “In this 
phenomenally ‘proximal’ manner it thus presents a way of Being with one 
another understandingly” (Ibid., p. 161). This phenomenon is known as 
‘empathy’, which provides the first ontological bridge (Ibid., p. 161). Of 
course Heidegger had basic ontology in mind; how one perceives ‘others’. 
Although by no means can Heidegger’s phenomenology be said to have 
been entirely definitive in the philosophical world, it provides a solid 
grounding of the phenomenon, which is that of the relationship between 
people and hence also between a doctor and the patient. We are ‘thrown’ 
into the world in which illness and disease have always been part of the 
deal; and with this deal come genetic illnesses. It is through this, we assert, 
that a reappraisal of the ethics of genetic testing and screening can be 
understood, if they are not simply to be of a parasitic nature upon the 
primordial nature of medicine itself.  
 
As Cassell (1991) points out, societies have different characters to 
represent their healers – from witch doctors to present-day doctors. But the 
common character of these encounters rema ins that of one seeking help, 
attention or counseling, and that of the other seeking to provide what is 
asked for. A doctor finds his identity in the relationship, just as much as 
the patient finds help and possibly a cure. A person becomes a doctor not 
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simply by acquiring, therefore, a degree in medicine, but in the clinical 
encounter; in being-in-the-world (of the doctor and patient). 
 
Yet just as Heidegger questions the authenticity of relationships and the 
leveling down which occurs in encounters, we can see a parallel leveling 
down of relationships in the clinical context. Heidegger explains how in 
reality this possibility of empathy, of fullness of relationship fails to hold. 
Because besides Being-with, Dasein is a Being-with-one-another, which is 
not the sum of Being-with of a number of subjects. The latter presupposes 
a hermeneutic of empathy; the former simply a coming-towards one 
another (in the sense that “Being-with ‘reckons’ with the other without 
seriously ‘counting on them’, or without even wanting to ‘have anything 
to do’ with them” (Heidegger, o.c., p. 163). This difference of encounters 
is found not only in a difference between how we encounter acquaintances 
and how we encounter an unknown person on the bus, but also how we 
encounter friends and the potentiality of these relationships with friends.  
 
This can be applied purely (or compared) to much of the technically- and 
scientifically- based medicine of today. In coming towards patients as 
‘entities with a disease’ or ‘entities with symptoms’ to be interpreted there 
has been a doing away with the necessity of true empathy with the sufferer 
or troubled patient. Even if used, it is seen as superfluous (Beauchamp and 
 159 
Childress, 1994, p. 375) though a lot of lip-service is paid. The total 
possibility of the relationship does not occur in most everyday 
relationships. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein 
completely into the kind of Being of the ‘Others’ which one encounters 
casually. The relationships to these ‘Others’ (the ‘they’) gives a 
‘distantiality’ of relationships (o.c., p.127), grounded in the fact that 
Being-with-one-another concerns itself with averageness, which is the 
essential character of the ‘they’ (Ibid., p.165). ‘They’ is ‘man’ in general. 
There is a ‘levelling down’ of all possibilities of Being. In other words 
relationships become superficial. In the medical environment which 
handles many patients every day this leveling down is seen in the 
uniformity of medical management; in the conformity of medical 
education, in hospital administration and construction etc. “Distantiality, 
averageness, and levelling down, as ways of Being for the ‘they’ 
constitute what we know as ‘publicness’. Publicness proximally controls 
every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted” (Heidegger, 
o.c., p.165). In Dasein’s everydayness the agency through which most 
things come about is one controlled by the ‘they’. Medicine has become a 
form of ‘publicness’. 
 
‘They’ in the sense of the present argument can be taken as the medical 
community. In its becoming uniform and in its averageness, ‘they’ (the 
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doctors) do this and this in such and such a situation. This is the existential 
state of doctors, of the medical community, today. Each doctor has taken 
on a ‘they’ -self instead of the potential authentic self. The doctor has been 
dispersed  into the they (Ibid., p.167). This dispersal is the ‘subject’ of that 
kind of Being (doctor’s-Being) which we know as concernful. This ‘they’ 
describes (or dictates) the way in which doctors should interpret the world. 
 
That there is a tendency to ‘average’ things cannot be disputed. The very 
search for ‘algorithmic’ solutions and comparing of cases attests to this. 
Now far from it to suggest that medicine today is in a crisis with respect to 
the treatment it provides. It is indeed an advantage that things are levelled 
down to protocols on treatment because experience gained through studies 
does not go in vain. In seeking to provide our patients with the best 
solutions and possibilities we rely on controlled trials and standard 
procedures. This however has left the unfortunate side effect of 
mechanizing to an extent the clinical encounter. What is important is to 
arrive at the correct diagnosis. The cost has been a loss in the art of 
medicine as a humanities profession besides a scientific one (Lown, 1996).  
 
Truth concealed 
One can argue therefore that technologically advanced societies, protocols 
and post-modern ideas of libertarian attitudes have concealed the true 
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nature of the doctor -patient relationship. All of these concealing factors 
are not wrong in themselves. Indeed they have given power to the patient, 
reduced paternalistic attitudes, which in themselves were a concealment of 
a hidden agenda for the clinical encounter, and allow us to treat the masses 
in approximately the same optimal (to our knowledge) manner. 
 
The original meaning of truth appears in the word ‘phenomenology’ as 
“taking beings out of concealment. Letting them be seen in their 
unconcealment” (Farrel Krell, 1993 p. 113). But discovery of beings is 
grounded in the disclosedness of the world. Disclosedness or 
unconcealment is therefore the most original meaning of truth. For 
Heidegger however disclosedness never goes unchallenged. Aware of our 
possibilities, we are nevertheless ‘thrown’ into the world and ‘ensnared’ 
by it. Hence we are ‘equally in truth and in untruth’. Open to beings and to 
our own being possible, we nonetheless relinquish this openness in 
exchange for the security of whatever ‘they’ say is true. We let truth slip 
into the same oblivion as Being and find our ‘truths’ in so many 
scintillating beings there before us, polished yet manipulable. The most 
dazzlingly finished become ‘eternal truths’.  
 
Presupposed in such truths of faith or science or even the universality of 
life, however, is a kind of opening or openness by virtue of which 
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something can and does show itself and let itself be seen. To let 
unconcealment show itself : this is perhaps the most succinct formulation 
of the task of Heidegger’s thinking, at the heart of which stands his 
formulation of Freedom. 
 
Untruth is errancy. “Errancy is the essential counter-essence to the 
primordial essence of truth…Error is not merely an isolated mistake but 
the realm (the domain) of the history of those entanglements in which all 
kinds of erring get interwoven” (Farrel Krell, 1993, p. 134). Man’s own 
freedom allows him to sway into errancy; and conversely it is this same 
freedom which allows him to unconceal truth. 
 
Thus looking at the post-modern consumerist society, ever ready to sell 
products to those who would have them, we can begin to realise the 
danger of the symbiotic relationship between industry, an evil necessity, 
so to speak, and medicine. To speak of industry as ‘evil’ is indeed unfair, 
because it is biting the hand that feeds you. After all medicines come 
through industry, but it is an undisputed fact that production of drugs 
depends also on market forces and therefore on the numbers the drug sells. 
And who can blame an entrepreneur for marketing a drug which sells to 
the millions and avoiding production of a drug for a rare disorder. It is in 
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this climate that genetic tests are carried out. The dispute of patenting 
genes is indeed a direct resultant of these market forces. 
 
Yet this has resulted in a relieving of the responsibilities of the doctor -
patient encounter on when a test is to be done. We now view diseases in 
numbers. If, as in Cyprus, we see that a genetic condition taxes on our 
scarce resources, we may be ready to compromise certain ethical standards 
(such as non-directiveness) to pressure people into doing tests to avoid 
offspring with the condition (Hoedemakers and ten Have, 1998; WHO 
1983). For a company to find it viable to produce a genetic test, it also 
must see the incentive of making as much profit as possible. Tests are thus 
marketed to the public; people told to get advice not through their 
physicians but directly from companies (Chandros Hull and Prasad, 2001, 
p. 34). In this context it is more than obvious that the sole aim of the 
company is financial and not seeking a cure for genetic diseases. Will 
companies market also that test for which there are no numbers in terms of 
patients or will it market tests similar to BRCA1/2 for which they can 
raise an awareness amongst the general public? Wise investment does not 
necessarily coincide with disease incidence and distribution. 
 
To ask, on the other hand, companies to look at the phenomenology of the 
doctor-patient relationship calls for a laugh in the face to say the least. 
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What is needed is a thorough understanding of a philosophy of medicine 
in the nature of the doctor -patient relationship. If philosophers persist in 
trying to ground the philosophy of medicine in a socially constructed 
context, then it will be more difficult to argue in favour of the benefits of 
allowing choices to occur within the doctor -patient relationship. What 
results is a market force, albeit based on a consumer right to know, in 
which people are induced with a fear of carrying a specific gene and 
thereafter seeking a test to confirm or not the presence of that gene in their 
being. This has nothing to do with disease or with the philosophy of 
medicine; it is only an allowing of an attempt to take advantage of innate 
fears which everyone can have of being ill or becoming ill, bypassing in 
the process any form of clinical encounter, and asking for that test to be 
done to relieve one’s mind or suffer the consequence of a positive result if 
no cure is available. 
 
The balance of the argument is whether we would have our health care 
providers tell us that we are at risk and therefore merit doing some genetic 
tests, or whether we should allow the media and industry to instill in us a 
fear, always based on lack of complete knowledge, to induce us solely into 
falling into a trap to do the test. If industry can honestly accept solely 
health care professionals to counsel patients into doing tests, then one may 
be in a position to accept their honest nature. But once they are resorting 
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to advertising (even the subtle form of ‘educating the public’), then their 
goals are other than those of offering those poor people at risk a chance of 
hope. 
 
Conclusion 
At the end of the day medicine is based on the clinical encounter. If there 
is to be a philosophy of medicine it has been suggested that it should start 
at this level. There are nevertheless incentives to make profit from 
medicine; a factor which become of increasing importance in genetic 
testing. These ‘goods external’ are tolerated because they allow the 
advancements of ‘goods internal’ to medic ine – the hope of providing a 
cure and promoting public health. Any advance in genetic testing therefore 
must, in the opinion of the authors, answer to this basic question: Is this 
test a contribution to the goods internal to medicine; or is it primarily 
seeking the goods external using the goods internal as an excuse to 
marketing the test. The best place to answer this question is within clinical 
encounters. It takes nerve to tell the large corporations what to do and how 
to market their products, but not doing so is allowing ourselves to be led 
evermore by the forces of the ‘they’ and losing an ‘authenticity’ of 
medicine to market forces. It is for this reason that it is difficult to 
perceive of a socially constructed theory, which has the power of 
undermining the value of the ontology of the doctor -patient relationship. 
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To see how we got here we must first ask where we started from, and 
where we wanted to go in the first place. Otherwise we may simply 
pragmatically be changing directions with where the wind is blowing; 
losing sight of our intended object: the patient. 
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THE REDISCOVERY OF TRINITARIAN THEOOGY AS 
APPLIED TO BIOETHICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P.Mallia and H.ten Have: The rediscovery of Trinitarian Theology as 
applied to bioethics (submitted July 2003). 
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New developments in the understanding of Trinitarian theology by 
Catholic movements in the heart of the Roman Catholic Church is 
exploring the impact of this new mode of living in areas ranging from 
economics to health care. This paper explores the possibilities offered to 
bioethical debate, with special attention given to genetic screening and 
testing, by such developments with a particular hope of an abandonment 
of fundamentalism and an embracement of pluralism, which, most 
theologians agree, should form the attitude of Christians in the third 
millenium. The basic issues that lie at the heart of genetic screening and 
testing are fundamental issues of bioethics, which have been debated since 
the birth of the subject. These can be summarized as the status of the 
embryo, discrimination against the disabled, and questions of justice 
towards those who would have genetic tests. The first two come down to 
are selective discarding of fertilized ova to be used for implantation and 
selective abortion of embryoes found to have unwanted genes, either for 
the purposes of eliminating particular disorders such as congenital 
malformations or genetic diseases as is Down’s syndrome, or, to aim at 
having the “perfect baby” (term taken from McGee) by selecting genes 
(McGee, 1997; Gosden, 1999). At the base is the question of the status of 
the embryo. Although some advocates for the disabled have indeed 
expressed themselves as pro-choice the issue here is not the status of the 
embryo but discrimination, it has in fact been argued (Parens & Asch, 
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1999, p. 2) that such an argument has little logical validity. Be that as it 
may, whilst no one has expressly denied the right of disabled to non-
discrimination, the fact that people may chose to kill an embryo to 
eliminate a genetic disorder, but not a newborn with the same disorder, 
shows that the argument is not on infanticide but on the status of the 
embryo.  
 
Conversely, the third point, that of justice towards those who would have 
genetic tests, is a question of whether to put teleology (Pellegrino, 2001) 
of medical practice subordinate to a social construct approach (Wildes, 
2001) which may indeed allow genetic tests to be done merely for 
commercial reasons without considering the ethical implications involved 
in carrying out these tests too liberally. Indeed market forces form a sort of 
symbiotic relationship with medicine; the one provides the service, the 
other the drug. There is a mutual need to achieve both ends. But whilst one 
end teleologically is that of providing care and cure, the other end, which 
inevitably is to be respected, is concerned with financial outcome. 
 
A trinitarian approach to dilemmas 
Catholic bioethics, or Catholics doing bioethics are faced with these 
dilemmas on one side and counter philosophical forces on the other. 
Whilst the worst opposition is a liberal force of relativism, that which 
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takes heavy precedence in western thought today is a more pragmatic 
analysis, which although confessing not to be relativist (Rorty, 1988, p. 
160), is indeed a call to put aside some values when debating issues of 
biological significance (McGee, 1997, p. 170). Faced with these stances, 
the Catholic has two roads of action. The first is a direct resolve to work 
against such forces; a ‘crusade’, for example, to safeguard life. A second 
approach being proposed (Gambon, 1999; Coda, 1987, 1998, 2000; and 
others) is the contemporary rediscovering of a trinitarian approach which 
in understanding the ‘other’, empties oneself from preformed prejudices 
and aims to ‘be one’, in unity, with the other, thus proposing a new 
‘ethics’ of behavior. Paradoxically, this ‘empyting oneself’ resounds of a 
pragmatic approach. But emptying oneself does not mean accepting what 
one perceives as wrong. Rather it is a more nonjudgmental approach 
where both sides are open to change. Although such an approach relies 
also on spiritual faith, rather than merely the rational, the method merits 
philosophical discussion if we are to understand whether it has a sound 
working basis.  
 
It is not the first time that the Catholic church has changed stance on 
controversial issues. Maybe the most important issue tackled the past 
century was that when the mother was sacrificed to save her baby. Such a 
situation was reversed in 1985 by the Belgian Episcopal Conference, 
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which used the principle of double effect to effectively reverse the 
situation and allow the sacrificing of a life, which is unintentional, in order 
to save another life. That the opposite effect can be brought about also 
rationally, and with the same force and faith as pretext, is indeed an act not 
only of courage but of emptying oneself from preconceived ideas to 
become one with society to understand its problems. Such are the pretexts 
of kenosis  and perichoresis, the trinitarian corner stones of dialogue. 
 
Perichoresis (Gr. Perichoresis, “penetration”; Lat. Circumincessio, 
“incoherence”) indicates the intimate union, mutual indwelling, or mutual 
interpenetration of the three members of the Trinity, the Father, the Son 
and the Holy Spirit, with each other (McKim, 1996, p. 206). Kenosis (Gr. 
Kenosis, “emptying”; Lat. Exinanito), on the other hand is the theological 
term for the ‘self-emptying’ of Jesus Christ, through which he 
relinquished heavenly authority to accomplish the work of salvation by his 
death and resurrection, emphasizing strongly the humanity of Christ (Ibid., 
p. 153). 
 
 
The first part of this article looks at the history of Trinitarianism in the 
philosophy of Hegel, who was the first to introduce new concepts. This is 
followed by a look at how and where this new philosophy is being 
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conceived; finally the third part asks what are the prerequisites for such a 
model to work in the field of bioethics focussing specifically on genetics. 
Whilst it is understood that a Catholic ma y use trinitarian concepts of 
emptying and being-one with the patient, it is less conceivable how one 
can understand resolution of dilemmas using this approach. Naturally this 
implies a different approach than has been achieved so far with each side 
trying to find philosophical argument to justify its position. It involves a 
change in the ‘lifeworld’, so much argued for by Habermas (1984). 
 
Hegel’s “congenial intuition, but fatal betrayal” 
Hegel’s philosophical influence on contemporary theology is undoubted 
and if we are to understand the logistics of how contemporary Trinitarian 
theology is to be lived-in-the-world, we must first appreciate these 
foundations. He was the first to centralize the concept of the ‘negative’ 
and the ontological and existential significance of ‘non-being’ in 
Trinitarian theology (Coda, 1987, p. 396). The International Theological 
Commission (1980) recognized that Hegel was the first to underline the 
importance that an understanding of God must include the concept of the 
abandonment on the cross. It clearly stated however, in its brief 
examination of Hegelian philosophy, that Hegel’s concepts of God’s 
negativity do not conform to the Catholic conception of God. The 
commission did not give any reason for this, leaving open the possibility 
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for theologians to make further in-depth studies of Hegel’s philosophy 
when contrasted with Christian faith (Coda, 1987, p. 22). On the other 
hand, as noted by Lafont, who has been described as a keen and 
equilibrated theologian (Ibid.), it is the duty of theology today to work for 
a reconciliation between classic and modern theology, which presents 
itself under the negativity of Christ on the cross (Lafont, 1979). It is for 
this reason that Kasper (1982) has noted that Hegel and German ideology 
have an urgent need to be elaborated upon by modern theology. Modern 
theological views on Trinitarian historiography thus depart from Hegel. 
 
Coda (1987), Catholic theologian at the Roman Catholic ‘Pontificia 
Universita’ Lateranense’ in Rome, has made a clear attempt to reconcile 
Hegelian philosophy of the negative with trinitarian theology. Hegel was 
the first philosopher to centralize the concept of the negative and the 
ontological and existential significance of the ‘non-being’, as playing a 
central role in Christianity. It is clear therefore that even for his concept of 
‘negativity’, he made a “congenial intuition” but a “fatal betrayal” (Ibid., 
396) because he failed in centralizing the concept of the person, which 
was the reason for the Commission’s conclus ion. Hegel however did 
centralize with precision where one should approach the mystery of the 
non-being as disclosed to us by the kenosis and the death of the Word, that 
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is, the mystery of the Cross. In reality, if Christ on the cross reveals the 
mystery of the trinity, it is because he reveals, in that abyss of emptiness, 
represented by His death on the cross, the profound mystery of being-a-
person of divine Beings. This signifies that the mystery of Divine Beings 
lies in their paradoxical non being in a state of love (Ibid., 397). 
  
The moment of Christ’s abandonment on the cross, when He calls out asks 
why He has been forsaken by the Father, is a crucial moment which can 
only take place in this state of non-being: the emptiness described as 
‘kenosis’, or the kenotic experience in which He empties himself of 
Divinity to take on all sin – the greatest possible suffering for a Divine 
Being. It is in this moment however He is united with the Father 
(perichoresis). For Christians to love the cross is not merely a 
manifestation of love towards this divine being who took onto Himself our 
sins for our salvation, but also to love suffering and live like him. Not 
because our suffering unites us to him in paying for the sins of the world – 
he surely does not need us mortals – but because in all the suffering we 
see around us we can recognise Him (Ibid., 399). Was it not He who told 
the faithful that they will find him in the poor, in the undressed, in the 
prisoner… Therefore, abortion, euthanasia, prostitution, are construed as 
negative and thus as manifestations of His suffering. Hegel is deemed 
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wrong is in defining this non-being of Christ as an alienation from God 
(Ibid., p. 399). In fact it is not, because paradoxically it is in this non-being 
that, albeit remaining three divine Beings, They become one. This is what 
the Greek ‘fathers’ called perichoresis, which Hegel, with his reasoning 
could not conceive. Lacking an exact hermeneutic of the trinity, Hegel 
could not comprehend the authentic significance of nothingness. 
 
 
The significance of Kenosis and Perichoresis and in Ethics. 
What significance does all this have for bioethics? For Christians the 
Trinitarian life can be expressed in many situations. In marriage two 
people can become ‘one body’, yet remaining physically different. If a 
couple mutually lose themselves in each other for love they act 
perichoretically (Gambon, 1999, p. 33). For this to happen, each must 
empty oneself of his or her being in order to enter the other. This allows 
the possibility of truly comprehending the world of the other. When this 
attitude is mutually reciprocated, then one can be said to have a 
perichoretic experience.  This perichoretic rapport has been explored in 
other settings.  Besides a return to profound modern Catholic theological 
studies to rediscover truths in Trinitarian theology as applied to the 
modern world (Baggio, A.M., 1998; Castellano Cervera, J. 1998; Coda P, 
1998, Zak, L., 1998; Macek, W.M., 2000, Coda, P., 2000; Alessandrini, 
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L., 2000, Brena, G.L., 2000), others have reworked this theology into the 
philosophies of their particular areas: in economics (Calvez, J.Y., 1994; 
Baggio, A., 1996; Ferruci, A., 1992;), in industry (Araujo, V., 1997; 
Lubich, C., 1984; Sorgi, T., 1998, p. 122), in culture (Salvati, G.M., 1990; 
Brague, R., 1983), in humans rights issues (Sobrino, J., 1987; Sapienza, 
R., 1996), in  Justice (Caso, G., 1987 and 1990); in public health (Caretta, 
F. & Petrini, M., 1991; Fratta A., 2001) and even in art (Pochet, M. 1996), 
philosophy and science (Picozza, P., 2000; O’Hara, P., 2000; Pettorossi, 
A., 2000; Rondinara, S., 2000).      
 
However, whilst it is easier to conceive of how Catholics can live their 
lives in society, it is less easy to see how fruitful such ‘principles’ of 
kenosis and perichoresis can help in an area where people of different 
religious denominations or secular groups come together to discuss issues 
on which there is such profound difference. Issues of rights to assisted 
suicide, to cloning, to abortion, to selective non-treatment of malformed 
newborns etc., cannot be resolved however, as has been in matter of fact, 
by mere argument. Even the Catholic world has tackled bioethical issues 
in a less Trinitarian fashion albeit with reverence to fundamental beliefs. 
But it is undisputed that the present day crusades of the Catholic laity and 
media has concentrated more on hosting wars against abortion, say, and 
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lobbying for legislation which does not favour these immoral standards. 
There are no studies to show how many pro-choicers, say, have been 
converted by mere rational argumentation. It is often the case in fact that 
one argument leads to a counter argument which in turns leads to another, 
making the field of philosophical debate a quagmire of contrasting 
rationalities. 
  
Rational arguments seem more intent on convincing legislators than on 
converting the ideas of people. The Society for the Protection of Unborn 
Children (SPUC) recently launched a High Court bid in London (Feb. 12, 
2002) to halt over-the-counter sales of ‘emergency contraception’, on 
grounds that the pills cause early abortions. The intent is to place a 
question mark on the legality of this kind of contraception as they go 
against the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act.  
 
It would be appropriate, after almost four decades of bioethics debate, to 
ask the ‘quo vadis’ question. If bioethics has been merely an area of 
debate and has not been instrumental in also changing hearts of people by 
rational argumentation, then we can clearly say that something more than 
rational argument is needed to convince the other. There must be a ‘code 
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of conduct’ to guide people doing bioethics from whichever secular or 
religious denomination they come from.  
    
Some social attitudes for a Kenotic/Perichoretic foundation   
At this stage we propose to describe some characteristics and attitudes 
which characterise this ethic. Cambon (1999) has described a number of 
social attitudes that characterize foundations of kenotic/perichoretic 
principles. The first is Solidarity (Ibid., p. 75-78). Today’s globalization is 
undeniable. Teilhard de Chardin had written that the time of nations has 
passed and we need to construct the earth (o.c., p76). Gambon recalls 
President Kennedy’s famous remarks on independence – that we should 
declare an interdependence among peoples reflected also in the encyclical 
Sollicitudo rei socialis where Pope John Paul II declares interdependence, 
not only between people but also between nations, as a necessary social 
and ethical norm for solidarity (o.c., 76). 
  
A second attitude is Liberty (o.c., p. 78-80). Historically those who 
dominate and win over others have been considered truly free. In slave 
societies, only lords and the rich were free; slaves, women and children 
were not. The free man’s liberty meant oppression for others, his power 
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meant submission, his riches, poverty. Today we understand that every 
individual can be a barrier to another’s freedom. Every individual is free 
in his or her own sense, but may remain inconsiderate towards the 
freedom of others. Such may be the industrial concerns to promote a test, 
compromising the freedom of others not to have that test done, when 
social pressure considers it a must. An AIDS test today, if refused, even by 
people who are not high risk individuals will compromise insurance cover. 
True liberty is that liberty which is communal; that which is charitable. I 
am free not only when I feel free and when I open my heart towards 
others, but when those others respect and allow my freedom of being and 
open in turn their lives towards me and share it with me. Liberty as 
dominion, in all its forms, destroys communion; liberty as communion, by 
contrast, destroys power and hatred between social classes. 
 
Yet a third attitude is Participation (o.c. p. 81). There can be no true liberty 
and solidarity, and hence no true Trinitarian life, without the opportunity 
for all to participate. Without attention to those without a voice and to the 
side-cast of society, these members cannot participate in the community. 
In this regard Habermas’ communicative ethics plays an important role in 
setting the scene for members of the community to participate in dialogue. 
‘Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech’  
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(Habermas 1984, p. 287). Communicative action, or ‘action oriented to 
understanding’, is contrasted with strategic action, in Habermas’ work, or 
‘action oriented to success’ (Scambler 1998, p. 47). Habermas contends 
that modern societies have witnessed a fundamental ‘uncoupling’ between 
the economy and state on the one hand and the private and public spheres 
in the ‘lifeworld’ on the other. These four domains are interdependent and 
each relies on what the other has. The economy produces ‘money’, the 
state ‘power’, the public sphere ‘influence’ and the private sphere 
‘commitment’ (o.c., p. 48). For Habermas, the principle of universalisation 
has to do with moral questions of ‘justice’ and ‘solidarity’; the principle of 
discourse ethics conversely has to do with ethical questions of the ‘good 
life’ (Habermas 1990, p. 66). Discourse ethics promotes priority to moral 
questions of justice and solidarity as a deontological theory (Scambler 
1998, p. 51). Discourse ethics does not purport to resolve substantive 
ethical issues, but resolves to bring together those involved who must then 
find out the answers in a procedure of decision-making (Habermas 1990, 
p. 211). What is required in this regard, according to Scambler is an 
extension of substantive democracy, which alone affords genuine 
participation of citizens in processes of will-formation (o.c. , p. 52). 
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On the other hand Scambler, refering to Habermas’ work, contends that a 
critical society is committed to removal of deliberative inequalities of 
power, communication and politics (o.c., p. 63). Yet a Trinitarian society, 
by default, recognizes inequalities and asymmetries in society. This 
recognition is a fourth condition or attitude to Trinitarian 
principles(Cambon, 1999, p. 86). As Adorno would describe love as the 
capacity to find similarities in what is different and Hegel that there is no 
love without differences, disparity is an invitation to seek mediation. Only 
by valuing what is different can we have an effective interdependence 
(Tommasi, 1996, p. 44). Habermas can be said to have worked the 
framework for dialogue but stopped short of a method. However we can 
see the beginnings of a link between trinitarian theology and ethical 
argument. 
 
Another attitude is Plurality. Unity-Plurality, is another way of describing 
what is Trinitarian by definition. This is perhaps the most important 
attitude to bioethics. Again Gambon describes well what pluralism means 
to the Catholic. Certainly a unity which is expressed in plurality is not 
simply accepted because there is no alternative, but which would readily 
be avoided. Neither is it a demagogic concession to appear modern and 
open, or some strategy that then in reality seeks the prevailing of one’s 
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own convictions. It is conversely a necessity, “if one is to support God’s 
plan on earth” (o.c., p. 91). It constitutes an attitude that all people are 
called to live. Now it is clear that a pluralistic society, even though more 
human, needs a greater maturity, because it becomes more complex and 
requires more responsibility. But the Christian, who knows the value of 
suffering and has at heart the unity of humanity, has to feel the need to 
absorb even these tensions that pluralism brings about. A trinitarian 
pluralism besides being able to interpret the more difficult social situations 
and conflicts requires ‘historic patience’ and an utopian/creative capacity, 
(Bastianel, 1990: 230). These indeed are deep rooted words which may 
even be misunderstood by Christians not well versed in Trinitarian 
Theology. Yet they open the road to a value-pluralism, where 
fundamentalism would be difficult. It is significant however that such 
doctrine emanates from the main seats of Catholic wisdom.  
 
The final two attitudes presented here are ‘Openness to Others’ and 
‘Alterity’. The first seems obvious as openness is synonymous with 
kenosis in many senses. Now Cambon notes that Merleau-Ponty has 
criticized Christians as being poor revolutionists and bad conservationists 
(o.c., p. 97), and it would seem just to weigh such criticism. In fact the 
Christian is called to revolutionize his world, because God’s plans are 
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always much greater than one can ever comprehend. The Benedictine 
theologian G. Lafont (1994) has noted that if the ways Christians uphold 
monotheism is Trinitarian, it will open  new ways and values, which are 
more communal, and pronounce more attention to just causes and to the 
novelties of every generation and epoch. He contrasts this to merely 
upholding an image of one-God, itself of value, but which also upholds an 
immutable stability (o.c., p. 97). 
Alterity (in Italian alterita’ = il porsi come l’altro; hence ‘being’ or ‘living’ 
the other, which in effect is close to empathy) is a typical Trinitarian 
aspect which has evolved from western contemporary thought. It is found 
very originally in Levinas’ work on the ‘face of the other’. Levinas (1984), 
identifies the ethical attitude as the capacity of the ‘I’ to give space to the 
‘other’. When the human being acts in this way, he resembles God, who 
empties oneself and makes space for the ‘other’ – that who is different. 
‘Creation’ signifies an ‘infinity’ that assimilates into oneself a being 
‘outside oneself’ (Levinas, English trans., 1969, p. 293). This is exactly 
the primordial aspect of kenosis (Gambon, 1998, p. 87). Levinas identifies 
this capacity of recognizing and being recognized with ‘the face’ (Levinas, 
o.c., p. 198-199).  
The face is equivalent to the person. ‘To give face’, ‘to look into ones face 
(or eye)’, ‘to save face’, are all expressions with profound meaning. To be 
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able to look directly into the face of someone means being able to treat 
that person with respect and fairly. For the bureucrat it means giving his 
services, for the governor, the doctor, the businessman, as not considering 
persons as being mere numbers (Gambon, o.c., p. 88). Therefore whilst in 
the classic ages, especially Greek, the vogue word was ‘being’; in 
modernity it was the ‘I’; in the third millenium it should be the (Mancini, 
1989, p. 68-69).  
We can continue to debate and to counter argument each other on journals 
or otherwise without ever making a true effort to ‘be with’ and 
comprehend the other. This requires making space for the other, making 
an emptiness, whilst at the same time maintaining identity (perichoretic) 
and not annihilating one’s values. This is where pragmatism differs from 
Trinitarianism. By simply negating the arguments of the ‘other’, even if 
for noble and fundamental reason of faith, we are effectually ‘killing’ the 
other; we cease to look him in the face as a person expressing his liberty 
and communication and solidarity; a person which longs to be heard.    
 
Approaching genetic screening and testing with Trinitarian 
principles  
Certainly, making an ethical argument which is sufficiently clear and 
strong without creating an effect of a juxtaposition rather than an 
integrated argument is not easy when trying to convert theological 
 186 
reflections into bioethics. We have discussed the necessity of working and 
integrating pluralism and moving away from fundamentalism as suggested 
by Lafont. The interdependence of societies and culture, respecting true 
liberty, participation and communicative action all need a recognition of 
inequalities and differences of opinion. Pluralism is not a mere cliché’. It 
requires openness and alterity – which gives space to ‘the other’; the other 
who disagrees with my view on abortion, euthanasia, genetic testing, etc. 
 
Cambon reflects upon this as a ‘new logic’ (o.c. 195). He affirms the only 
sense in which a trinitarian spirit of dialogue is possible is through an 
abandonment of fundamentalism as it cannot insert itself in social life 
without a sense of mediation. “The Trinitarian paradigm does not offer us 
technical ‘recipes’, but a style of life…at the same time, in order to put 
into practice such criteria an objective analysis of reality, formulating 
concrete projects and social, political and economic necessities (o.c. 196). 
He also affirms that one cannot have an ‘ideological strumentalization’, 
that is use Trinitarian theology simple to affirms one’s convictions. 
Translating this into the Bioethical reality may need more thorough 
analysis as many of the issues boil down to fundamental beliefs such as 
the status of the embryo and an affirmation of life. It is possible, by 
exploiting formulas such as that of double effect in a more open manner 
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however to arrive at sound arguments acceptable to all. Such occurred 
when in 1985 the Belgian Episcopal Conference decided that it was 
possible to sacrifice a life during pregnancy to protect the mother 
(although not in all circumstances). It may thus be possible to argue in 
favour of emergenecy contraception in cases of rape. Conversely it may be 
used to prevent consumeristic abuse of genetic tests. Again one can 
envisage the use of genetic technology once a couple has opted for IVF 
because of infertility and who know they carry a genetic disorder such as 
Huntington’s, to avoid implantation of fetuses carrying defective genes 
(without of course having otherwise fertile couples using IVF soley for 
this purpose).  
 
Naturally each of these suggestions would need scholarly argumentation 
beyond the scope of this article. However Bioethics may pose deeper 
problems in departing from fundamentalism than are political, social and 
economic norms. However these scholars are indeed speaking across the 
board when referring to Trinitarian approaches and therefore bioethica l 
issues need be considered seriously if one is not to fall into the same trap 
of cliché’s that one is trying to avoid.  
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Genetic testing poses its problems of treating the person as a means to 
generating revenue from genetic tests (Chandros Hull and Prassad, 2001). 
Genetic tests are marketed in a way which bypasses the health care 
professions, and even proper counseling. Clearly any counseling done by a 
representative of the company promoting the tests would tend to be 
directional. A dialogue is necessary between the marketing world and the 
medical world, which exist in symbiotic relationship. We therefore agree 
with Pellegrino (2001) that a teleological, rather than a social construct 
theory of medicine, is important in maintaining the original telos of 
patient-centered medicine. An attitude of primordial kenosis and 
perichoresis can be encouraged and engendered in most parties and the 
industry brought to understand that notwithstanding its teleology of 
profitability and marketing, the person must remain at the center of debate , 
not instrumentally but ideologically. Instead of seeing the marketing 
potential we the person-centered reality. 
 
A kenotic/perichoretic attitude in those involved in the disability debate, 
can accept that disabled persons are to be given a fair chance. If we are to 
respect the disabled, even pro-choice individuals may come to an 
understanding that although they do not consider the embryo a person, 
they must respect embryos equally, and that one part does not substitute 
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the rest. The World Health Organization (1983) may think twice before 
issuing statements as the one issued for Cyprus as a clear example of how 
one can eliminate genetic disorders. Clearly the person is not central to 
such statements and the focus is on economic trends and eliminating 
burdensome costs to already scarce resources. The end does indeed not 
justify the means. Such statements by such important bodies send 
resounding messages to people who will look at themselves as not being 
fully recognized for what they are; that their type necessitates elimination 
because of burdensome costs, or merely because parents, who are having 
less children, have a right to a ‘perfect baby’. What has been discussed 
here may be a road to see ‘the other’ in a child they wish to eliminate. 
 
Conclusion 
The field of bioethics has been a field of moral debate since its birth. The 
debate it has encouraged thus far however is one of conflict between 
fundamental beliefs and attitudes. Conversely, philosophies which 
prescribe compromise have been too pragmatic in their approach to be 
endeared by all, especially those of strong values.  Yet it has been argued 
that the challenge even to religions with long-standing traditions, like 
Catholicism, is to embrace pluralism and dialogue, not merely in a 
figurative manner of speaking, whilst in reality seeking only to defend 
one’s fundamental ideals, but in a way of seeking true alternatives. 
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The principles of kenosis and perichoreis embrace an outward attitude 
which is open to true dialogue. This essay has looked at the thoughts of 
scholars within the Roman Catholic tradition, in particular Cambon and 
Coda. Whilst applying these issues to biomedical ethics still needs 
considerable work in each area, it can be envisaged that a departure from 
fundamentalism which embraces pluralism, interdependence and 
inequality of ideas, within the Catholic tradition may be a great 
breakthrough in bioethical thought. 
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SHOULD FAMILY PHYSICIANS COUNCIL PATIENTS ON 
GENETIC TESTING AND SCREENING? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P.Mallia and H.ten Have: Should family doctor council patients on genetic 
testing and screening (accepted, The Family Physician, A Mediterranean 
journal). 
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Genetic information has a tremendous potential to harm as well as to help 
and stands to affect a broad number of  family members (McCanse, 2001). 
Even well educated patients may be ill prepared to understand or deal 
realistically with the results of genetic tests. The primary care culture is 
different than the genetics culture but primary care doctors are more 
patient-oriented asking what specific aspects of a genetic approach to this 
health problem (or potential problem) are likely to benefit this patient. 
Howard Brody warned family doctors about the perils of genetic testing 
and the role the family physician must play (Ibid., p.1). The ability to 
genetically screen for diseases far outpaces the ability to treat conditions, 
such as breast cancer, Alzheimer’s disease and prostate cancer. 
Nonetheless people often consider genetic tests as some sort of cure or 
prevention of the condition (Lapp, 2002).  
 
At the same time Chandros Hull and Prassas (2001) have shown how 
companies may use advertising to their advantage to entice people into 
believing that they should do genetic tests. They sometimes advise 
potential patients that there is no need to consult the family doctor or 
anybody else as their own ‘experts’ will guide the patients into what tests 
they should carry out. However genetic tests not only may affect the 
individual adversely, but also family members of that person carrying out 
the tests. In this context it is fair for family physicians and their societies 
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and colleges to be weary of the effect these tests can have over family 
members. Conversely family doctors, without the proper Continuing 
Medical Education (CME) imparted specifically to meet the needs of 
ongoing ethical dilemmas in genetic tests, may find themselves ordering 
such tests too liberally, once it is the patient who request them, believing 
they are respecting the individual’s autonomy. 
 
Weber and Corban (1996) note that although today geneticists perform 
most testing and counseling for genetic disorders, in the near future family 
physicians will increasingly become responsible for this role. Whilst the 
reasons for testing may be simple, they are likely to ignite fierce issues 
regarding cost, ethics, insurability, patient expectations and information 
which family members may wish not to know. How should family doctors 
consider their role in regard to genetic testing and counseling? 
 
What are the concerns of genetic tests?  
Why should genetic tests cause concern to family doctors more than any 
other form of test? The prime reason is indeed the novelty of these tests 
and the aura they are raising. Awareness campaigns sponsored by 
companies need to be considered for what they may actually be – an 
impetus for them to promote their product. While such campaigning need 
not be bad in itself, if it is to be endorsed by the medical profession, the 
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latter has the responsibility towards society not to be an accomplice in 
enticing patients to spend more than they should on such tests. Definitely 
not everybody need do genetic tests and therefore fears must be quelled. 
Who is in a better position to quell such fears than family physicians who 
enjoy the trust of patients and their families? Consider the testing for the 
breast cancer genes BRCA 1 & 2. Those who test positive for the 
mutations of these genes via a commercially available genetic test are at 
an increased risk compared to the general population of having breast 
cancer. Some may argue therefore that once these tests are available it is 
not the onus of any physician to try to convince someone not to do them. 
Yet people may not be aware of the implications for employment and 
insurance the result of such a test may have. Also whether they know 
what, if anything, can be done with such knowledge and how this will 
affect their mental well being and that of their family is uncertain. In the 
event such a test is positive, it does not necessarily imply that the person 
will have cancer; yet it puts them into a high risk category justifying 
insurers to charge a higher premium or not to insure them at all for breast 
cancer. This has enticed many States in the USA to have laws protecting 
against inappropriate access of such tests to the public. In other countries 
such laws do not yet exist.  
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Recent studies on bilateral prohylactic oophorectomy vs. radical 
mastectomy (Kauff, 2002; Rebbeck, 2002) show that this is a highly 
evolving field in which it is wise to seek the advice of a doctor. Haber 
(2002), analysing the relevance in the statistics of such results, shows only 
that more studies are necessary. Thus by no means is there any certainty 
about outcomes of BRCA testing other than to recommend it to women 
past childbearing age and counseling them on oophorectomy should they 
test positive. Again this operation does not exempt completely them from 
breast cancer, especially when there are as yet no studies to show whether 
the required Hormone Replacement Therapy (to prevent premature side 
effects of the artificially-induced menopause; namely increased 
cardiovascular risk and osteoporosis) may itself have an increased 
incidence of breast cancer which the oophorectomy is trying to eliminate. 
Even though the effectiveness of bilateral prophylactic radical mastectomy 
was demonstrated recently (Meijers, 2001), the controversy over such 
radical treatment remains. 
 
Role of the Family Physician 
Whereas it is undisputed that the General Practitioner is in an ideal 
position to counsel patients on genetic testing (BMA, 1998, p. 120; 
Starfield et al., 2002) and to know when to refer patients for specialized 
counseling, Brody argues that a balance has to be struck between the 
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physicians hunches, the patient’s wishes and the evidence of clinical trials 
(Lapp, 2002).  One concern which is not being addressed adequately, for 
example, is the implications such tests pose for family members. A 
possible solution he proposes is that the family doctor is in a position to 
set up a ‘family covenant’ before an individual goes through with testing. 
Such a document would be negotiated among the family members with the 
help of the physician. Family members who ‘opt in’ set conditions are 
privy to the knowledge that comes out (Lapp, 2002). Yet the concept of 
covenant is lagging behind advances in genetic testing and it is doubtful 
how much such a covenant is possible before family doctors establish 
themselves as the agents of basic genetic counseling. 
 
The BMA document argues that primary care physicians should be able to 
identify patients and families who would need further genetic counseling 
by specialists, arguing that the rapidity with which genetic technology is 
developing and the complexity of the decisions to be made in relation to 
genetic testing mean that specialized genetic counseling, both pre-test and 
post-test, is likely to be required (BMA, 1998, p. 121). This however only 
refers to identification of individuals and families who need specialist 
counseling. It is unlikely that genetic counselors can reach the public as 
much as family physicians because of their smaller numbers and their less 
easily accessibility as the family doctor for the more generic genetic tests 
 197 
being advertised. Moreover the family doctor already knows much about 
the family and probably its requirements and would be able to identify 
who would benefit from genetic information. He/she is familiar with the 
background and family dynamics in a way that a specialized counselor can 
never be: it is information obtained over time within the context of 
practicing family medicine. Indeed if it were possible for the counselor to 
arrive to such knowledge, it could be argued that this would be a repetition 
and waste of time for health professionals and patients alike. 
 
Boxes 1 and 2 (Ibid., p. 123-124) show respectively the process of genetic 
counseling and the framework for exploring decisions laid down by both 
the BMA and the American Society for Human Genetics. Nothing in this 
list is in fact beyond the capabilities of the average primary care physician 
or family doctor. If people seek the advise of the family physician, it is 
appropriate that the latter should be able to handle most questions and 
counseling, leaving to the specialist those who have serious genetic 
inheritance problems. For those patients seeking to know more about 
cancer genes, paternity testing and even genetic screening of the unborn, 
the family physician is in an ideal and maybe better position to impart 
advise. Family physicians are moreover prescriptive by nature and thus 
tend to be more directive than the average non-directive genetic counselor 
(BMA, 1998, p. 122). 
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There are then additional reasons why general genetic counseling should 
be imparted by family doctors. The strategically placed position of the 
family physician favours the role that genetic counseling should play in 
primary care. It is the responsibility of family physicians as a group to take 
on the role of protecting families against commercial interest. This is 
particularly important because people may not be aware of the 
implications to other members of the family when doing a genetic test. 
Who else but the family physician is in the central stage to counsel 
directly family members? This is all more important because to await the 
development of genetic services and to wait for specialized counselors to 
deal with the true impact of genetic testing is being unrealistic even in the 
United Kingdom and the United States, let alone the rest of the world. 
 
Of course the family doctor can never replace the role of the specialized 
genetic counselor just as he can never replace the specialized radiographer 
and cardiologist. But the energy of the specialist counselor is better spent 
on the hard core cases like Huntington’s and Tay Sachs, rather than where 
the industry is striking hard, namely the cancer genes and such tests as 
‘cardiovascular panels’ and ‘thrombosis panels’ which are aimed to raise 
awareness of the public in order to satisfy a profit motive rather than a 
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benevolent principle. Specialized counselors can continue doing what they 
have been doing up till now.  
 
Consider a country like Malta where recently a newly formed company 
offered genetic testing to the public. For the time being it uses specialists 
and family doctors for referral. No form of counseling is offered to the 
patient, leaving this onus on the doctor. Indeed there has been little to 
promote awareness among the medical profession of the special nature of 
genetic tests and the implication they may have on the personal life of the 
person seeking those tests and on the family. This fertile ground is the 
ideal incubator for releasing ‘awareness information’ onto the public 
catching doctors off guard. Before there is enough time to prepare for 
genetic counseling services, people will start believing, as happens in 
other countries, that there is some inherent cure in carrying out such tests 
(Lapp, 2002). Doctors, on the other hand, unaware of the implications of 
such tests, as has been the subtle warning of the BMA, will not counsel the 
public properly. Specialized services, even if they do exist in theory in the 
main general hospital are not enough to handle the everyday questions of 
genetic tests and definitely cannot direct patients into what tests are 
necessary. Appointment with the service may run into months just to 
handle the cases that truly need specialized counseling. 
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General practitioners are strategically placed to train themselves in 
imparting this counseling, which being a core medical subject is already in 
their realm. It is the responsibility of colleges, association and academies 
of family physicians to counsel members to learn more about genetic 
counseling. 
 
The coming of age of Family Practice 
A second important reason is the coming of age of family practice. Whilst 
the history of medicine shows that the family doctor or community doctor 
was the traditional doctor (Porter, 1996, p. 118), the last century saw a 
surge of specialties and sub-specialities. In Britain the Royal College of 
General Practitioners was founded after the war and incorporated in it 
almost all general practitioners. It became the strongest political body in 
Britain to bargain with government over the structure of the National 
Health Service. In the United States, the American Academy of Family 
Physicians brought together Family Doctors raising the status of Family 
Medicine to that of a speciality. Similar roads were taken later in other 
countries.  
 
Family doctors now provide more and more services which can be offered 
to people at more reasonable rates making it more acceptable to insurance 
companies. GPs have always traditionally carried out minor surgery such 
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as removal of sebaceous cysts, cautery of warts and injection of internal 
haemorrhoids. Nowadays more and more GPs take on more engaging non-
invasive surgery such as removal of lipomas, injection of varicose veins 
circumcision lists and even haemorroidectomies (Brown, 1992). Studies 
have shown (Siepel, 2000) that family doctors who attend a course in 
ultrasonography can perform ultrasounds as part of the physical 
examination detecting pathology such as renal tumours, aortic aneurysms 
and others, before any signs and symptoms are noticed by doctor and 
patient respectively. Family doctors in the United States train 
sigmoidoscopy, gastroscopy, colposcopy and can even have a whole 
radiological set-up if economically viable. All of this in the interest of 
quick diagnostics bypassing long referral lists and delays in a secondary 
care setting. In this setting it is reasonable to assume that whilst the family 
doctor, with continued medical education (CME) is taking onto himself 
more and more diagnostic techniques which not only increase the scope of 
general practice but which result in more benefit to patients. With proper 
CME a genetic counseling service to people and their families is within 
scope and definition of family practice.  
 
What is needed with the impact of genetic technologies therefore is a 
primary care setting that can explain tests to all people, not only to those 
who have some genetic disorder in their lineage. It is reasonable to assume 
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that any woman may request information about whether she should have a 
BRCA test done. She may not know she needs counseling (in terms of 
implications for herself and her relative and also for insurance etc). The 
family doctor is therefore not only strategically placed for this role but 
genetic counseling is within the scope and goals of family practice. 
Moreover family physicians can bring a broader scope to genetic 
counseling. They are trained to think of issues such as getting patients to 
get their house in order vis -à-vis insurance before getting tests done 
(Lavallee, 1999). 
 
Conversely it is unreasonable to assume or request genetic counselors to 
have to deal with this sort of mass population counseling. They would lose 
time which is valuable to what they are doing at present – counseling to 
those families, which may indeed be identified by family doctors, who 
require further in-depth evaluation. Unless genetic counselors increase in 
numbers and become almost as common as the family doctor they may not 
be able to handle the amount of information which necessarily would need 
to be imparted to keep up with the media and the rapidly expanding 
genetic industry. Starfield et al. (2002, p. 51) argue that if genetic 
problems should be considered, and initiate diagnosis and even 
management. Primary-care-centred systems offer the greatest for 
improving health. 
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The responsibility of Associations and Colleges 
Family physician Nancy Stevens stresses the importance of injecting the 
family practice perspective into genetic medicine (McCanse, 2000). As 
this perspective is still underrepresented in conversations of genetic 
medicine, it means that patients of family practitioners are 
underrepresented. For example, she points out that only someone from 
high-risk families tends to benefit from BRCA testing.  Once it is accepted 
that the family doctor has this role to play in imparting knowledge and 
genetic counseling to patients, associations and colleges have an 
obligatory role to see that its members get the CME required in genetic 
counseling that is required. Family doctors, by their very nature, are 
already in a position to give evidence -based information, genetics being 
one specialty they have always had in their curriculum. It would be 
unreasonable not to accept their role in providing such evidence-based 
counseling.  
 
Associations and colleges of family doctors, which strive to guarantee 
excellence of their members to the public, have a special role to play here. 
But primary-care-centred systems  may pose a risk of underdetection and 
undermanagement of genetic problems if information and other 
educational networks do not actively support practitioners (Starfield et al. 
2002, p. 51). Whereas it may be obvious that a family doctor intending to 
carry out diagnostic ultrasonography would require training, it may not be 
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that obvious that to do genetic counseling one also needs training, because 
genetics has always formed part of the medical undergraduate curriculum. 
The focus of counseling is not on Mendelian inheritance explained in 
layman terms, but is a matter of explaining the social, legal and ethical 
implications of these tests and also of having a clear understanding of why 
they are so different than merely having a blood count done. Doctors need 
to understand and explain that genetic tests are largely non-therapeutic and 
predictive. The patient therefore needs to be empowered with information 
by someone who realizes the full potential of these tests and how industry 
may exploit fear of disease without concern for other family members and 
implications on employment and insurability.  
 
Associations must guarantee that their members will explain the 
harm/benefit of genetic testing and screening. They must also guarantee 
that they will continue to seek the interests of the family and not only of 
individual people seeking testing. In other words family doctors need to 
maintain the trust of the public, that financial gain is not the main motive 
of the counseling as may be the case for the company providing that test. 
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BOX 1 
The description of genetic counseling set out by the American Society of 
Human Genetics is as follows: 
Genetic counseling is a communication process which deals with the 
human problems associated with the occurrence or risk of occurrence, of a 
genetic disorder in a family. This process involves an attempt by one or 
more appropriately trained persons to help the individual or family: 
1. comprehend the medical facts, including the diagnosis, the probable 
course of the disorder and the available management; 
2. appreciate the way heredity contributes to the disorder, and the risk of 
recurrence in specified relatives; 
3. understand the options for dealing with the risk of recurrence; 
4. choose the course of action which seems appropriate to them in view  
of their risk and their family goals and act in accordance with that 
decision; 
5. make the best possible adjustment to the disorder in an affected 
member and/or to the risk of recurrence of that disorder. 
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 BOX 2 
The British Medical Association states that genetic counselling consists of 
a series of activities which make a coherent whole. For ease of analysis we 
separate them in the list given below. In reality, however, they are not 
separate entities, but facets of one process. In general terms, genetic 
counseling includes: 
· taking a family history and establishing a diagnosis; 
· gaining an understanding of the social and cultural context within 
which a patient and his or her family live and the values they bring to 
the counseling process; 
· listening to the questions and anxieties of the patient; 
· providing information about the condition, its inheritance pattern, and 
its management and raising questions about the potential significance 
of sharing information with other family members; 
· giving information about reproductive options; and/or 
· giving information about predictive options (if applicable); 
· providing the opportunity to reflect upon the options (implications 
counseling); 
· providing the opportunity to reflect upon the options (implications 
counseling); 
· providing emotional support; and 
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· initiating sustained help, if necessary, to enable individuals to adjust to 
particular life circumstances (psycho-therapeutic counseling). 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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In the beginning of this thesis we set out to answer two basic questions. 
The first being whether the New Genetics is verging onto a new form of 
eugenics; the second was to inquire whether there is indeed a 
philosophical framework which is adequate to help us in setting standards 
for genetics. These two questions inevitably lead to other questions 
pertinent to our study. One question is whether there is anything special in 
genetic testing. This question is important for the practitioner in 
discriminating and deliberating on which tests to choose for his or her 
patients. Is requesting a BRCA test the same as requesting a cholesterol 
test? If not, then what is special about genetic tests would require a 
different approach to informed consent; a process requiring an amount of 
(genetic) counseling. This leads us to an additional question: who is in I 
daily practice strategically placed to impart genetic counseling and 
educate the general public? It is unrealistic to expect that existing genetic 
counselors can handle the load which is expected to arise with the future 
onslaught of genetic tests – especially if these will be an over-the-counter 
(OTC) matter. Moreover, would this load not jeopardize the genetic 
counselor as a specialist? 
 
These questions are put in the light of three different but pertinent issues 
to our study. All three in fact are referred to frequently in the various 
chapters.  
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a. Genetic screening. The Cyprus experience is often referred to as the 
paradigm case of genetic screening. Cyprus had a long standing 
problem with thalassaemia major. The major trait can only result 
through the copulation of two heterozygous individuals, who in turn 
will have a twenty-five percent chance of producing a homozygous 
individual with thalassaemia major, a twenty-five percent chance of 
producing a ‘normal’ individual (apologizing for the deliberate use of 
the word ‘normal’ – it is used with respect to a condition rather than 
with respect to an individual), and a fifty percent chance of producing 
again heterozygous individuals. This basic case is kept for simplicity. 
It is beyond our scope to go into the various types of thalassaemia and 
their inheritance. The Cypriots courageously, if not uncannily, used all 
means possible to reduce the incidence of thalassaemia major which 
impinged roughly on their health care resources. They requested 
couples to undergo genetic counseling before marriage; an option 
condoned by the Orthodox Church, which in turn would not allow a 
couple to be married without certification of such counseling. 
Moreover the counseling is directive and intended to reduce the 
number of marriages between heterozygous individuals. Besides these 
couples are offered selective discard and abortion of their affected 
embryos, thus reducing the number of births with this disability. The 
 211 
overall result is a successful decrease in numbers of thalassaemia 
major which in turn translated into better care for existing homozygous 
individuals. The whole process is condoned by the World Health 
Organization (WHO), thus raising the question whether this selective 
process is indeed a goa l of medicine and whether it in fact constitutes a 
legitimate form of eugenics. 
b. Genetic testing. The tremendous study into molecular biology and 
genetic technology has led to readily available genetic tests, which are 
envisaged to be on an exponential rise over the coming years. Such 
tests can be offered directly to the consumer from the company. The 
company may get around counseling by offering counselors itself, thus 
bypassing the individual’s health care provider. The conflict of interest 
here is worrying. People will be ensnared in requesting a genetic test 
out of fear, thinking there is a possible cure. Such indiscriminate OTC 
testing will bring about its own tragedies as people will do a test 
before knowing enough information about whether they indeed are 
candidates for such testing and what good will it do anyway. The right 
to a test is not automatic and we must ensure that such a right is 
exerted following proper channels of information and consent and 
through the right people, who hopefully will have no vested interests. 
c. The ‘perfect’ baby. We all wish the best for our children. We choose 
the schools we can afford best and seek to provide our offspring with 
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the best opportunities available to us. Moreover we take medical 
precautions by taking folic acid and eating healthily so as to minimize 
congenital defects in our children. These interventions however do not 
impinge on the individual fetus. Does responsible parenthood, given 
the decreasing numbers of birth rates, entail a responsibility to de -
select those offspring which will be a burden to the parents or society, 
or better still, to select those babies with traits the parents would 
prefer? Would such selection put undue pressure on these children? 
Should we leave offspring to chance? If I know I have a genetic trait or 
severe condition in my family who will I be wronging by selecting an 
offspring without that condition: myself, the family or the discarded 
fetus? Will this have any possible psychological implications for the 
‘selected’ baby?  
 
The first chapter assesses the question of eugenics and the new genetics. 
Wikler (1999) has argued that there were good intentions encircling the 
various eugenics movements. Although we do contest such argumentation, 
the arguments are more pertinent for today’s new genetics. With the 
Cyprus experience, the WHO has condoned a practice which deliberately 
discriminates against new unborn children with thalassaemia. This 
practice may be understandable in an economic situation of dire straits but 
it is roughly utilitar ian to say the least. There is great danger of slippery a 
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slope and if one were to follow WHO guidelines, which paraded the 
Cyprus paradigm as an ‘example’ or test case, we will be eliminating 
genetic disorders this way for any utilitarian reason. At least this is what 
we have argued that the WHO report implies. 
 
What about future generations? This is one of those areas of philosophical 
quagmires in which some philosophers would agree we have a 
responsibility to future generations and others would say we do not. For if 
we say we have a responsibility, we inevitably are affecting outcomes and 
thus possibly discriminating against the birth of some individuals which 
we do not want to tolerate in our society. And what right do we have to do 
this? We can, for example, argue that cloning is wrong because a clone 
will have DNA which is older than the individual. In fact the age would be 
his or her age in years, plus the age of the person from whom the DNA 
was taken. Thus a clone may age earlier and die younger than usual and 
have a considerable amount of ailments which economies would have to 
cope with. But what right have we to say such people should not exist? 
Can I go up to a clone and say that he is a mistake of the past and should 
not be around? Would this justify treating these people less respectfully?  
 
However such arguments were found to be rather frivolous because the 
issue of ‘possible people’ can have no ending. Is a couple being 
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disrespectful to a possible person by omitting intercourse on a particular 
night which could have translated into a person? Are we being 
disrespectful to possible people by using contraception (including the 
family planning condoned by Catholic authorities)? Since there is more to 
life than surviving and reproducing as in the animal kingdom, then such 
arguments can only qualify as food for thought but cannot be taken very 
seriously by people who have their feet on the ground.  
 
Moreover we do indeed make retrospective moral judgements. We have 
quoted the radiation experiments which were done in good faith and which 
yet did not respect issues of informed consent as we understand them 
today. Civilizations of the past have done many things which in retrospect 
we consider to be immoral but which at that time were not morally 
questioned in that culture. Even the Roman Catholic Church condoned 
torture and execution in the past as it was considered that in such a way 
the sin of the flesh could be destroyed for a higher moral principle – that 
of saving the soul. Today nobody condones such behavior. So if we can 
make retrospective moral judgement on past cultures, it is not only 
reasonable to expect that future generations can make retrospective moral 
judgements on us. Once we know they will make such judgement on us, 
this would imply that we now have a moral obligation to them. If our 
ancestors had the excuse that they were ignorant of retrospective moral 
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judgements of their future generations, we cannot claim the same excuse. 
Today we would be choosing deliberately not to respect future generations 
knowing they will be looking upon us and judging us for our actions as we 
judge those in our past.  
 
Once we have asked the question we seem to have lost the right to the 
answer. Respect for future generations thus seems not only to be a 
responsible thing to do but also is a moral obligation on our part when 
looked at from this perspective. The complete exploration of the concept 
of a Guardian for future generations is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
it is definitely something worth deliberating on. But if there is no 
individual ombudsman or guardian, we definitely should be our own 
guardians for future generations. Peer review and ethics commissions do 
indeed have a role to play in this respect. 
 
 
 
What philosophical model? 
Having spread out the issues and problem we now have to explore the 
possible philosophical models and what they stand for in relation to the 
genetic questions. Now a framework for moral reasoning may be good 
when deliberating on ‘food ethics’, say, but not that helpful in relat ion to 
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genetics. This immediately has an implication. For if we choose a model 
for deliberating on the new genetics, this in no way diminishes the value 
of other models, although some of the arguments can indeed be 
extrapolated. It only means that in our opinion, they are less helpful in the 
realm of genetics. 
 
It was first established whether there is indeed anything special about 
genetic tests. It would be a futile exercise to discuss philosophical models 
if at the end of the day we affirm that not only genetic essentialism is an 
abstract, useless criterion, but that indeed there is nothing different 
between ordering a BRCA genetic test and a cholesterol test. The scope 
and width of genetic tests extend into realms beyond cure for disease. 
Moreover it is in the category of ‘predictive’ and ‘pre-symptomatic’ 
testing that most difficult issues arise. A genetic test can tell me something 
about myself which is a possible future outcome. I can know about a 
possible disease without any symptoms or signs. But a woman may wish 
not to know her genetic status with respect to breast cancer. Once you 
know there is little you can do other than radical surgery. This may be 
followed by cosmetic surgery. But the effect on one’s life is too radical to 
ignore. Does this make the BRCA test any more special than a cholesterol 
test? Both require a change in lifestyle. Prima facie they are the same thing 
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and it would seem that the whole outrage against genetic testing is nothing 
more than merely the usual concerns regarding new technologies. 
 
But genetic testing gives power in at least two ways, which in turn affect 
our moral standards. In the first instance, there are social issues like 
insurance and employment. Clearly it is the moral prerogative of insurance 
companies to assess risks so that they may maintain a pool of resources 
from which those insured can benefit. Running an insurance business 
means insuring people fairly, giving no advantage to one over the other. 
Therefore insurance companies assess risk outcomes. If I decide  to come 
to an insurance at an older age, I pay for an increased-risk category of age. 
Moreover any existing conditions are taken into consideration. Now 
genetic tests are measuring something which is there from before we are 
born to after death. Clearly if I know my genetic constitution and an 
insurance company penalizes me for knowledge which is not balanced 
fairly with the rest of the people in the pool, then I will have an argument 
for discrimination. The only way for an insurance company to request 
genetic tests in a fair way would be to ask everyone for those tests; such as 
many do for HIV. But besides being in a difficulty to know where to draw 
a line (for it is envisaged that the number of tests available will rocket in 
the coming years) it would be going against people’s rights not-to-know 
about their genetic make-up. Conversely, if it becomes too painful and 
 218 
expensive to join an insurance plan, it would be deceiving the end of 
buying insurance or even going into the business in the first place. 
 
Besides insurance, genetic tests give the power to select offspring. The 
film Gattaca was not quoted frivolously. It is a reality which is on our 
doorstep. People will soon have the option of selecting fertilized eggs that 
have undergone genetic testing and/or screening. In the not too distant 
future which can provide artificial gestations, this selection becomes even 
more feasible. We have the power to select and discard. Moreover if such 
practices become common they may on one hand give an advantage to 
some socio-economic classes or countries over others, and on the other 
hand be deemed as ‘responsible’ parenthood, as has been suggested by 
various authors. This then brings along other problems of its own. Parents 
would be selecting traits in their offspring. If I select an offspring which 
should have an aptitude for sport or for learning, it is difficult to see how 
pressure on these people is to be avoided. We conclude that if one can 
honestly argue that there is nothing special in selecting a child’s genetic 
makeup through information and elimination of other potential children, 
then one can have an argument that there is nothing special about genetic 
tests. But this argument is over-enthusiastic and ambitious to say the least. 
It is fraught will moral controversy. Since the power of genetic testing 
gives us abilities which put into question or deliberately go against many 
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people’s moral imperatives, then we can conclude that there is indeed 
something special to think about when deliberating genetic tests and 
screening. 
 
Philosophical approaches 
These deliberations draw us into the query of what moral framework we 
should use when deliberating about genetic screening and testing. The four 
principles (respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and 
justice) were first assessed. It is argued that these cannot resolve moral 
dilemmas in genetics. They may be useful in other respects but not in this 
one. There is something more to ethical disagreement and debate than 
principle balancing or specification. Princip les are just too ‘thin’, and the 
systems we build from them too reductionist, and even when more 
carefully specified they are not an adequate means of making decisive 
judgements in matters of moral disagreement. They may be of practical 
help in specific cases but only if we have independent grounds for 
resolving the broader ethical questions that are also relevant to these cases. 
And for genetic screening and testing this is not the case. We disagree on 
the moral status of the embryo; we disagree on the limits of parental 
autonomy; we even may disagree on whether a spouse should have a right 
to know the genetic constitution of the partner, which in turn will affect 
outcomes. We need principles of higher moral order to be able then to 
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specify and balance the four principles. Once we do not agree on higher-
order principles, such as respect for life from fertilization, then principles 
cannot help us resolve moral dilemmas raised by genetic screening and 
testing. 
 
The same can be said for Pragmatism. But here the problem may be even 
more complex. The pragmatist will even go as far as to ask us to challenge 
those values we hold dear. Now this may not be as drastic as it sounds. 
The pragmatist, especially the modern Deweyan type, does indeed have a 
respect for socia l principles and condones the balancing and specifying of 
principles as a way of even being pragmatic. He may tell us to look again 
at double effect in order to be able to change our view on a particular 
subject. He invokes biology to remind us there is more to moral 
deliberation and reminds us of continuums, moral and otherwise, and to 
use the scientific method and apply it to normative issues. Thus we may 
want to reconsider emergency contraception in cases of rape, say, even 
though it is abortificient, because it is only condoned outside ovulation 
pointing out that the reasoning here is quantitative rather than qualitative; 
the chances of a pregnancy merely increase during ovulation so if you are 
allowed to use it in the rest of the cycle, you should be allowed to use it 
throughout. He thus reminds us of conversation and dialogue. 
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But the pragmatist stops short of the principlist. He again does not have a 
solution to higher principles and morals which we hold dear. The question 
of the status of the embryo is not resolved. We may be able to give some 
leeway, but definitely cannot accept selecting the perfect baby if we accept 
the moral status of the embryo. Here the pragmatist seems to become 
frustrated and will not accept that the world we live in, albeit pluralistic, is 
made of people who indeed have at least some fundamental principles. 
This is the world, the phenomenological situation, we are thrown in and 
where we have to do our reasoning. 
 
Our appraisal of phenomenology has not been the traditional appr oach. 
Rather it focuses on the phenomenology of the doctor-patient relationship 
as opposed to socially-constructed theories. If principlism and pragmatism 
do not help us; if they are too socially constructed so as to impinge on the 
reality which is the building block of medical practice, then there may be 
something more to deliberations over genetic testing than merely social 
and moral issues. We have seen how social construction has indeed put the 
medical encounter into danger. Edmund Pellegrino (2001) reminds us of 
Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Maoist China and Imperialist Japan. It 
cannot be guaranteed that libertarian pragmatist philosophies cannot have 
their toll on our way of looking at genetics. 
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In a consumerist society which allows drug companies to publicize and 
market ferociously their product, the potential patient, who at the end of 
the day is the target, may be defenseless. He may be doing tests just to 
satisfy the market greed of a company rather than because he really needs 
that test to be done. Market publicity and distorted information (which can 
be even media frenzy) moreover will jeopardize truly informed choices. It 
is not the place here to enter into the conditions of informed consent and 
choices, suffice it to say that manipulation can affect our understanding 
and voluntariness – two important conditions to make an informed choice. 
A teleology of medicine should protect against the symbiotic relationship 
that associates the goods of medicine to the industry. Teleology may not 
have the answers to questions such as the status of the embryo, but it does 
articulate the significance of a fiduciary relationship based on trust and 
care, which should guarantee honest outcomes. 
 
Yet, with the advantages of a phenomenological approach, it still does not 
give us the answers to questions of higher moral order. And indeed where 
the enlightenment and the modern moral projects have failed, we cannot 
say that we have a philosophy today that seems to be succeeding. Where 
philosophy and rationality have failed, we can however turn to theology. 
Theology is a legitimate contributant of bioethical issues. Although it 
seems that bioethics is dominated by philosophy, it is still legitimate in a 
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thesis of bioethics to not only include theological issues, but also 
important to consider them as well. We choose to deliberate on a revival 
approach to Trinitarian theology in Christian circles (more notably in 
Catholic circles following the spirituality of the international lay Focolare 
movement based in Rome).  
 
The challenge of this century to Christianity and for Catholicism in 
particular is to live in a pluralistic world. Catholics have moved forward 
by upholding fundamental values, itself of value, but albeit too 
confrontational in approach and lacking dialogue which is effective and 
which sees Christ also in those who do not uphold such values. A 
monotheism that is Trinitarian (to empty and unite oneself with the other) 
is, according to Lafont (1994), of greater value and more communal. It 
respects pluralism in a true way and not simply says so at face value, but 
in reality, continues to do what it was doing before. All those who have in 
some way expressed doubt on Catholic doctrine know what it feels like to 
be frowned at and dismissed as dissenting. Rather we should uphold true 
understanding and dialogue, even with those who disagree, having faith 
that a Trinitarian dialogue will bring about a unity which inspires wisdom. 
True Catholicism has faith not merely in rational thought but also in God’s 
meaningful relationship to man; a God who lies amidst those who are 
united in his name. The processes of perichoresis and kenosis, the 
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conditions for Trinitarian respect can be learnt even by those among us 
who do not hold Christian or theistic values but who believe in life, love, 
and dialogue amongst human beings.  
 
Possibly with such attitudes can we hope to arrive at resolving moral 
issues such as the status of the embryo. Where rational thought has created 
more discord, a faith in a theological approach can convert minds . This 
approach merits more thought in the area of bioethics. 
 
Bringing genetic counseling to people 
If the only hope for reaching the masses in a neutral manner without the 
influence of social-construct forces is through the phenomenology of the 
doctor-patient relationship, the final chapter proposes a practical solution. 
The specialist in family medicine, the general practitioner (GP), is the 
person who has at heart the family and the primary health care of the 
individual. The family doctor is not only strategically placed to impart 
genetic counseling, but he (she) is probably the first person to be asked in 
many communities by people about genetic tests. Often people come to 
their family doctor with questions like, “what do you think about this new 
test?”. The family doctor should be versant with all ethical, legal and 
social issues of genetic testing and screening. For many, probably, CME 
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and CPD courses would be needed; and it is the responsibility of GP 
Colleges and Associations to see these are imparted effectively. 
 
Moreover the family doctor is not a genetic counseling specialist and in no 
way would he be taking over this work. Conversely he should be relieving 
genetic counselors from this overwhelming work. Neither are genetic 
counselors in number enough to deal with the potential request for primary 
care counseling of genetic tests, nor is it really in their aegis. Family 
doctors are, conversely, many and close to the community. Genetic 
counseling has already been within their professional duty and on their 
curricula. Family physicians are taking more and more responsibilities, 
relieving specialists from what is more appropriately primary care. 
Genetic counseling for the myriad of conditions we can test for is indeed 
primary care and therefore should lie within this special teleology of the 
doctor-patient relationship in family practice. 
 
Further research 
The challenges we face by genetic tests are not therefore insurmountable. 
We do have the necessary frameworks where to impart information. We 
do have to accept however that decision-making within a teleology of 
medicine, which after all can indeed have input from society (and doctors 
indeed live in that society), is overall better than any socially constructed 
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theory can hope to achieve. It was seen that such theories fall short of 
agreement on higher order principles. A teleological approach at least 
upholds the higher principle ‘for the good of the patient’. This is not 
paternalism; this is professionalism whose duty it is to protect the patient 
from societal forces which can have monetary rather than health reasons 
for promoting a test. There was a time when someone was considered a 
man for keeping his word and language played an important part in 
communication. When once a hand-shake was enough, today, maybe 
rightly so, we need written contracts. But the written word can be 
conveying one message- health -when in reality its aims are commercial. 
There are many hidden agendas behind the written word – something that 
makes them immoral (albeit accepted). In a socially constructed and 
accepted post-modern world where adverts give off messages like ‘whiter 
than white’ or imply a magic formula if you eat a certain chocolate bar, it 
is unlikely that social-construct theories can gain the faith of people. 
Professions are always held more accountable for their actions. It is less 
likely here that we will find any linguistic sleight of hand. 
 
Teleology apart however, the issue of the status of the embryo has been a 
recurring theme throughout the chapters of this thesis. Indeed it would 
seem that many of the threats posed by genetic screening and testing, can 
be reduced to the embryo being seen as a commodity which can be 
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sacrificed for better genetic outcomes. Since historically this theme of the 
status of the embryo has generated considerable literature without tangible 
outcomes, we stand the risk of bypassing this obstacle in ‘pragmatic’ 
ways. The danger of theories with open principles such as ‘the four -
principle-approach’ is that they allow moral argument in any direction the 
agent chooses to arrive a priori. Further research is thus needed in the 
following areas: 
 
1. We need to investigate what the new Trinitarian doctrines have to 
offer as regards to the challenge of living in a pluralistic society. The 
doctrine which has been reflected upon here has to be put through the 
phenomenological test and perhaps outcomes need to be assessed 
empirically. In particular we need to see how a departure from 
fundamentalism, as is being suggested by the scholars discussed in 
chapter 7, will be worked out regarding issues like status of the 
embryo. 
2. Further in-depth analysis has to be done in the region of social 
construct versus teleological theories of medicine. The dangers of 
socially constructed theories have, in agreement with Pellegrino, been 
reflected upon here. Conversely, one can understand fears of 
paternalism from society-oriented professionals. Perhaps some form of 
agreement regarding how one can preserve teleology whilst reflecting 
 228 
socially constructed ideology can be worked out using the Trinitarian 
dialogue discussed here. 
3. The concept of ‘Guardian’ for future generations needs to be studied 
more extensively. It was concluded here that the present guardians are 
our politicians as well as the system of peer review, which guarantee 
reliable outcomes. This indeed can be a balance between teleology and 
social-constructivism. But since the WHO has in fact condoned 
genetic selection, then perhaps an office of guardian should be studied 
and endorsed. The literature on this subject shows that what has been 
said so far, albeit by authoritative scholars, is indeed limited. What, if 
any, of the human genome needs protection, and, what would we 
consider to be eugenics? This concept should be explored more 
enthusiastically. 
4. Finally, it has been proposed that family physicians are the best 
strategically placed health care professionals to impart genetic 
counseling on commercially available genetic tests. This work should 
prove too overwhelming to the present number of genetic counselors, 
who would still be needed for the specialized work they do. 
Conversely, the family physician has been trained in genetic jargon 
and understanding and is probably the first line contact of a patient 
with a question on genetic testing. Yet this proposal needs to be 
assessed over time for its validity and outcomes. Prospective studies 
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would show whether family physicians can indeed be effective in 
educating and counseling and whether they have any effect on 
outcomes. 
 
In concluding this study of the ethics of genetic screening and testing 
through a philosophical reflection on our genetic future, we are left with 
implicit questions, which need to be answered. Some questions need 
prospective studies spread over geography and time as are common in 
medical research. Others need deeper philosophical reflection in order to 
implement logistic and strategic individuals and offices in the right 
institutions, which will guarantee a balance between market and 
teleological/deontological realities. 
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SUMMARY 
The general aim of the thesis is to discuss and analyse the ethical issues 
regarding genetic screening and testing. The aim is to identify whether 
testing and screening pose threats such as eugenics practices and 
disadvantaging certain groups in modern society and to find a background 
against which one can dialogue to reach desired goals. Genetics has been 
an issue during the last hundred years. Starting out as eugenic practices 
which were hailed in many countries as the solution to improving society, 
it peaked at a stage whereby with its excuse racism led to genocide. This 
naturally left a negative heritage impacting on the modern development of 
the life sciences. All genetic research and attempts to improve even 
specific genetic conditions were henceforth surrounded with the aura of 
the holocaust. Eugenics took on a negative turn. Indeed with the awaking 
of the value of persons and the recognition that there is no race superior to 
another, eugenics, rightly so, came to be associated with where we do not 
want to go.  
 
The thesis thus analyzes three basic questions: what is eugenics and is it 
still a threat today; can and should we protect future generations from 
genetic manipulation; is the human genome a ‘common heritage’; finally, 
is there anything special about genetic tests or is this all mere fear of our 
past? Should doctors order genetic tests as if they were ordering a 
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cholesterol test? Or are there indeed social, legal and ethical implications 
which other tests may not carry so strongly?  
 
We conclude that it is unlikely that eugenics will be used for racial 
genocide but that indeed the eugenics we may be facing today is more 
population-controlled than state-controlled. It is indeed subtler. Even the 
WHO hailed practices at eliminating genetic conditions that involved, 
amongst other methods, selective discard and selective abortion of 
affected fetuses. The question this raises is whether one particular genetic 
trait, which will cost society money, can be used to determine whether a 
person will live or not. Is a person valued for what s/he is, or for what s/he 
does or has in terms of genetic traits? Clearly for that part of society which 
upholds the dignity of the human being and personhood to be independent 
of what traits or disabilities s/he has, this is indeed eugenics hiding behind 
medical interventions. Whilst it is understandable that married couples 
should prefer healthy babies, this does not mean that those with disabling 
genetic traits are to be considered any less valuable human beings. 
 
But now a pertinent question brings itself forth. With the onset of genetic 
manipulation, should we protect our human genome as something that is 
ours and belongs to us intact? Should we transmit it to our future 
generations untouched? This is not an easy question. The difference 
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between gene -line from germ-line manipulation has been distinguished. 
Using genetics to manipulate our genes to produce humans with stronger 
muscles or better brains is still far away. There are more pressing issues. 
Rather than manipulating genes, we can select genes which in turn affect 
the gene-line. This human selection will oppose natural selection in a way 
which medicine has so far been unable to do. If we can identify embryos 
which are potentially better than others, then we can also select them. This 
search for the ‘perfect baby’, as proposed through pragmatic discussions 
has been analyzed. We conclude that if outright selecting one type of 
human over another does not fit into the definition of eugenics nothing 
else will. 
 
So we are not concerned with manipulating a gene for, say, Huntington’s 
disease. Indeed individuals may welcome a side effect in their family tree 
if they eliminate such a horrible condition through germ-line  
manipulation. More importantly, we should be concerned with screening 
and testing for conditions which may lead to eliminating persons. Of 
course this argument centers around to status of the embryo. It is not 
germ-line but gene-line that at the present seems to be subject to a threat. 
 
What is special about genetic tests is not merely their novelty but their 
predictive nature. This is also of concern to modern tests for predisposition 
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to disorders such as breast and colon cancer as well as heart disease. If 
these tests cannot lead to significant medical management, can they be 
detrimental to the individual? If a woman tests positive for BRCA her only 
option may be radical mastectomy with reconstructive surgery and 
removal of her ovaries. If she needs time to decide about this, being in 
itself only a predictive test, insurance may not give her cover for this 
management. Moreover she may lose cover for breast disease – the 
condition which she needs cover for most. Therefore whilst environment 
plays the key role in determining individuality, genetics establishes a 
range in which the environment can intervene. The social, legal and 
ethical implications of this have been considered too great to leave the 
question of genetic essentialism aside. 
 
But if eugenics and protecting future generations surrounds basic 
questions of status of the embryo and genetic essentialism, then we need a 
philosophical framework in which to discuss and move forward to 
resolving the pertinent issues. In this regard various philosophical 
approaches were discussed. We can conclude that although pragmatism 
and the principles-oriented approach have their value, they have been 
found lacking in providing a moral framework to answer our basic 
questions. In particular pragmatism tends to avoid or steer away from 
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fundamental issues, and principles are simply too general: one still needs 
more basic principles, such as respect for the status of the embryo. 
 
Conversely the phenomenological approach is stronger because it reflects 
the telos of medicine. Medicine does have its goals and genetic tests and 
screening should be understood within this aegis. The alternative would be 
to rest on socially constructed theories that (it has been argued) may have 
goals counter to what we mean to achieve by good medical practice. Thus 
even the symbiotic nature between industry and medicine can lead into 
dangerous grounds if the teleology of medicine is ignored. What is 
symbiotic can easily develop into a parasitic relationship of industry and 
economics against medicine and the ill. This would be exploiting the fear 
in human nature of disease to lure people into doing tests that they do not 
need. The aim of the test would simply be to sell it rather than use it only 
where it is necessary. The goals of the genetic industry may be different 
than those of medical genetics. 
 
Clearly more dialogue is needed. This has not really been achieved in 
bioethics today, which is finding itself in a quagmire of philosophical 
debate. Bioethics can easily become a ground of paper and position wars. 
It is developing in the journals; some of which refuse papers because they 
take certain positions rather than because of argument. Indeed bioethics 
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has become a field of the discussion of values: naturalistic on one side and 
liberal/pragmatic on the other; the religious versus the secular. 
 
The danger is that genetics is on our doorstep. People are already using 
tests. If bioethical debate, especially in the context of genetics, remains 
divided, then the rulers will be those who would use genetics to their own 
ends, ignoring whether these ends meet with the respect that the human 
being deserves. As bioethics involves not only philosophy but also legal 
and social debate, a new theological development has been discussed – 
especially because of its potential value in dialogue. This reflects a school 
of thought13 that is rediscovering Trinitarian theology in society today.  
 
If people in society cannot see eye to eye about God and hence about 
fundamental issues, it may be because we have unlearned how to discover 
God in our own interaction which each other, which forms the basis of the 
lived experience of the Trinity. A departure from fundamentalism and a 
commitment to pluralism is proposed. Whilst this may resound of 
pragmatic theories it is unlikely that Catholic doctrine will depart from 
issues of the moral status of the embryo and a commitment to life. For this 
dialogue to be successful conditions need to be met which go beyond 
articles in journals. Clearly this school of thought has to explore deeper 
                                                               
13 Scoula Abba, within the Catholic Lateran University in Rome 
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what departing from fundamentalism means (and this counts for all sides, 
including the pragmatist). To interact in a dialogue which searches the 
truth through an emptying of one’s preconceived ideas and a commitment 
to unifying oneself to a common ideal may then hold promise. 
 
On a more practical level, an approach has been suggested for reaching the 
masses in genetic counseling. Clearly the field of genetic research has 
entered the consumer industry and has outpaced the ethical debate. It is 
not only within the realm and aegis of family medicine to counsel about 
genetics, family doctors are numerous enough and are strategically placed 
to meet and counsel people. Their strategy lies in the fact that people go to 
them for all sorts of advice, often before committing themselves to buy a 
product. To this end colleges and associations of family doctors must see 
that refresher courses in counseling not only include the medical condition 
(and in so doing identifying those who would need more specialist 
counseling) but also impart the ethical, legal and social implications of 
genetic tests. 
 
Science is not the enemy and neither is genetic testing or screening. Man 
however can be his own worst enemy if he does not discern that when it 
comes to medicine, there are inherent goals embedded in the 
phenomenology of illness and the doctor patient relationship. If this is not 
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heeded he exposes himself to other forces (such as economic and free 
market) which will misdirect and abuse his inherent quest for health.   
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Samenvatting 
 
De algemene doelstelling van deze dissertatie is het bespreken en analyseren van de ethische 
problemen met betrekking tot genetisch screenen en testen. Doel hiervan is om na te gaan of 
screenen en testen inderdaad gevaren met zich meebrengen, zoals eugenetische praktijken en 
het benadelen van bepaalde groepen in de samenleving. Daarmee wordt een achtergrond 
geschetst voor een dialoog over het bereiken van gewenste doelstellingen. Genetica is al een 
eeuw lang onderwerp van discussie. Het begon met eugenetische praktijken die in sommige 
landen werden verwelkomd als de oplossing voor het verbeteren van de samenleving. Dit 
heeft uiteraard geleid tot een negatieve erfenis die zijn weerslag had op de moderne 
ontwikkelingen in de levenswetenschappen. Alle genetisch onderzoek en zelfs alle pogingen 
om heel specifieke genetische aandoeningen te verbeteren werden tengevolge daarvan 
omgeven met de aura van de holocaust. Eugenetica kreeg een negatieve betekenis.  We 
kunnen zelfs stellen dat met het ontdekken van de waarde van de menselijke persoon en de 
erkenning van het feit dat geen ras superieur is aan een ander, eugenetica, terecht, werd 
geassocieerd met een weg die we niet verder willen gaan.  
 
Deze dissertatie analyseert zo drie fundamentele problemen. Wat is eugenetica en vormt het 
vandaag de dag nog steeds een bedreiging? Kunnen en moeten we toekomstige generaties 
beschermen tegen genetische manipulatie? Is het menselijk genoom een ‘gemeenschappelijke 
erfenis’; en tenslotte, is er iets wat genetische tests bijzonder maakt, of is dit slechts louter 
angst uit het verleden? En deze laatste vraag behoeft weer antwoorden op de volgende: 
Moeten dokters op dezelfde wijze met genetische tests omgaan  als een cholesterolbepaling? 
Zijn er inderdaad sociale, juridische en ethische implicaties die andere tests in veel mindere 
mate hebben?  
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We concluderen dat het onwaarschijnlijk is dat eugenetica gebruikt zal gaan worden voor 
raciale genocide, maar ook dat de hedendaagse eugenetica meer gestuurd wordt door de 
algemene bevolking dan door de staat. Het is subtieler. Zelfs de WHO verwelkomde het 
uitroeien van genetische aandoeningen door, onder andere, embryoselectie en selectieve 
abortus. Dit roept de vraag op of een bepaald genetisch kenmerk, dat de maatschappij geld 
gaat kosten, gebruikt kan worden om te bepalen of een persoon al dan niet zal leven. Wordt 
een persoon gewaardeerd op grond van wat hij of zij is, of doet, of  heeft in termen van 
genetische afwijkingen? Het is duidelijk dat het deel van de samenleving, dat van mening is 
dat de waardigheid van de menselijke persoon en zijn persoon-zijn onafhankelijk zijn van 
welke eigenschap of handicap dan ook, dit inderdaad opvat als eugenetica verborgen in 
medische interventies. Het is begrijpelijk dat getrouwde paren de voorkeur geven aan gezonde 
baby’s, maar dit wil niet zeggen dat mensen met genetische kenmerken die worden 
geassocieerd met ziekte en handicap op enigerlei wijze minder waard zijn dan andere mensen. 
 
Een relevante vraag is nu de volgende: Moeten we, met de nieuwe mogelijkheden van 
genetische manipulatie, ons menselijk genoom beschermen als iets wat van ons is – in de 
samenstelling zoals het nu is? Dienen we ons genoom onaangetast aan toekomstige generaties 
door te geven? Dat is geen gemakkelijke vraag. Er is een onderscheid gemaakt tussen 
somatische  genetische manipulatie en kiembaan genetische manipulatie. Het gebruik van 
genetica om onze genen zo te manipuleren dat er mensen ontstaan met krachtiger spieren of 
betere hersenen is echter nog ver weg. Er zijn nu meer urgente problemen. In plaats van genen 
te manipuleren kunnen we genen selecteren – wat zijn invloed heeft op de kiembaan. Deze 
vorm van menselijke selectie komt dan te staan tegenover vormen van natuurlijke selectie op 
een wijze zoals de geneeskunde dat tot nu toe nog niet heeft kunnen doen. Als we embryo’s 
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kunnen identificeren die in potentie beter zijn dan andere, dan kunnen we ze ook selecteren. 
Deze zoektocht naar de ‘perfecte baby’ zoals deze in pragmatische discussies naar voren komt 
is geanalyseerd. Onze conclusie is dat, als het gericht selecteren  van één type mens boven een 
ander niet valt binnen de definitie van eugenetica, er niets anders is dat daar wel binnen valt. 
 
We houden ons daarom niet bezig met het manipuleren van een gen voor, bijvoorbeeld, de 
ziekte van Huntington. We zouden kunnen stellen dat individuen een negatief neveneffect in 
hun stamboom zelfs zouden verwelkomen als zij door genetische manipulatie een dergelijke 
verschrikkelijke ziekte kunnen elimineren. Het is echter belangrijker dat we ons bezighouden 
met het screenen en testen op aandoeningen dan met het elimineren van personen als gevolg 
van genetisch onderzoek. Natuurlijk is hierbij de morele status van het embryo een kernvraag. 
Het is momenteel niet genetische manipulatie van de kiembaan  maar genetische manipulatie 
door selectie die een bedreiging vormt. 
 
Wat genetische testen zo speciaal maakt is niet dat ze nieuw zijn, maar dat ze voorspellend 
van aard zijn. Dit geldt ook voor moderne genetische tests voor het opsporen van aanleg voor 
ziektes als borst- en colonkanker en hartziekten. Als ze echter niet kunnen leiden tot een 
significante verbetering van de medische behandeling voor deze aandoeningen, is de vraag of  
ze schadelijk zijn voor het individu. Als een testuitslag voor BRCA positief is dan is radicale 
mastectomie met  reconstructieve operaties en verwijdering van de ovaria voor een vrouw de 
enige optie. Als ze tijd nodig heeft om hierover te beslissen – het gaat immers over een 
predictieve test - kan het zijn dat de verzekeraar haar daarvoor niet de tijd gunt. Erger nog, ze 
kan onverzekerbaar zijn voor juist die aandoening waarvoor ze de verzekering het meeste 
nodig heeft. Dit laat zien dat, terwijl de omgeving een sleutelrol speelt bij het bepalen van 
individualiteit, de genetica het bereik bepaalt waarbinnen de omgeving kan interveniëren. De 
 4 
sociale, juridische en ethische implicaties hiervan zijn te groot om daarbij de kwestie van het 
genetisch essentialisme buiten beschouwing te laten.  
 
Maar indien eugenetica en de bescherming van toekomstige generaties kernvragen aangaande 
de morele status van het embryo en genetisch essentialisme oproept, dan hebben we een 
ethisch raamwerk nodig waarbinnen we deze kwesties kunnen bespreken en dat ons verder 
brengt met het beantwoorden van relevante vragen. Hiertoe zijn verschillende filosofische 
theorieën besproken, die leiden tot de conclusie dat, hoewel pragmatisme en de 
‘principebenadering’ hun waarde hebben, zij geen moreel raamwerk bieden om onze 
fundamentele vragen te beantwoorden. Met name het pragmatisme heeft de neiging 
fundamentele kwesties te vermijden of te omzeilen, en de principes zijn eenvoudigweg te 
algemeen. Men heeft nog steeds meer fundamentele basisprincipes nodig, zoals respect voor 
de morele status van het embryo.  
 
De fenomenologische benadering is daarentegen sterker omdat deze ook  reflectie over de 
telos van de geneeskunde insluit. De geneeskunde is gericht op specifieke doelen en genetisch 
testen en screenen dient binnen deze doelstellingen te worden begrepen. Het alternatief is om 
terug te vallen op sociaal geconstrueerde theorieën die (zo wordt beargumenteerd) 
doelstellingen kunnen hebben die juist ingaan tegen wat we verstaan onder ‘goed medisch 
handelen’. Zo kan zelfs de symbiose tussen industrie en geneeskunde gevaren in zich bergen 
als de teleologie van de geneeskunde wordt genegeerd.  Symbiose kan immers gemakkelijk 
leiden tot een parasitaire relatie van industrie en economie  met een negatieve uitwerking op 
geneeskunde en zieken. Het verleiden van mensen tot het ondergaan van tests die ze niet 
nodig hebben komt in feite neer op het exploiteren van de angst in de mens voor ziekte. Het 
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doel van de test zou daarmee eenvoudig zijn het verkopen ervan, in plaats van de test alleen 
daar te gebruiken waar het nodig is.   
 
Er is duidelijk meer dialoog nodig. Die wordt nog steeds niet werkelijk gevoerd binnen de 
huidige bio-ethiek, die zich in feite bevindt in een moeras van filosofische debatten. Bio-
ethiek kan daardoor gemakkelijk ontaarden in een papieren oorlog over uitgangspuntenDit 
proces is al zichtbaar in de tijdschriften: sommigen er van weigeren artikelen omdat daarin 
bepaalde standpunten worden verdedigd in plaats van de gebruikte argumenten te beoordelen. 
De bio-ethiek is zelfs een terrein geworden voor discussie over waarden. Naturalistische 
waarden aan de ene kant en liberaal/pragmatische aan de andere. Het religieuze tegenover het 
seculiere.  
 
Het gevaar is dat genetica al een impact heeft. Mensen maken al gebruik van tests. Als het 
bio-ethische debat, vooral binnen de context van de genetica, verdeeld blijft, dan zullen de 
overwinnaars diegenen zijn die de genetica tot hun eigen doel aanwenden, daarbij de vraag 
negerend of deze doelen wel voldoende rekening houden met het principe van eerbied voor de 
menselijke waardigheid. Aangezien de bio-ethiek niet alleen het filosofische, maar ook het 
juridische en sociale debat insluit, is een nieuwe theologische ontwikkeling besproken – met 
name vanwege de mogelijkheden tot dialoog die zij biedt. Het gaat hierbij om een wijze van 
denken die de trinitaire theologie in de hedendaagse samenleving opnieuw aan het ontdekken 
is.  
 
Als mensen in een samenleving elkaar niet meer verstaan als het over God of fundamentele 
vragen gaat, dan is dat wellicht omdat  we hebben afgeleerd hoe we God kunnen ontdekken in 
onze eigen interactie met elkaar – wat de basis vormt van de geleefde ervaring van de Drie-
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eenheid. Er wordt een voorstel gedaan om het pad van het fundamentalisme te verlaten en die 
van het pluralisme op te gaan. Hoewel dit mogelijk pragmatisch klinkt, is het niet 
waarschijnlijk dat de katholieke leer anders zal gaan denken over kwesties als de morele 
status van het embryo en de bescherming van het (menselijk) leven. Om deze dialoog toch 
succesvol te kunnen voeren moet er worden voldaan aan voorwaarden die verder gaan dan die 
waaraan artikelen in tijdschriften moeten voldoen. Duidelijk is dat men zich dan intensief 
dient bezig te houden met de vraag wat het betekent om het fundamentalisme op te geven (en 
dit geldt voor alle betrokkenen, inclusief het pragmatisme). Het deelnemen aan een dialoog 
die de waarheid zoekt door vooronderstellingen op te geven en die gericht is op het vinden 
van een gemeenschappelijk ideaal kan dan veelbelovend zijn. 
 
Op meer praktisch niveau is er een procedure voorgesteld om de grote massa te bereiken bij 
het genetisch counselen. Het is duidelijk dat genetische research deel is gaan uitmaken van de 
consumptieindustrie en dat het ethische debat daarbij achterloopt. Hier ligt daarom een taak 
voor huisartsen. Zij dienen zich niet te beperken tot genetisch counselen maar ook de patiënt 
te informeren over de genetische tests zelf. Er zijn voldoende huisartsen en deze bevinden 
zich op in een strategische positie om  mensen te zien en te counselen. Hun strategie is 
gebaseerd op het feit dat mensen naar hen toekomen voor allerlei soorten advies, vaak voordat 
ze besloten hebben een bepaald product te kopen. Om dit te bereiken moeten 
artsenopleidingen en verenigingen van huisartsen er op toezien dat bijscholingscursussen op 
het terrein van het counselen niet alleen gaan over de aandoening zelf, (waarbij ze kunnen 
nagaan wie er meer specialistische counseling nodig heeft), maar ook over de ethische, 
juridische en sociale implicaties van de tests zelf.  
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De wetenschap is niet de vijand en evenmin is dat genetisch screenen en testen. De mens is 
echter zelf zijn ergste vijand, als hij niet onderkent dat, wanneer het gaat over geneeskunde, er 
inherente doeleinden zijn die zijn ingebed in zowel de fenomenologie van ziekte als de arts-
patient relatie. Als hiermee geen rekening wordt gehouden, dan stelt hij zichzelf bloot aan 
andere krachten (zoals een economische en vrije markt), die zijn  inherente zoektocht naar 
gezondheid een verkeerde kant opsturen en er misbruik van maken. 
